Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law

Cleveland officers Kazimer and Crisan drove to an apartment complex to investigate a sighting of armed-robbery suspects. Seeing someone who matched the description, they gave chase. A resident slowed Kazimer, knowing the officer was chasing 16-year-old Juan, and told Kazimer about Juan’s disability, Down Syndrome. “Shut up, get out of my way,” Kazmier responded. Juan stopped running at the parking lot, where his family was waiting. Kazimer, who arrived seconds later, admits that he saw Juan “surrendering.” According to witnesses, Kazimer “grabbed Juan from behind, forcefully pulled him from his mother’s arms, and slammed him very hard into [a] vehicle.” He handcuffed Juan and used his 205-pound weight, twice Juan’s weight, “to pin Juan against the hot vehicle.” Juan was not resisting and was crying in pain. Kazimer reportedly kept Juan pinned 15 minutes, telling Juan’s parents that they were “lucky he didn’t shoot.” Crisan did nothing—except, according to witnesses, hurl racial slurs. When police dispatch radioed that the robbers had been apprehended, they released Juan. Juan allegedly suffered chest pains, abrasions, posttraumatic stress, and other medical complications. The court denied the officers’ qualified immunity motion with respect to Juan’s excessive-force claims and some state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the claims must go to a jury. View "Ortiz v. Kazimer" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, eight tenants were evicted from their respective homes for alleged violations of the Lansing Housing and Premises Code. Each eviction followed an inspection of the buildings conducted in conjunction with criminal drug investigations. Each inspector summarized his findings in an eviction “red-tag” notice form, which he gave to the tenant; none of the red-tags provided any information regarding the right to appeal and have an administrative hearing. Each stated: “You must contact the undersigned, no later than ... to set up an appointment to meet at the structure (to verify that all corrections have been completed) or to acquire an authorized extension. Before the re-inspection you must obtain all required permits and have those repairs inspected .... If you have any questions or concerns about complying within the time indicated, you may contact ….” None of the tenants filed an appeal within the 20-day period prescribed by the code. They later filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Inspectors’ qualified immunity defense with respect to the constitutional adequacy of the notice. Sixth Circuit precedent did not clearly establish that a notice of eviction must include a direct explanation of the post-deprivation appeals process. View "Gardner v. Evans" on Justia Law

Cabrera, indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after he procured a handgun for a confidential informant, claimed, in pre-trial motions and post-trial submissions, that law-enforcement agents had doctored an audio-tape recording of that transaction. Cabrera did not, however, testify in support of that theory. A jury found him guilty. At sentencing, the district judge announced that he was sentencing Cabrera to 63 months’ imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range, because Cabrera advanced a “fantastic” claim (that the tape was altered); and did not testify in support of that claim. Cabrera’s counsel raised no objection to his sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although the district judge seemed to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), his statements suggest that he misinterpreted the thrust of that statutory sentencing factor; he failed to substantiate his claim that Cabrera disrespected the law within the meaning of that factor so that Cabrera was punished for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to challenge the government’s case. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

In 2013 Ohio enacted Rev. Code 3503.06(C)(1)(a): “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state.” Non-profit organizations wrote to Secretary of State Husted, asking whether he planned to “reject[] petitions where the circulator is domiciled in a state other than Ohio[.]” “While a court may ultimately find this law unconstitutional,” Husted responded, “that determination is a decision for the judicial branch, not the Secretary of State… this office and county boards of election will implement this law like any other until such time as the legislature acts to make a statutory change or a court directs otherwise.” One of the non-profit groups hired a firm to gather signatures for an initiative petition, paying a higher-than-usual fee to ensure that the firm hired in-state signature gatherers. The organizations then sought a declaration that the residency requirement was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, and damages against Husted “as compensation for extra petition circulation charges.” The court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction and denied Husted’s qualified-immunity motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity ruling; the Secretary had no clearly established duty to decline enforcement of the properly enacted and presumptively constitutional statute. View "Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Three special-education students claimed that Kowalski abused her students during the 2003–2004 school year by, among other things, gagging one student with a bandana to stop him from spitting, strapping another to a toilet to keep her from falling from the toilet, and forcing another to sit with her pants down on a training toilet in full view of her classmates to assist her with toilet-training. They alleged that Kowalski’s supervisors were deliberately indifferent to this alleged abuse, and that North Point created an environment primed for abuse by its adoption of allegedly unconstitutional policies and practices. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants in the suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, because Kowalski’s instructional techniques, while inappropriate and even “abusive,” did not rise to the conscience-shocking level required of a substantive due process claim; because Kowalski’s supervisors had insufficient notice of her actions to be found deliberately indifferent; and because North Point’s policies and practices were not constitutionally inadequate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, as a matter of law, Kowalski’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Domingo v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

In 2005, Watkins was sentenced to 185-months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Watkins had three prior convictions: arson, felony escape, and voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After unsuccessful direct appeals and a post-conviction petition, which was rejected as untimely, Watkins sought authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an increased sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, stating that Johnson announced “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The residual clause defines the term “violent felony” to include a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” View "In re: Watkins" on Justia Law

When Michigan police officers arrested Bachynski on suspicion of murder, she invoked her right to remain silent and asked for an attorney. During later interactions between the officers and Bachynski, she changed her mind, eventually pointing to a detective and saying: “I want to talk to you.” She then waived her Miranda rights three times and confessed three times to a slew of crimes, including murder. A jury convicted her, and the state courts upheld the conviction over challenges to her confession. The federal district court granted her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the detectives impermissibly interrogated her without an attorney present. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the state courts reasonably construed the Supreme Court’s holdings in this area. Ample evidence rebutted showed that Bachynski voluntarily and knowingly waived her Miranda rights and there was ample, admissible evidence of her guilt even without the confession. View "Bachynski v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 2009, a first grade student complained to a teacher that her genitals hurt and the teacher sent her to the school nurse who visually inspected the girl. Plaintiff, the girl's mother, filed a money-damages action against the nurse and the school district for conducting a search in violation of her child’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court subsequently issued an injunction that required the school system to train its nurses more effectively to prevent incidents of this sort from happening again. The court reversed the injunction because: (1) the mother did not seek such an injunction; (2) the undisturbed (and now unappealed) jury verdict that no constitutional violation occurred eliminated the factual predicate for such an injunction; and (3) the mother (and daughter) lacked standing to obtain such an injunction anyway. The court directed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the school district. View "Hearring v. Sliwowski" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the father of Armetta Foster, filed suit against the deputy sheriff that shot and killed Armetta. On appeal, the deputy appealed the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that, even without the benefit of hindsight, a jury could reasonably conclude that neither the deputy nor anyone else was in danger when he shot thirteen or fourteen rounds at Armetta - eight of which actually struck her; the evidence also supports a finding that the deputy continued firing at her as she was driving away in the police vehicle and no one was in the cruiser's path; and the court has previously acknowledged that the danger presented when a suspect drives off in a stolen police car, without more, is not so grave as to justify the use of deadly force. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could conclude that the deputy's use of deadly force violated Armetta's clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of summary judgment. View "Foster v. Patrick" on Justia Law