Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law

An Ohio State Dental Board-recognized specialist must complete a postdoctoral education program in a specialty recognized by the American Dental Association and limit the scope of his practice to that specialty. The use of the terms “specialist”, “specializes” or “practice limited to” or the terms “orthodontist”, “oral and maxillofacial surgeon”, “oral and maxillofacial radiologist”, “periodontist”, “pediatric dentist”, “prosthodontist”, “endodontist”, “oral pathologist”, or “public health dentist” or similar terms is limited to licensed Board-recognized specialists.. Any general dentist who uses those terms in advertisements can have his dental license placed on probationary status, suspended, or revoked. Kiser, a licensed dentist with postdoctoral education in endodontics (root-canal procedures). does not to limit his practice exclusively to endodontics. The Board’s regulations treat him as a general dentist. He is banned from using the word “endodontist” in his advertisements. In 2009, the Board warned Kiser with respect to the regulations, but did not take further action. In 2012, Kiser requested that the Board review signage that would include the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” The Board neither approved nor rejected Kiser’s proposed signage, but recommended that he consult legal counsel. Kiser challenged the regulations as violating: the First Amendment right to commercial speech; substantive and procedural due process; and equal protection. The district court twice dismissed Kiser’s claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Kiser had stated viable claims with respect to the First Amendment, substantive due process, and equal protection. View "Kiser v. Kamdar" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party challenged Ohio’s ballot qualification law, Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1), arguing selective enforcement and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the law, a political party may qualify by obtaining at least “three percent of the total vote cast” for governor or president “at the most recent regular state election” or through a petition. A petition-formed party must nominate a candidate for the general election by petition, filed “[n]ot later than one hundred ten days before the” general election, and, for statewide offices, “signed by at least fifty qualified electors who have not voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the current year or the immediately preceding two calendar years.” For local office, five qualifying signatures are required. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Party did not establish state action with respect to its selective enforcement claim. The Party did not demonstrate that Ohio law deprives it of membership or affiliation in a general sense and was not severely burdened by the requirement that it select candidates by petition, rather than by primary. The state articulated a legitimate interest in its law, sufficient in light of the Party’s claimed burdens. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

In 2000, Embry pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. In calculating his sentencing range, the court treated him as a career offender based on prior convictions for robbery and wanton endangerment, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. In 2016, he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). The court of appeals may authorize a successive motion to vacate a sentence or conviction if the inmate “makes a prima facie showing” that his proposed claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Embry relied on the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson decision, later made retroactive, which voided for vagueness the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Johnson was sentenced under an identically worded clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court to be held in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court’s decision (next term) in Beckles v. United States. The court noted “respectable constitutional arguments that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the advisory Guidelines.” View "In re: Embry" on Justia Law

On April 28, 2010, Thompson was driving his car erratically on a two-lane Tennessee highway. After nearly colliding head-on with City of Lebanon Police Officer McKinley, Thompson sped away. McKinley gave chase, later joined by Officer McDannald. After approximately six minutes of high-speed driving, Thompson swerved, spun 360 degrees, and ran off the road into a ditch. McKinley ran toward Thompson’s crashed car and fired one round. McDannald then aimed at Thompson’s car and fired 13 rounds. The shooting ended within 19 seconds of the crash. Thompson sat behind the wheel of his vehicle the entire time and did not make any threatening moves. Thompson died at the scene, from gunshot wounds. In his estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the city summary judgment on Thompson’s claims of failure to screen, train, supervise, investigate, and discipline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a jury believed the plaintiff’s asserted facts, it could find that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing into Thompson’s vehicle and person violated his Fourth Amendment rights “when Thompson had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence.” View "Thompson v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Bickerstaff, a private investigator for Ohio criminal-defense law firms, was conducting an investigation on behalf of a defendant accused of breaking into the Harris house. After speaking with Harris, Bickerstaff received a phone call from Detective Lucarelli, telling her to discontinue her contacts with Harris. Bickerstaff claimed that Lucarelli was involved in a “personal and/or sexual relationship” with Harris, and with other female crime victims, based upon text messages and photos that Bickerstaff alleges were sent from Lucarelli’s cell phone. Bickerstaff alleged that Lucarelli’s supervisor and a fellow detective were aware of Lucarelli’s “improper relationships” and received sexually explicit pictures of and text messages concerning the victims from Lucarelli. Harris had filed a complaint, attached to a report prepared by Lucarelli, indicating that Harris had originally agreed to an interview but later felt harassed by Bickerstaff’s repeated calls and unannounced visit. Bickerstaff was indicted for intimidating a crime victim or witness and for telecommunications harassment. The charges were dismissed the following month.The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Bickerstaff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, retaliation, supervisory liability, municipal liability, civil conspiracy, and reckless, wanton, or willful conduct, calling the allegations “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” not sufficient to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli" on Justia Law

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law