Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Michigan charged and tried the named plaintiffs as adults for acts they committed while under the age of 18. Each received a conviction for first-degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2010, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan statutory scheme that barred them from parole eligibility. Since then, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama (2012), “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” Michigan amended its juvenile offender laws in light of Miller, but made some changes contingent upon either the Michigan Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court announcing that Miller applied retroactively, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), that Miller’s prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders is retroactive. The district court held, in 2013, that Miller should apply retroactively and issued an injunction requiring compliance with Miller. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of remedies in the context of the new legal landscape and to determine whether class certification is required to extend relief to non-plaintiffs. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

HCEA was recognized under the Tennessee Education Professional Negotiations Act (EPNA) as the exclusive representative of Hamilton County Board of Education professional employees. In 2011, HCEA and the Board entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), to expire in June 2014. While this agreement was in effect, Tennessee enacted the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act, replacing EPNA. PECCA would not govern the parties’ relationship until the expiration of their existing agreement. HCEA and the Board entered into the latest version of their CBA under EPNA in September 2013. PECCA created a new category: “management team” members, including principals and assistant principals, no longer considered “professional employees” entitled to participate in concerted activities as part of professional employee organizations. PECCA also made it unlawful for a professional employee organization to “[c]oerce or attempt to intimidate professional employees who choose not to join a professional employee organization.” Communications following HCEA’s September 2013 monthly meeting resulted in a Board letter, requesting that HCEA “refrain from … negative or coercive statements.” HCEA filed suit, alleging violation of EPNA and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment favoring the Board. EPNA claims were not rendered moot by PECCA’s intervening effective date, but the letter did not violate EPNA. It contained no threat of reprisal and did not significantly burden HCEA’s expressive activity. View "Hamilton Cnty. Ed. Ass'n. v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Horvath died after being beaten and stabbed by his cellmate, Gillespie, inside the mental-health ward of Michigan’s Wayne County Jail. Richko, as representative of Horvath’s estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, claiming that Wayne County and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Horvath’s safety. Richko alleged that the defendants knew or should have known about Gillespie’s dangerous and violent propensities and disregarded the risk by allowing Gillespie to be placed in Horvath’s cell and failing to adequately respond to the ensuing assault. The district court denied summary judgment to all of the defendants. The individual defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Faced with competing circumstantial evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that jail personnel were aware of the risk and did in fact hear Gillespie’s assault on Horvath and elected not to respond. View "Richko v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Smith and Johnston divorced; they had two daughters Tiffany, aged 9-11 and Jasmine, 13-15 years old. In March 2012, police entered, purportedly at the invitation of a guest, after child services reported that Smith was possibly intoxicated and unable to care for her children. Another time, Johnston called 9-1-1 after Tiffany told him, by telephone, that a man was in Smith’s house and was making her uncomfortable. Tiffany opened the door and stated that her mother and the unknown man were in an upstairs bedroom. Smith disputes the officers’ assertion that they were visibly drunk and did not comply with repeated requests to leave the bedroom. The officers arrested Smith for obstructing official business. The criminal charge was later dropped. At a later date, Tiffany called 9-1-1, saying that her mother had threatened to kill her; officers mediated the dispute and left. On another date, Johnston took his daughter to a police station, where he showed a bruise on her head. Tiffany reported that Smith had struck her several times. Smith denied hitting Tiffany, who changed her story. Smith, an attorney, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to claims of an unlawful entry in March 2012, and an unlawful arrest following Johnston’s 9-1-1 call, but otherwise affirmed dismissal. View "Smith v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Police arrested men suspected of committing armed robberies at Detroit-area stores. One confessed that the group had robbed nine stores in Michigan and Ohio in 2010-2011, supported by a shifting collection of 15 drivers and lookouts. He gave the FBI the cell phone numbers of other participants; the FBI reviewed his call records and obtained orders under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), for release of records for 16 numbers, including “[a]ll subscriber information, toll records and call detail records including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from" the phones for relevant dates and “cell site information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination” to obtain evidence against Sanders, Carpenter and others. The government charged Carpenter with six, and Sanders with two, Hobbs Act counts, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and aiding the use or carriage of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), 1951(a). The records showed that each used his cellphone within one-half-to-two miles of several robberies while the robberies occurred. A jury convicted on all of the Hobbs Act counts and convicted Carpenter on all but one of the gun counts. The court sentenced Carpenter to 1,395 months’ and Sanders to 170 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge. The content of a communication is protected by the Fourth Amendment; routing information necessary to convey it is not. The court distinguished between GPS tracking and the far less precise phone locational information. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Smith pled guilty to two counts of possessing firearms as a felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and to other federal crimes and was sentenced to 200 months in prison. Smith challenged the enhancement of his sentence under the enumerated-offenses clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), under which a person who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and has three previous convictions for a violent felony shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, a “violent felony” includes a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves [the] use of explosives.” Smith argued cited the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidating a different ACCA clause, the residual clause, as unconstitutionally vague. That clause includes as a “violent felony” a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Limiting language in the Johnson opinion makes clear that its holding does not extend to the enumerated-offenses clause. The enumerated-offenses clause gives ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told ATF agent Kloostra that a man called “D” was selling cocaine out of a particular Flint residence. Kloostra later observed, first-hand, as Dionte Jones emerged from the house, got into a car registered to an owner at that residence, drove to the site of a prearranged drug deal, and sold cocaine to the informant, whom Kloostra had known for two years. Kloostra promptly obtained a search warrant for the house, where agents found cocaine, guns, scales, and cash. The district court later granted Jones’s motion to suppress all this evidence, finding that Kloostra’s affidavit in support of the warrant application did not support the state judge’s finding of probable cause. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court’s mistake was to think of this case as one where the police conducted a search based on an informant’s tip alone: the warrant was actually based on Kloostra’s own observations more than it was the informant’s. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Binford, convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and of possessing with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D), was given an enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, Binford appealed, arguing that his sentencing-guidelines range was substantially increased based on an identical provision in the Sentencing Guidelines that is also void. The Sixth CIrcuit affirmed Binford’s convictions, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress evidence and incriminating statements under the exclusionary rule. An interrogation on Binford, in his bathroom while the search was in progress, lasted a short time and was not prolonged or repeated. While Binford said he was scared, he did not say he was scared into making the statements. An officer’s statement that he could help Binford if he cooperated did not amount to the level of police coercion required to suppress the statements. Binford knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Binford" on Justia Law

Memphis Officers Dunaway and McMillen were at the Northside Market. Vanterpool, a black male, pulled up to the gas pumps, driving a purple 1993 Caprice. He attempted to pump gas, but the pump was turned off. He went inside and spoke to the clerk. He returned and began pumping gas. The officers also exited the Market. Dunaway, looking toward the pumps, made a call on his cellular phone to Officer Brooks, who stated that the purple Chevrolet was the vehicle he had followed the day before and had expired tags, not registered to that vehicle. Brooks had lost sight of the vehicle. Vanterpool finished pumping gas. The officers approached. Vanterpool began driving away. McMillen jumped in front of Vanterpool’s vehicle with his gun drawn. The officers fired seven shots into the vehicle, which stopped across from the Market. Vanterpool died as a result of the shooting. His estate sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging a link between the Department's deficient policies and customs and the violation of Vanterpool’s constitutional rights. The court denied a motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claim, concluding that the complaint alleged facts supporting that MPD Director Armstrong “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the qualified immunity defense. View "Peatross v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

All American, a health agency, purportedly provided a range of therapy-related services at the homes of patients and submitted claims to Medicare for the cost therapy services that were medically unnecessary and not provided. According to the government, its office manager, Mahbub, specifically created, fabricated and falsified medical and billing documents. All American was paid $5,809,435.74 by Medicare for home-health services between September 2008 and November 2009. In 2013, a jury convicted Mahbub of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1349, and Mahbub was sentenced to 46 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit remanded, based on a Batson challenge, “for a proper determination of whether there is an inference that the government engaged in purposeful discrimination,” but otherwise affirmed. The government had challenged a prospective juror (Syed), alleged to be the only Muslim on the panel, but had claimed that the challenge was based on Syed’s response to a question about “younger people” becoming “caught up” in criminal activity. The court rejected challenges to a jury instruction and to the sentence. View "United States v. Mahbub" on Justia Law