Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Collazo was driving on I-40. His wife, Cinthia, was the passenger. Officer Hill initiated a traffic stop after concluding that Collazo’s van was following too closely. Hill observed a jar of what appeared to be urine between the seats and Cinthia behaving erratically. Collazo said that Cinthia might be on pain medication due to recent surgeries. Hill concluded the traffic stop 21 minutes after it began. Collazo remained by the patrol car chatting for another eight minutes, until Officer Montgomery returned with Cinthia’s purse. Montgomery had asked Cinthia if she was nervous because something illegal was in the van. She hesitated, so he asked, “is it a lot?” Cinthia said that it was a lot and handed over her purse, where Montgomery discovered a prescription bottle for Suboxone and several loose Suboxone strips. Hill returned to the van and received Cinthia’s consent to search. Hill did not ask for or obtain written consent, despite the West Tennessee Drug Task Force’s policy. The officers discovered three kilograms of cocaine in the van approximately 90 minutes into the stop. A later search, following an attempted controlled delivery of the cocaine to its intended recipient, revealed 14 kilograms more. After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, Collazo pled guilty to conspiracy to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. 2. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taken together, the circumstances provided ample evidence to conclude that the officers possessed probable cause to search Collazo’s van. View "United States v. Collazo" on Justia Law

DS attended Rutledge School, 2010-2012 as a seventh and eighth grader, where he was was involved in several verbal and physical altercations with other students. DS and his mother repeatedly complained to school officials that other students were bullying DS. School officials investigated these complaints, disciplined the students found culpable, and took other proactive measures such as placing DS in different classes from his alleged harassers. Despite these efforts, DS continued to have problems with other students, culminating in an attack in the school bathroom that led DS to transfer to another school. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and deprivation of DS’s constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no evidence concerning how the defendants treated other students—male or female, heterosexual or homosexual—who similarly complained about bullying. “The law does not require that [defendants] . . . have a pleasant demeanor” in responding to harassment, but only that they respond to it in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable; the defendants acted on DS’s complaints. There was no state-created danger, nor any special duty to protect. View "Stiles v. Grainger County, Tenn." on Justia Law

In 2010 the IRS began to pay unusual attention to applications for exemption from federal taxes under Internal Revenue Code 501(c) coming from groups with certain political affiliations. It used "inappropriate criteria" to identify organizations with "Tea Party’" in their names, expanded the criteria to include "Patriots and 9/12," and gave heightened scrutiny to organizations concerned with “government spending, government debt or taxes,” “lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live[,]’” or “criticiz[ing] how the country is being run[.]” The IRS used a “‘Be On the Lookout’ listing” for more than 18 months. Applicants flagged by the criteria were sent to a “team of specialists,” where they experienced significant delays and requests for unnecessary information. The IRS demanded that many groups provide names of donors; a list of issues important to the organization and its position regarding such issues; and political affiliations. After the release of the Inspector General’s report, the plaintiffs sued, citing the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibition on the unauthorized inspection of confidential “return information,” 26 U.S.C. 6103(a), 7431. Plaintiffs sought discovery of basic information relevant to class certification. The district court ordered production of “Lookout” lists. A year later, the IRS had not complied, but sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied that petition and ordered the IRS to comply. View "United States v. NorCal Tea Party Patriots" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams’s kidnapping conviction, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. In 2003, Adams filed an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, Adams filed a federal habeas petition, challenging the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. In 2013, the district court denied Adams’s motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Glossip v. Gross. The court rejected arguments that requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial and that Ohio’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the stun belt inflicted no harm, was unknown to the jury, and was necessary because Adams had threatened bodily harm and posed a risk for escape, View "Adams v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Nashville Officer Ranney’s confidential informant arranged to meet a suspected drug dealer to purchase cocaine. The informant parked in the lot at the expected time, with officers watching. Another car (matching the description provided) pulled next to the informant’s vehicle, then pulled away. Ranney did not see anything indicating a drug sale. Officers followed the car. The driver, without signaling, turned left into an apartment complex. Ranney activated his lights, stopping the car. In response to a question, the suspect, Pittman, confessed that there was cocaine in the car. Police recovered cocaine and a digital scale and found $1000 in Pittman’s pocket. An officer read Pittman his Miranda rights. Pittman suggested that there might be something at his house and signed a consent document. Police searched his house, recovering two firearms. Ranney administered Miranda warnings again. Pittman admitted that he had purchased both guns. The court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that failing to signal provided probable cause for the stop and that Pittman consented to the search of his home. After five lawyers withdrew, the court found that Pittman had “effectively waived his right to counsel” and appointed stand-by counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and for distributing cocaine, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 235-month sentence, the lowest point on the guidelines range. View "United States v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Ronald Davis, the owner of a corporation, was liable for over $1 million in unpaid federal employment taxes and penalties. After demands for payment went unanswered, the government filed suit against Ronald to reduce its tax assessments to judgment and sought to enforce its tax liens through the sale of the primary residence of Ronald and his wife, Diane. The government named Diane, who did not owe any unpaid taxes, as a defendant in the action because she had an interest in the properties. The district court issued an order of sale authorizing the sale of the primary residence. Diane appealed, arguing (1) the district court should have allowed the government to sell only Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale violated 26 U.S.C. 7403 and the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of sale, holding (1) the district court did not err when it declined to limit the government to the sale of Ronald’s interest in the property; and (2) the order of sale did not violate section 7403 or the Just Compensation Clause. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (African-American adult males), and adult female friends, some of whom were Caucasian, walked past the Police Department’s EDU precinct, leaving the nearby Entertainment District. They had spent the evening socializing and drinking alcohol. Off-duty officers, including Flake (an African-American), had congregated in the EDU parking lot to socialize; some were drinking alcohol, as is commonplace at precincts throughout Memphis. Flake approached the plaintiffs and, telling them to move along, referred to their companions as “snow bunnies,” a racial slur. Plaintiff McDonald responded: “Who the fuck are you?” As the group walked away, Flake yelled, “I’m going to show y’all who I am,” and attacked McDonald. Other officers joined in, shouting “Stop resisting arrest!” McDonald’s injuries resulted in $7,000 in medical bills. Plaintiffs were taken into custody and transported to a hospital. Charges of resisting official detention, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct were later dismissed. The Inspectional Services Bureau found that the officers had used excessive force and violated departmental policies. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied defendants’ motions seeking summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of qualified immunity claims and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment on municipal liability. Citing “the defendants’ disregard for the governing law and the particular circumstances,” the court awarded sanctions. View "McDonald v. Flake" on Justia Law

Ohio prohibited persons from disseminating false information about a political candidate in campaign materials during the campaign season “knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.” Ohio Rev. Code 3517.21(B)(10), specifically prohibiting false statements about a candidate’s voting record. The statute established a multi-step complaint process involving the Elections Commission, culminating in referral to a prosecutor. If convicted in subsequent state court proceedings, violators could be sentenced to prison or fined. In 2010, then-Congressman Driehaus filed a complaint alleging that SBA issued a press release accusing him of voting for “taxpayer-funded abortion” by voting for the Affordable Care Act. The Commission issued a probable cause finding. SBA sued Driehaus and state officials. That case was consolidated with a similar case, adding the Commission as a defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court found the case ripe as a facial challenge, despite the dismissal of Commission proceedings. On remand, the district court granted SBA summary judgment, holding that Ohio’s political false statement laws were content-based restrictions that fail strict scrutiny review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the laws as content-based restrictions that burden core protected political speech, not narrowly tailored to achieve state interests in promoting fair elections. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this. Before Brown retrieved his license and registration, they ordered him out of the car. Brown complied. During a pat-down, Officer Chapman hit Brown in the neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. Chapman tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught and wrestled him down, tasering him. The officers handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before reaching the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M., arrived at 9:07 P.M., found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse, and was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to the officers on plaintiff’s claim that the officers stopped Brown’s vehicle without probable cause, holding that the city is not liable on that claim; reversed summary judgment to Chapman on plaintiff’s claim that use of a taser constituted excessive force, stating that the city is liable on that claim; and reversed summary judgment to an officer on plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law