Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines’ busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an “imminent hazard” to public safety based on its finding that the “unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death.” The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; “Bivens” claims were time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Tessier was on probation for a 2011 Tennessee felony conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor. His probation order contained a “standard” search condition that applied to all probationers in Tennessee: “I agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time.” After being subjected to a search that was not otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion, Tessler unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of child pornography and pled guilty to child pornography charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the totality-of-the-circumstances reasonableness approach employed by the Supreme Court. View "United States v. Tessier" on Justia Law

Ohio elects its state judges through a hybrid process. Judicial candidates are first selected through partisan primary elections. On the general-election ballot, their names show no partisan affiliation, even though judicial candidates may affiliate with political parties throughout their campaigns. The Ohio Democratic Party, three individuals who were candidates for state court judgeships in the 2010 election, and a statewide labor organization, challenged the law’s constitutionality as burdening their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by precluding candidates from being associated with their political parties in the general election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The burden is minimal and is outweighed by Ohio’s interest in minimizing partisanship in judicial elections. Judicial candidates are not restricted from associating with political parties in other contexts. Political parties may even communicate with voters outside of polling places on the day of the general election and distribute sample ballots identifying their preferred candidates, which voters may take with them into the voting booth. View "Ohio Council 8 v. Husted" on Justia Law

Convicted-felon Houston resided on a farm containing signs critical of government and depicting the dead bodies of an officer and his companion. Houston and his brother (Leon) were acquitted of those murders. The farm is not enclosed. The Roane Sheriff’ informed ATF that Houston possessed firearms. ATF attempted drive-by surveillance. Later, at the direction of ATF and without a warrant, the utility company installed a surveillance camera on a utility pole 200 yards from Leon’s trailer, which broadcast recordings. An ATF agent testified that the captured footage was identical to what he would have observed by driving down public roads. After 10 weeks of warrantless monitoring, ATF obtained a warrant on the same day that the Sixth Circuit expressed “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term warrantless surveillance of an individual’s backyard via a pole camera. Weeks later, agents arrested Houston, away from the farm. No firearms were found on his person. Agents executed warrants for the farm and seized 17 firearms from Houston’s house, five from Leon’s trailer, and three from Leon’s person. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Houston’s conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Use of the camera did not violate Houston’s reasonable expectations of privacy because it recorded the view as seen by passersby on public roads. The court also rejected challenges to his classification as a “prohibited person” and to the reasonableness of his 108-month sentence. View "United States v. Houston" on Justia Law

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law

Cleveland officers Kazimer and Crisan drove to an apartment complex to investigate a sighting of armed-robbery suspects. Seeing someone who matched the description, they gave chase. A resident slowed Kazimer, knowing the officer was chasing 16-year-old Juan, and told Kazimer about Juan’s disability, Down Syndrome. “Shut up, get out of my way,” Kazmier responded. Juan stopped running at the parking lot, where his family was waiting. Kazimer, who arrived seconds later, admits that he saw Juan “surrendering.” According to witnesses, Kazimer “grabbed Juan from behind, forcefully pulled him from his mother’s arms, and slammed him very hard into [a] vehicle.” He handcuffed Juan and used his 205-pound weight, twice Juan’s weight, “to pin Juan against the hot vehicle.” Juan was not resisting and was crying in pain. Kazimer reportedly kept Juan pinned 15 minutes, telling Juan’s parents that they were “lucky he didn’t shoot.” Crisan did nothing—except, according to witnesses, hurl racial slurs. When police dispatch radioed that the robbers had been apprehended, they released Juan. Juan allegedly suffered chest pains, abrasions, posttraumatic stress, and other medical complications. The court denied the officers’ qualified immunity motion with respect to Juan’s excessive-force claims and some state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the claims must go to a jury. View "Ortiz v. Kazimer" on Justia Law

In 2009-2010, eight tenants were evicted from their respective homes for alleged violations of the Lansing Housing and Premises Code. Each eviction followed an inspection of the buildings conducted in conjunction with criminal drug investigations. Each inspector summarized his findings in an eviction “red-tag” notice form, which he gave to the tenant; none of the red-tags provided any information regarding the right to appeal and have an administrative hearing. Each stated: “You must contact the undersigned, no later than ... to set up an appointment to meet at the structure (to verify that all corrections have been completed) or to acquire an authorized extension. Before the re-inspection you must obtain all required permits and have those repairs inspected .... If you have any questions or concerns about complying within the time indicated, you may contact ….” None of the tenants filed an appeal within the 20-day period prescribed by the code. They later filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Inspectors’ qualified immunity defense with respect to the constitutional adequacy of the notice. Sixth Circuit precedent did not clearly establish that a notice of eviction must include a direct explanation of the post-deprivation appeals process. View "Gardner v. Evans" on Justia Law

Cabrera, indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after he procured a handgun for a confidential informant, claimed, in pre-trial motions and post-trial submissions, that law-enforcement agents had doctored an audio-tape recording of that transaction. Cabrera did not, however, testify in support of that theory. A jury found him guilty. At sentencing, the district judge announced that he was sentencing Cabrera to 63 months’ imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range, because Cabrera advanced a “fantastic” claim (that the tape was altered); and did not testify in support of that claim. Cabrera’s counsel raised no objection to his sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although the district judge seemed to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), his statements suggest that he misinterpreted the thrust of that statutory sentencing factor; he failed to substantiate his claim that Cabrera disrespected the law within the meaning of that factor so that Cabrera was punished for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to challenge the government’s case. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

In 2013 Ohio enacted Rev. Code 3503.06(C)(1)(a): “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state.” Non-profit organizations wrote to Secretary of State Husted, asking whether he planned to “reject[] petitions where the circulator is domiciled in a state other than Ohio[.]” “While a court may ultimately find this law unconstitutional,” Husted responded, “that determination is a decision for the judicial branch, not the Secretary of State… this office and county boards of election will implement this law like any other until such time as the legislature acts to make a statutory change or a court directs otherwise.” One of the non-profit groups hired a firm to gather signatures for an initiative petition, paying a higher-than-usual fee to ensure that the firm hired in-state signature gatherers. The organizations then sought a declaration that the residency requirement was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, and damages against Husted “as compensation for extra petition circulation charges.” The court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction and denied Husted’s qualified-immunity motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity ruling; the Secretary had no clearly established duty to decline enforcement of the properly enacted and presumptively constitutional statute. View "Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted" on Justia Law