Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

“Overwhelming evidence” established that brothers Eric and Carlos ran a lucrative Detroit narcotics and money-laundering conspiracy. After an Arizona DEA investigation snared a middleman (Morawa), who had received large quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin from Mexico and arranged the transportation of drugs and cash to and from customers in the midwest. Morawa cooperated with the government. Detroit DEA agents gathered evidence by: obtaining warrants for prospective real-time cell-phone location data; using a cell-site simulator to identify unknown cell phones used by the suspects; placing a GPS tracking device on Eric’s pickup truck; and monitoring cameras installed on public utility poles near “stash” locations. The surveillance led agents to request that the Michigan State Police make traffic stops that resulted in the seizure of drugs and cash. Defendants did not challenge the validity of the stops, but argued that the evidence should be suppressed as fruit of earlier illegal searches or seizures. The court denied defendants’ motions to suppress; struck the brothers' motions claiming to revoke their citizenship and terminate the court’s power; and denied motions to proceed pro se. While the jury was deliberating, Carlos, Eric, and Proge fled. They were convicted on drug, firearms, and money-laundering counts and subsequently apprehended. They received life sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of the motions to suppress that had been based on challenges to the DEA surveillance tactics. The court remanded in part, finding error in the court’s denial of a request, by Proge’s counsel, to withdraw. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

Moody, engaged in harness racing, is the horse trainer of record for his family farm. The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) suspended Moody’s father, John, in 2010. John publicly criticized and sued the MGCB. An anonymous email led to MGCB’s investigation into whether Moody was only a “paper trainer” for John. When Moody attempted to apply for 2013 licensing, he was disqualified. In January 2013, a consent order was prepared that would have allowed Moody to begin participating in racing in March 2013, but it required Moody to agree not to take legal action against MGCB. Moody did not sign the order; he remained disqualified for six months. In September 2013, Moody was told that he could apply for licensure without any conditions. The ALJ dismissed the case. In 2015, Moody filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation in his disqualification due to his father’s lawsuit, and that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests in his right to engage in harness-racing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. MGCB was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity; neither MGCB nor the individual defendants in their official capacities were “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Moody lacked third-party standing for a First Amendment claim because failed to show a hindrance to his father’s ability to protect his own rights. Moody did not have a liberty interest in his license and was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

In 2000, Leonard followed his former fiancé, Flick, to her home, where he handcuffed Flick and pointed a gun as Flick called to tell Gries that she was not coming to his house. Gries determined that she was in danger. Gries and Minges rushed to Flick’s house. When Leonard heard Gries’s truck, he shot Flick three times in the head, then fired through the door, striking Gries. Gries and Minges left to call the police. Leonard fled. He later surrendered and, in custody, gave a taped confession to Flick’s murder, to attempting to have sex with Flick while she was restrained, and to shooting at Gries and Minges. The defense’s theory was that Leonard was trying to salvage his relationship with Flick, had not intended to kill her, and had not acted with prior calculation. A jury found Leonard guilty of aggravated murder, kidnapping, attempted rape, and felonious assault, but acquitted Leonard of rape and attempted murder. The court imposed a death sentence. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. His state post-conviction efforts were unsuccessful. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Leonard sought federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, rejecting arguments concerning: the court’s decision to have Leonard wear a stun belt; alleged prosecutorial misconduct; an alleged conflict of interest involving counsel; ineffective assistance in investigation and failure to impeach Gries and Minges; Ohio’s death penalty scheme; sufficiency of the evidence for an attempted rape conviction; and Ohio’s post-conviction process. View "Leonard v. Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary" on Justia Law

Before 2013, the surviving spouse of a member of Chattanooga’s Fire and Police Pension Fund could receive benefits after the member died without incurring a proportional reduction in the member’s lifetime benefits. In 2012, the city removed this “default death benefit” for members who were not eligible to retire as of January 1, 2013. Dodd was not eligible to retire on that date and opted for a five-percent reduction in current, lifetime benefits so that his wife could receive an additional benefit upon his death. Dodd sued, asserting claims under the federal Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Takings Clause, and Tennessee’s Law of the Land Clause. Dodd also argued that the 2012 amendment was not validly enacted under local law. The district court granted the city summary judgment on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because Dodd does not have a contract or property right to the default death benefit, his constitutional claims fail. Although Dodd’s interest in some future benefits vested after 10 years of service, but Dodd did not become entitled to the default death benefit when he hit 10 years. Dodd’s challenge to the validity of the amendment’s enactment is also without merit. View "Dodd v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Hilliard (age 19) was a prostitute staying at a Madison Heights, Michigan Motel 6 while Officer Wolowiec was conducting a narcotics investigation. Wolowiece saw a bag of marijuana through Hilliard’s open window. Wolowiece and Officer Koehler initiated a “knock and talk.” Hilliard consented to the officers entering her room. Hilliard asked whether she could “work off” the possession charge. Hilliard called her drug dealer, Raqib, and ordered drugs. Wolowiec planned to have officers intercept Raqib before he arrived. Hilliard signed a confidential informant form, which provided that the “Department will use all reasonable means to protect your identity; however, this cannot be guaranteed.” Wolowiec asked Hilliard whether she was afraid that Raqib would hurt her. She responded “No.” Wolowiec nonetheless removed her from the hotel. Koehler made a traffic stop and conducted a canine search of Raqib’s car. Wolowiec later told Raqib’s passenger, Clark, that he had ordered the drugs. Wolowiec testified that he did not think this would reveal Hilliard as the informant. After the arrests, Wolowiec told Hilliard that Raqib and Clark believed she had set them up. Clark later testified that Wolowiec told her that Hilliard set up Raqib and that she relayed the information to Raqib. Raqib stated that Clark told him that Hilliard informed on him. Days later, Raqib and an accomplice murdered Hilliard. Hilliard’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment of qualified immunity. A reasonable jury could find that Wolowiec acted with deliberate indifference when he told Clark that Hilliard set up Raqib. View "Nelson v. City of Madison Heights" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

Decatur County Sheriff’s Department Officer Jones conducted a controlled buy of marijuana on May 22, 2013, through a confidential informant (CI) as part of a county-wide drug–bust operation. A warrant issued for Sanders's arrest and she turned herself in, but the state later dismissed the charges against her due to misidentification. Sanders filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for malicious prosecution, alleging that Jones prepared a misleading police report and gave false grand jury testimony identifying Sanders as the person who sold the CI drugs. Jones moved for summary judgment on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. The district court denied both defenses. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones’s absolute immunity defense presented a question of first impression about how the Supreme Court’s provision of absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses in Rehberg v. Paulk (2012), intersected with the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that an indicted plaintiff present evidence that the defendant provided false testimony to the grand jury. The court concluded that Rehberg’s absolute immunity for false grand jury testimony precludes Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim because she cannot rebut the indictment’s presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s grand jury testimony. View "Sanders v. Jones" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

Death-row inmates challenged Ohio’s protocols for lethal injunction. In 2014, Ohio amended Ohio Revised Code 149.43, creating sections 2949.221 and 2949.222, to prohibit the release of information identifying the manufacturer or supplier of drugs for use in Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol. The district court granted defendants a protective order to prevent the release of any information in their possession that could identify the sources of Ohio’s lethal-injection drugs. Plaintiffs sought a modification that would permit limited disclosures to counsel only under the designation “attorney’s eyes only.” The district court denied the motion, noting that “disclosure of identities subjects the disclosed persons or entities to suit” and that “confidential information has appeared in the media.” The parties notified the court that Ohio plans to move forward with scheduled executions, starting in January 2017. Defendants represented that they intend to use a new three-drug protocol, mirroring the Oklahoma protocol approbated by the Supreme Court in 2015. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the protective order. Defendants established good cause for protection from certain discovery. The protective order does not prevent plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims. View "Fears v. Kasich" on Justia Law