Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Hilliard (age 19) was a prostitute staying at a Madison Heights, Michigan Motel 6 while Officer Wolowiec was conducting a narcotics investigation. Wolowiece saw a bag of marijuana through Hilliard’s open window. Wolowiece and Officer Koehler initiated a “knock and talk.” Hilliard consented to the officers entering her room. Hilliard asked whether she could “work off” the possession charge. Hilliard called her drug dealer, Raqib, and ordered drugs. Wolowiec planned to have officers intercept Raqib before he arrived. Hilliard signed a confidential informant form, which provided that the “Department will use all reasonable means to protect your identity; however, this cannot be guaranteed.” Wolowiec asked Hilliard whether she was afraid that Raqib would hurt her. She responded “No.” Wolowiec nonetheless removed her from the hotel. Koehler made a traffic stop and conducted a canine search of Raqib’s car. Wolowiec later told Raqib’s passenger, Clark, that he had ordered the drugs. Wolowiec testified that he did not think this would reveal Hilliard as the informant. After the arrests, Wolowiec told Hilliard that Raqib and Clark believed she had set them up. Clark later testified that Wolowiec told her that Hilliard set up Raqib and that she relayed the information to Raqib. Raqib stated that Clark told him that Hilliard informed on him. Days later, Raqib and an accomplice murdered Hilliard. Hilliard’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment of qualified immunity. A reasonable jury could find that Wolowiec acted with deliberate indifference when he told Clark that Hilliard set up Raqib. View "Nelson v. City of Madison Heights" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

Decatur County Sheriff’s Department Officer Jones conducted a controlled buy of marijuana on May 22, 2013, through a confidential informant (CI) as part of a county-wide drug–bust operation. A warrant issued for Sanders's arrest and she turned herself in, but the state later dismissed the charges against her due to misidentification. Sanders filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for malicious prosecution, alleging that Jones prepared a misleading police report and gave false grand jury testimony identifying Sanders as the person who sold the CI drugs. Jones moved for summary judgment on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. The district court denied both defenses. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones’s absolute immunity defense presented a question of first impression about how the Supreme Court’s provision of absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses in Rehberg v. Paulk (2012), intersected with the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that an indicted plaintiff present evidence that the defendant provided false testimony to the grand jury. The court concluded that Rehberg’s absolute immunity for false grand jury testimony precludes Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim because she cannot rebut the indictment’s presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s grand jury testimony. View "Sanders v. Jones" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

Death-row inmates challenged Ohio’s protocols for lethal injunction. In 2014, Ohio amended Ohio Revised Code 149.43, creating sections 2949.221 and 2949.222, to prohibit the release of information identifying the manufacturer or supplier of drugs for use in Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol. The district court granted defendants a protective order to prevent the release of any information in their possession that could identify the sources of Ohio’s lethal-injection drugs. Plaintiffs sought a modification that would permit limited disclosures to counsel only under the designation “attorney’s eyes only.” The district court denied the motion, noting that “disclosure of identities subjects the disclosed persons or entities to suit” and that “confidential information has appeared in the media.” The parties notified the court that Ohio plans to move forward with scheduled executions, starting in January 2017. Defendants represented that they intend to use a new three-drug protocol, mirroring the Oklahoma protocol approbated by the Supreme Court in 2015. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the protective order. Defendants established good cause for protection from certain discovery. The protective order does not prevent plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims. View "Fears v. Kasich" on Justia Law

The Battle Creek Police Department obtained a warrant to search a residence, based on evidence from a trash pull and from a confidential informant. The Emergency Response Team was involved due to the subject’s (Jones) criminal history, gang affiliations, possession of firearms, and possible possession of cocaine and heroin. Jones and Brown were detained outside. Officer Klein testified that, approaching the door, he could see dogs barking aggressively and “jumping.” The dogs, owned by Brown, were pit bulls, weighing about 97 pounds and 53 pounds. Klein testified that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs down there.” The officers shot and killed the dogs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of the dogs, unreasonable forced entry, and that the city was liable under “Monell” because the Department failed to provide training to address the known risk of constitutional violations arising from dog shootings. The court dismissed, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the Fourth Amendment claims or that an inadequate training policy caused the alleged constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the officers acted reasonably and that there was no history of “needless killing of animals in the course of searches in Battle Creek.” View "Brown v. Battle Creek Police Department" on Justia Law

In April 1987, witnesses saw Middlebrooks and Brewington chase Majors, a 14-year-old black male. The next day, Majors’ body was found near where that incident had occurred. Majors had been tortured. Brewington led police to a bloodstained knife and to Middlebrooks, who resisted arrest. Middlebrooks gave a video-taped statement. He admitted that he stabbed Majors twice, but depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator. A jury convicted Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Middlebrooks’s convictions but vacated the death sentence. Evidence presented on remand indicated that Majors was small for his age, a good student, not violent, and not armed. Middlebrooks was described as a member of the KKK, who “hated niggers.” Middlebrooks’ relatives described his childhood as involving sexual abuse and neglect. There was testimony that Middlebrooks has severe mental illness and organic brain impairment. The jury found the murder “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,’” and that this outweighed any mitigating factors. Middlebrooks was resentenced to death. The sentence was affirmed. His petition for state post-conviction relief was unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Middlebrooks’s federal habeas petition. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated in light its 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan. On remand, the district court again denied Middlebrooks’s petition, finding his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims not “substantial” under Martinez and not warranting an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Middlebrooks’s claims were rejected on the merits in state court. View "Middlebrooks v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

In 1995, Bryan was convicted of attempted robbery. After being paroled in 1998, Bryan was indicted for theft. Arrest warrants issued. In 2000, when Bryan stopped at a gas station, officer Leon pulled behind him, saw that Bryan’s temporary tag had been altered, and took Bryan’s driver’s license to run a check. When Leon radioed the police station, Bryan shot the officer in the face. Officer Leon died instantly. Bryan fled. Niedhammer, who owned a private security agency, heard the shooting, saw the officer lying on the ground. and saw a white Pontiac Grand Prix “erratically leave the gas station almost running into people.” Niedhammer activated his siren and lights and gave chase. Twice, Bryan stopped his car, got out, and fired at Niedhammer. Both times Niedhammer returned fire. Eventually, Bryan lost control, crashed, fled on foot, and threw his handgun into a dumpster. He was arrested that same day. A jury convicted Bryan of aggravated murder and attempted murder with firearm specifications and death-penalty specifications, plus carrying a concealed weapon, carrying a firearm as a convicted felon, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Bryan to death and 33½ years. Bryan unsuccessfully sought relief on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. Bryan timely sought federal habeas relief with 16 claims. The court granted relief on his Batson claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded for dismissal. The district court correctly denied claims concerning: specific jurors, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, lethal injection, and an allegedly unconstitutional death-penalty scheme. The court incorrectly granted relief on the Batson claim, failing to properly defer to the state court’s ruling. View "Bryan v. Bobby" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 32-year-old black man, has prior state court convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2014, Defendant was arrested by Memphis Police for possession of an assault rifle. He was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated, reversing denial of a “Batson” challenge. During voir dire, the government used peremptory strikes on five prospective jurors—all of whom were black. Defendant made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. The government justified striking the last of the black prospective jurors, Dandridge, because he had changed jobs four months prior and had eight children; the government was purportedly “concerned about his ability to focus on the case at hand and listen and be attentive in a trial.” The government did not delve deeper into Dandridge’s answers by, for instance, asking about his child care arrangements, or the reasons he changed jobs. A comparative juror analysis shows that the government did not express concerns about the ability of similarly-situated white jurors to focus throughout the trial despite their large number of children and inconsistent work history. View "United States v. Atkins" on Justia Law

Nashville Detectives travelled to the residence where Abernathy lived with his girlfriend, searched the outdoor trash cans, and found: “Marijuana roaches with Marijuana residue inside;” “Several plastic vacuumed packed heat sealed bags consistent to those used to package marijuana for resale containing marijuana residue with T22 markings;” “USPS certified mail receipts addressed to Jimmy Jail Abernathy 5809 Tru Long Ct. Antioch TN;” and mail belonging to Abernathy’s girlfriend. Detective Particelli applied for a warrant, stating in his affidavit: I have received information that the occupants of 5809 Tru Long ... have been and are currently engaging in illegal drug activity. The search revealed large quantities of cash, marijuana, cocaine, and firearms. After the court denied a motion to suppress, Abernathy entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed denial of the motion to suppress and vacated Abernathy’s conviction. The trial court found Particelli’s statement that he had “received information” false; marijuana roaches and T2-laced plastic bags recovered from the garbage were insufficient to create a fair probability that drugs would be found in Abernathy’s home. View "United States v. Abernathy" on Justia Law