Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jones was arrested in 2013, charged with felonious assault. He pled guilty to a reduced charge on February 3, 2015. At his sentencing hearing that day, the judge imposed an 18-month sentence in the Ohio Department of Corrections, with 560-days credit for time served, but stated that Jones “may be supervised . . . if the parole board determines it is necessary.” The board would make that determination “[b]efore [Jones is] released,” and the sheriff’s office was to “process him.” The judge predicted that Jones “will never be transported.” The sheriff did not release Jones on February 3 or February 4. Jones’ counsel attempted to secure his release. Those efforts failed, absent documentation. The court finally filed the judgment on February 5, but the sheriff had processed Jones. He was transported on February 6. The Department applied the credit, gave Jones the official certificate of expiration of sentence, and released him that day. Jones sued the sheriff in his official capacity for damages, alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and false imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Although Ohio generally treats its sheriffs as county policymakers, Ohio law required the sheriff to transport Jones to the Department. The sheriff, as an arm of the state in this respect, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. View "Jones v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Kruger pleaded guilty to possessing pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(c)(1). Kruger was sentenced in 2009. Under the 2008 U.S.S.G. Kruger’s recommended sentencing range was 188-235 months of imprisonment. The court accepted the calculation, but varied downward and imposed a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment, reasoning that the proposed range overstated the seriousness of Kruger’s offense and the significance of his criminal history. Five years later, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, so that Kruger’s recommended range would have been 151-188 months of imprisonment. Kruger challenged a 2011 amendment, which prohibits the retroactive application of Guidelines amendments to defendants, like Kruger, whose sentences are for terms “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” Kruger claimed that the limitation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of his claim. Kruger has no constitutional right to the retroactive application of a more lenient version of the Guidelines. The amendment does not have the effect “of increasing the measure of punishment,” but only forecloses the possibility of a reduced sentence on the basis of an amendment that did not even exist at the time Kruger was sentenced. View "United States v. Kruger" on Justia Law

On November 29, 2012, a vehicle sped by Cleveland Police Officers and emitted a loud bang. Thinking that it was a gunshot, the officers radioed their dispatcher, stating that they were shot at by two African-American men in a vehicle. Officers responded and attempted a traffic stop. The subsequent 25-minute pursuit, reached speeds of 100 miles per hour, involved 62 police vehicles, and ended in a school parking lot. With the car contained, Officer Diaz exited his vehicle. Believing that he saw the passenger reach for a gun, Diaz fired his weapon. The vehicle then accelerated toward Diaz; 13 officers fired 139 shots. The vehicle occupants were killed. The media framed the incident as one Hispanic and 12 Caucasian officers killing unarmed African-Americans. Community response was significant. Under department policy, the officers were assigned to restricted duty status, which they call “demeaning.” After the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation released its report to the county prosecutor, but before the prosecutor finished his review, the officers were returned to transitional duties. The state grand jury declined to issue criminal charges. The officers returned to full duty. Nine officers sued, claiming that because of the racial implications and community response, they were assigned to restricted duty for a longer period than their African-American colleagues who have also been involved in deadly force incidents with African-Americans (42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claims. “While we should heed history’s lesson about protecting civil liberties in times of crisis, history alone is not evidence of civil rights violations.” The officers did not complain to the department about their assignments; they did not show that the decision to keep them on restricted duty pending the investigation’s outcome was a pretext for discrimination. View "O'Donnell v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Shimel pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in the shooting death of her husband. After sentencing, the trial court conducted a “Ginther” hearing and concluded that Shimel’s attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a battered spouse self-defense theory and granted her motion to withdraw her plea. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of counsel on a matter of strategy. On collateral review, the federal district court denied Shimel’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time consulting with her and for advising her to plead guilty rather than taking the case to trial and presenting a battered spouse self-defense theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Shimel did not establish prejudice. A reasonable defendant in Shimel’s situation, charged with open murder, would have accepted the plea, in light of the prosecutor’s stance that, even with expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, he would not have reduced the charge to manslaughter. Shimel failed to establish a reasonable probability that expert testimony would have improved her result. Michigan law only permits a defendant to plead battered spouse syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Shimel’s husband suffered nine gunshot wounds. Seven entered his body through his back. There was evidence that the shooting was precipitated by financial problems View "Shimel v. Warren" on Justia Law

Crangle agreed to plead guilty to rape with a recommended sentence of life imprisonment and parole eligibility after 10 years. Crangle acknowledged, “I have been informed that . . . after my release from prison I [May__ or Will__] be supervised under post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, which could last up to 5 years,” with a checkmark after “Will.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge and Crangle’s attorney incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to “straight parole” and not post-release control. The sentencing entry did not refer to post-release control. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by encouraging him to plead guilty rather than no contest. Because Crangle did not appeal, his conviction became final in December 2008. In June 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a trial judge who “failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control,” to issue a judgment in compliance with the statute. In November 2010, the court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his plea based on that case and ordered a correction to the judgment, which was backdated to Crangle’s initial sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion in November 2011. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 4, 2012 and in January 2013. Crangle placed a federal habeas petition in the prison mail on March 28, 2013, which was docketed on April 15, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. The district court dismissed Crangle’s petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state-court order imposing post-release control was a new judgment, that reset AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. View "Crangle v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an enhanced (327-month) sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on convictions for arson; first-degree wanton endangerment; trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana; and first-degree rape. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement in 2012. Sargent filed his first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2014, claiming that it was error for the court, rather than a jury, to enhance his sentence based on his convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States. The district court denied the motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In a second motion, Sargent cited Johnson v. United States (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague. Sargent claimed that the district court ruled that his conviction for wanton endangerment fell within the residual clause and that his conviction for arson has been reversed and cannot qualify as a predicate offense. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider the petition, concluding that Sargent had made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” View "In re: Sargent" on Justia Law

In 2014, Ohio enacted Senate Bills 205 and 216 (amending sections 3509.06-.07, Ohio Revised Code). The Bills required county boards of elections to reject the ballots of absentee voters and provisional voters whose identification envelopes or affirmation forms contain an address or birthdate that does not perfectly match voting records; reduced (from 10 to seven) the number of post-election days to cure identification-envelope errors or to present valid identification; and limited the ways in which poll workers can assist in-person voters. The district court held that all three provisions imposed an undue burden on the right to vote and disparately impacted minority voters. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the undue-burden claim only concerning the SB 205 requirement that in-person and mail-in absentee voters complete the address and birthdate fields on the identification envelope with technical precision. The court reversed findings that the other provisions create an undue burden and that the provisions disparately impact minority voters. The “remaining injunction does not impede the legitimate interests of Ohio election law.” The sections reinstated “were altogether serviceable.” The court stated that it “deeply respect[s] the dissent’s recounting of important parts of the racial history of our country and the struggle for voting rights …. However, that history does not without more determine the outcome.” View "NE Ohio Coal. v. Husted" on Justia Law

When the finances of a Michigan municipality or public school system are in jeopardy, state law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Public Act 436, allows temporary appointment of an emergency manager, with extensive powers that arguably displace all of those of the local governmental officials. Plaintiffs, voters in areas with emergency managers and local elected officials in place, claimed that, by vesting elected officials’ powers in appointed individuals, the law violates their substantive due process right to elect local legislative officials and violates the Constitution’s guarantee, Article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government. They also asserted claims under the First and Thirteenth amendments and under the Voting Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. It is up to the political branches of the federal government to determine whether a state has met its federal constitutional obligation to maintain a republican form of government. The financial conditions of plaintiffs’ localities are the reasons for the appointments of the emergency managers. An entity in a distressed financial state can cause harm to its citizenry and the state in general. Improving the financial situation of a distressed locality is a legitimate legislative purpose, and PA 436 is rationally related to that purpose. View "Phillips v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Michigan Trooper Ziecina, patrolling I-75, observed Calvetti's minivan abruptly slow and change lanes without signaling. Ziecina followed; the minivan moved at or below the posted minimum speed. Ziecina pulled Calvetti over to give a citation for failure to signal, impeding traffic, and driving below the minimum speed. A passenger, Cortez, produced identification. Calvetti could not find her driver’s license. Calvetti told Ziecina that she was helping Calvetti move and that the previous day the minivan had been searched in Mississippi. Ziecina’s database check revealed that the minivan was not registered to Calvetti, as she had claimed. Calvetti authorized a search. About 15 minutes after the stop, a drug-sniffing dog arrived and showed interest in the minivan floor, but did not alert. Calvetti admitted to a non-felony drug conviction and that Cortez had a felony charge involving 50 pounds of marijuana and had been involved in a shootout. Approximately 35 minutes into the stop, officers searched the minivan. The patrol car’s system recorded a conversation: Calvetti said that she was “not doing this anymore,” told Cortez that he would take the blame, and used Cortez’s cell phone, notifying a co-conspirator of the search. Ziecina observed “discrepancies” in the minivan, suspected a hidden trap under the floor, and found 16 kilograms of cocaine. About 73 minutes after the stop, agents read the two their Miranda rights. Both signed waivers. Cortez told agents that he took the minivan to Mexico to buy cocaine. Calvetti indicated that she did not want to talk, but agents continued the questioning. With Calvetti’s permission, agents used her residence for an unsuccessful controlled delivery, then searched the residence, finding packing materials similar to those used to wrap the cocaine. Finding no Miranda violation, the court denied Calvetti’s motion to suppress and held that the officers had probable cause for the stop and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Calvetti’s consent to search her residence did not fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Consenting to a search is not an incriminating statement it is not testimonial or communicative evidence. View "United States v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Ballard and France were framed during Operation Turnaround, a corrupt investigation into the Mansfield, Ohio drug trade by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO). The federal government prosecuted Ballard and France for allegedly selling drugs to law-enforcement officials and confidential informant, Bray. After Operation Turnaround ended, however, Bray admitted that he used his friends to act as “stand-ins” for the drug buys and intentionally misidentified them to frame Ballard and France. Ballard and France then sued Bray, DEA Special Agent Lucas, RCSO officers, and the County of Richland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ballard and France failed to produce evidence showing that the officers personally violated their constitutional rights. In addition, the officers relied on eyewitness identifications of Ballard and France by Agent Lucas and indictments from a federal grand jury for probable cause; Ballard and France failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants should have doubted that there was probable cause. View "France v. Lucas" on Justia Law