Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Ohio enacted Senate Bills 205 and 216 (amending sections 3509.06-.07, Ohio Revised Code). The Bills required county boards of elections to reject the ballots of absentee voters and provisional voters whose identification envelopes or affirmation forms contain an address or birthdate that does not perfectly match voting records; reduced (from 10 to seven) the number of post-election days to cure identification-envelope errors or to present valid identification; and limited the ways in which poll workers can assist in-person voters. The district court held that all three provisions imposed an undue burden on the right to vote and disparately impacted minority voters. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the undue-burden claim only concerning the SB 205 requirement that in-person and mail-in absentee voters complete the address and birthdate fields on the identification envelope with technical precision. The court reversed findings that the other provisions create an undue burden and that the provisions disparately impact minority voters. The “remaining injunction does not impede the legitimate interests of Ohio election law.” The sections reinstated “were altogether serviceable.” The court stated that it “deeply respect[s] the dissent’s recounting of important parts of the racial history of our country and the struggle for voting rights …. However, that history does not without more determine the outcome.” View "NE Ohio Coal. v. Husted" on Justia Law

When the finances of a Michigan municipality or public school system are in jeopardy, state law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Public Act 436, allows temporary appointment of an emergency manager, with extensive powers that arguably displace all of those of the local governmental officials. Plaintiffs, voters in areas with emergency managers and local elected officials in place, claimed that, by vesting elected officials’ powers in appointed individuals, the law violates their substantive due process right to elect local legislative officials and violates the Constitution’s guarantee, Article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government. They also asserted claims under the First and Thirteenth amendments and under the Voting Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. It is up to the political branches of the federal government to determine whether a state has met its federal constitutional obligation to maintain a republican form of government. The financial conditions of plaintiffs’ localities are the reasons for the appointments of the emergency managers. An entity in a distressed financial state can cause harm to its citizenry and the state in general. Improving the financial situation of a distressed locality is a legitimate legislative purpose, and PA 436 is rationally related to that purpose. View "Phillips v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Michigan Trooper Ziecina, patrolling I-75, observed Calvetti's minivan abruptly slow and change lanes without signaling. Ziecina followed; the minivan moved at or below the posted minimum speed. Ziecina pulled Calvetti over to give a citation for failure to signal, impeding traffic, and driving below the minimum speed. A passenger, Cortez, produced identification. Calvetti could not find her driver’s license. Calvetti told Ziecina that she was helping Calvetti move and that the previous day the minivan had been searched in Mississippi. Ziecina’s database check revealed that the minivan was not registered to Calvetti, as she had claimed. Calvetti authorized a search. About 15 minutes after the stop, a drug-sniffing dog arrived and showed interest in the minivan floor, but did not alert. Calvetti admitted to a non-felony drug conviction and that Cortez had a felony charge involving 50 pounds of marijuana and had been involved in a shootout. Approximately 35 minutes into the stop, officers searched the minivan. The patrol car’s system recorded a conversation: Calvetti said that she was “not doing this anymore,” told Cortez that he would take the blame, and used Cortez’s cell phone, notifying a co-conspirator of the search. Ziecina observed “discrepancies” in the minivan, suspected a hidden trap under the floor, and found 16 kilograms of cocaine. About 73 minutes after the stop, agents read the two their Miranda rights. Both signed waivers. Cortez told agents that he took the minivan to Mexico to buy cocaine. Calvetti indicated that she did not want to talk, but agents continued the questioning. With Calvetti’s permission, agents used her residence for an unsuccessful controlled delivery, then searched the residence, finding packing materials similar to those used to wrap the cocaine. Finding no Miranda violation, the court denied Calvetti’s motion to suppress and held that the officers had probable cause for the stop and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Calvetti’s consent to search her residence did not fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. Consenting to a search is not an incriminating statement it is not testimonial or communicative evidence. View "United States v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Ballard and France were framed during Operation Turnaround, a corrupt investigation into the Mansfield, Ohio drug trade by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO). The federal government prosecuted Ballard and France for allegedly selling drugs to law-enforcement officials and confidential informant, Bray. After Operation Turnaround ended, however, Bray admitted that he used his friends to act as “stand-ins” for the drug buys and intentionally misidentified them to frame Ballard and France. Ballard and France then sued Bray, DEA Special Agent Lucas, RCSO officers, and the County of Richland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ballard and France failed to produce evidence showing that the officers personally violated their constitutional rights. In addition, the officers relied on eyewitness identifications of Ballard and France by Agent Lucas and indictments from a federal grand jury for probable cause; Ballard and France failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants should have doubted that there was probable cause. View "France v. Lucas" on Justia Law

An anonymous caller to the district court clerk’s office complained that an accident might make it difficult for voters to reach the polls before they closed on Ohio’s March 15 primary election. That office relayed the call to a judge, who orally directed the clerk to enter an order: This matter is before the court upon an oral complaint requesting that the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren be extended for one hour due to Interstate I-275 being closed for hours due to a fatal accident. The request is hereby GRANTED and the Secretary of State is hereby ordered to keep the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren open until 8:30 p.m. The call from the clerk’s office went to the cell phone voicemail of Assistant Secretary of State Damschroder. Damschroder got the message, but the polls had closed minutes earlier and had to try to reopen; “some polls were open and others were not.” No complaint preceded the order; none materialized after. Seeking to avoid similar last-minute election orders, the Ohio Secretary of State and boards of elections appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Article III limitations. View "In re: 2016 Primary Election" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law

Coleman sold crack cocaine to a DEA informant, pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 92 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Six months before Coleman’s sentence ended, he was granted a transfer to a charity establishment. Two months later, Coleman escaped. U.S. Marshals found Coleman, who pleaded guilty to escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Judge Hood sentenced Coleman to 15 months of imprisonment, plus supervised release. Coleman completed his prison sentences. Two months into his supervised release, Coleman admitted to using cocaine. Judge Hood ordered that Coleman serve an additional six months, followed by inpatient substance-abuse treatment. After finishing that treatment, Coleman was again released. Days later, Coleman admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana. Coleman’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine. A magistrate appointed attorney Gordon to represent Coleman and scheduled a revocation hearing before Judge Hood. Coleman moved, pro se, for new counsel. The court relieved Gordon and appointed Abell, who was present at the court’s request. Upon confirming that Abell had copies of Coleman’s reports, the court had a 14-minute recess. Abell informed the court that Coleman would not contest the drug-related charges and that Coleman was “ready to go forward today.” Judge Hood revoked supervised release and sentenced Coleman to 30 months of imprisonment—three months above the Guidelines range—without further supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Coleman was constructively denied the assistance of counsel during his revocation hearing and that the court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors and did not justify the above-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party filed suit, claiming that Kentucky law unconstitutionally burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of political association and equal protection by categorizing the Libertarian Party and Constitution Party as “political groups,” which must petition to list their candidates for state and local office on election ballots, rather than as “political parties” or “political organizations,” which enjoy “blanket” ballot access for all the candidates they nominate (Ky. Rev. Stat. 118.015). The district court concluded, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Kentucky’s three-tiered ballot-access scheme is a constitutional means of exercising the Commonwealth’s power to regulate elections. The court found the burden imposed by the ballot-access scheme “less than severe,” so that strict scrutiny did not apply, but not so “minimal” as to warrant rational basis review. Engaging in “flexible scrutiny,” the court found that Kentucky has an important interest in ensuring that candidates demonstrate a “significant modicum of support,” strong enough to justify the scheme. View "Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes" on Justia Law

A Kentucky jury sentenced Foley to death for the 1991 shootings the Vaughn brothers. After exhausting all available appeals, Foley moved under 18 U.S.C. 3599(a)(2) and (f) for the district court to appoint counsel and grant funds to retain experts in anticipation of state clemency proceedings. Foley requested a neuropsychologist to evaluate the impact of multiple head injuries on his mental functioning. He also sought a ballistics and crime scene​ reconstruction expert to support his contention that he shot Rodney in self-defense and that someone else shot Lynn. The district court granted his motion to appoint counsel but denied expert funds as not reasonably necessary for Foley’s clemency bid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that Foley is under additional death sentences for murdering four people in 1989. View "Foley v. White" on Justia Law

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), overseen by the USDA, is administered by the states, 7 U.S.C. 2011–2036c. An individual is ineligible for SNAP benefits if he is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing.” Michigan’s implementation barred assistance to anyone “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Michigan had an automated program that compared the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police; when the program identified a match, it automatically closed the recipient’s file and generated a notice of the termination of benefits. In 2015 the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n), clarifying disqualification of fugitive felons. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's automatic disqualification and notice process. The court certified a class, held that Michigan policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution, and issued an injunction requiring Michigan to refrain from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices of valid disqualification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, of mootness, that there is no SNAP Act private right of action, and that Michigan's methods were valid. View "Barry v. Lyon" on Justia Law