Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An anonymous caller to the district court clerk’s office complained that an accident might make it difficult for voters to reach the polls before they closed on Ohio’s March 15 primary election. That office relayed the call to a judge, who orally directed the clerk to enter an order: This matter is before the court upon an oral complaint requesting that the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren be extended for one hour due to Interstate I-275 being closed for hours due to a fatal accident. The request is hereby GRANTED and the Secretary of State is hereby ordered to keep the polling locations within the counties of Butler, Clermont, Hamilton and Warren open until 8:30 p.m. The call from the clerk’s office went to the cell phone voicemail of Assistant Secretary of State Damschroder. Damschroder got the message, but the polls had closed minutes earlier and had to try to reopen; “some polls were open and others were not.” No complaint preceded the order; none materialized after. Seeking to avoid similar last-minute election orders, the Ohio Secretary of State and boards of elections appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Article III limitations. View "In re: 2016 Primary Election" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law

Coleman sold crack cocaine to a DEA informant, pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced to 92 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Six months before Coleman’s sentence ended, he was granted a transfer to a charity establishment. Two months later, Coleman escaped. U.S. Marshals found Coleman, who pleaded guilty to escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Judge Hood sentenced Coleman to 15 months of imprisonment, plus supervised release. Coleman completed his prison sentences. Two months into his supervised release, Coleman admitted to using cocaine. Judge Hood ordered that Coleman serve an additional six months, followed by inpatient substance-abuse treatment. After finishing that treatment, Coleman was again released. Days later, Coleman admitted that he had recently smoked marijuana. Coleman’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine. A magistrate appointed attorney Gordon to represent Coleman and scheduled a revocation hearing before Judge Hood. Coleman moved, pro se, for new counsel. The court relieved Gordon and appointed Abell, who was present at the court’s request. Upon confirming that Abell had copies of Coleman’s reports, the court had a 14-minute recess. Abell informed the court that Coleman would not contest the drug-related charges and that Coleman was “ready to go forward today.” Judge Hood revoked supervised release and sentenced Coleman to 30 months of imprisonment—three months above the Guidelines range—without further supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Coleman was constructively denied the assistance of counsel during his revocation hearing and that the court failed to consider relevant sentencing factors and did not justify the above-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party filed suit, claiming that Kentucky law unconstitutionally burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of political association and equal protection by categorizing the Libertarian Party and Constitution Party as “political groups,” which must petition to list their candidates for state and local office on election ballots, rather than as “political parties” or “political organizations,” which enjoy “blanket” ballot access for all the candidates they nominate (Ky. Rev. Stat. 118.015). The district court concluded, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Kentucky’s three-tiered ballot-access scheme is a constitutional means of exercising the Commonwealth’s power to regulate elections. The court found the burden imposed by the ballot-access scheme “less than severe,” so that strict scrutiny did not apply, but not so “minimal” as to warrant rational basis review. Engaging in “flexible scrutiny,” the court found that Kentucky has an important interest in ensuring that candidates demonstrate a “significant modicum of support,” strong enough to justify the scheme. View "Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes" on Justia Law

A Kentucky jury sentenced Foley to death for the 1991 shootings the Vaughn brothers. After exhausting all available appeals, Foley moved under 18 U.S.C. 3599(a)(2) and (f) for the district court to appoint counsel and grant funds to retain experts in anticipation of state clemency proceedings. Foley requested a neuropsychologist to evaluate the impact of multiple head injuries on his mental functioning. He also sought a ballistics and crime scene​ reconstruction expert to support his contention that he shot Rodney in self-defense and that someone else shot Lynn. The district court granted his motion to appoint counsel but denied expert funds as not reasonably necessary for Foley’s clemency bid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that Foley is under additional death sentences for murdering four people in 1989. View "Foley v. White" on Justia Law

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), overseen by the USDA, is administered by the states, 7 U.S.C. 2011–2036c. An individual is ineligible for SNAP benefits if he is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing.” Michigan’s implementation barred assistance to anyone “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Michigan had an automated program that compared the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police; when the program identified a match, it automatically closed the recipient’s file and generated a notice of the termination of benefits. In 2015 the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n), clarifying disqualification of fugitive felons. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's automatic disqualification and notice process. The court certified a class, held that Michigan policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution, and issued an injunction requiring Michigan to refrain from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices of valid disqualification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, of mootness, that there is no SNAP Act private right of action, and that Michigan's methods were valid. View "Barry v. Lyon" on Justia Law

D.E., then 19 years old, took a wrong turn on his way to a Michigan summer camp and inadvertently ended up at the border with Canada. The toll-booth operator provided him with a laminated card, prepared by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that stated: You are being allowed to turn around without traveling to Canada. Please present this card, along with your identification to an open CBP inspection booth prior to departing. Thank you. The back stated: All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States or from places outside thereof are liable to inspection and search by a Customs official. The operator directed him to turn around without crossing the border and to merge into traffic containing motorists arriving from Canada. That lane funneled D.E. to a CBP inspection booth. Despite his explanation that he had not crossed the border, CBP officers searched his vehicle and discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. After pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge in state court, D.E. filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. A traveler’s subjective intent not to leave the country does not provide an exception to the government’s authority to conduct suspicionless searches of vehicles at the border. View "D.E. v. Doe" on Justia Law

Michigan amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Mich. Comp. Laws 28.723, so that, in addition to the online public registry of sex offenders’ names, addresses, biometric data, and photographs, it prohibits registrants (with exceptions) from living, working, or “loitering” within 1,000 feet of a school and divides registrants into three tiers of “dangerousness,” based solely on the crime of conviction. Recent amendments also require all registrants to appear in person “immediately” to update information such as new vehicles or “internet identifiers” (new email accounts). Violations carry heavy criminal penalties. Registered offenders challenged SORA’s validity, asserting that parts are unconstitutionally vague; that it should not be construed as creating strict liability offenses; that SORA violates the First Amendment; that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing oppressive restrictions on their ability to parent, work, and travel; and that SORA’s retroactive application amounts to an unconstitutional Ex Post Facto punishment. The district court rejected most of the arguments but held that some of SORA’s provisions were unconstitutionally vague, that those required to register cannot be held strictly liable for violating its requirements, and that its retroactive requirement that offenders register on-line aliases for life violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the Ex Post Facto argument. SORA does impose punishment and that retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments is unconstitutional. View "Does v. Snyder" on Justia Law

One sitting judge and two aspiring Kentucky judges challenged the Commonwealth’s Code of Judicial Conduct clauses prohibiting “campaign[ing] as a member of a political organization,” “endors[ing] . . . a candidate for public office,” “mak[ing] a contribution to a political organization,” making any “commitments” with respect to “cases, controversies, or issues” likely to come before the court, making “false” or “misleading” statements. The sitting judge, previously appointed, made statements regarding being “re-elected,” and concerning penalties for heroin use. A candidate for the judiciary referred to himself as a Republic and his opponents as Democrats. The Third plaintiff wanted to publicly participate in Republican Party functions. The district court struck some of these provisions and upheld others. The Sixth Circuit found contributions, leadership, false statements and endorsement clauses valid. The campaigning, speeches, clauses are unconstitutional. The misleading statements prohibition is valid on its face, but may be unconstitutional as applied to one of the plaintiffs. View "Winter v. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, in a 2007 Detroit police raid on their home, Geraldine heard a loud boom and went upstairs where an officer put a gun to her face and said, “on the floor.” She explained that she had undergone two knee replacements. Another officer shoved her. She fell, hitting her head, shoulder, neck, and back against a table. Another officer walked on top of her body. When Geraldine’s adult daughter, Caroline, entered, an officer allegedly put a gun to her face and threw her onto the floor. Caroline yelled, “I’ve had back surgeries.” Another officer placed his foot on her back. The officers allegedly concealed their identities, wearing black clothing with their faces covered except for their eyes. The officers would only say that they were “Team 11,” from a multi-agency task force. It took two years for Wayne County to disclose a report that purportedly revealed the identities of the officers who executed the warrant. The federal defendants did not assert their lack of involvement during early discovery, but, after the limitations period had run, alleged that they did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the federal officers .On remand, the jury found that defendants did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the district court’s decision not to “shift[] the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement.” View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law