Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

ATF investigated the theft of firearms from Michigan gun dealers, leading to two arrests. Both men admitted trading the stolen firearms with Doxey, in exchange for heroin. Another informant stated that Doxey was a heroin dealer and described his vehicle. Doxey, known to be on parole, was seen at a gas station, engaging in an apparent “hand-to-hand” narcotic transaction with another man in Doxey's vehicle. Officers watched Doxey drive away with female passengers. Doxey had a suspended license. Before officers stopped him, Doxey pulled over and exited his car. Officers approached, searched Doxey with his consent, and removed $1,560 in cash from Doxey’s pocket. Searching the car, they found a partially burnt marijuana cigarette and a digital scale. With written consent from one of the passengers, the officers searched her house and found a jar, containing heroin residue. Doxey consented to and initially cooperated with a search of his genitals and rectum, pulling his clothing down. He then began clenching his butt cheeks. He was taken to the police station. Doxey’s parole officer stated his parole required Doxey to allow complete body searches. Doxey continued to resist and had to be restrained. Officers could see “the corner tie bag in between his butt crack.” A field test confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was heroin, weighing 8.17 grams. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), rejecting a challenge to the body search and an argument that the informer's identity should have been disclosed. View "United States v. Doxey" on Justia Law

Michigan has offered “straight-party” voting since 1891. Previous attempts to eliminate straight-party voting were defeated by referendum. In 2015, the Michigan legislature passed PA 268, eliminating straight-party voting and appropriating $5 million to purchase voting equipment to implement the change. Because PA 268 includes an appropriation, it cannot be repealed by referendum. Opponents alleged that PA 268 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Plaintiffs’ expert report prepared by a demographer and former U.S. Census Bureau Regional Information Specialist, included a statistical analysis demonstrating “that African Americans are more likely to use the straight party voting option and that its elimination will disproportionately affect African-American voters.”The plaintiffs attached declarations from county election administrators, indicating that the elimination of straight-party voting would cause a demonstrable increase in wait times for voting. The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their ADA claim, but were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act claims. The Sixth Circuit denied an emergency motion for a stay of the injunction, stating that the case does not involve the potential disruption of complicated election administration procedures on the eve of Election Day; denying the request for a stay here will merely require Michigan to use the same straight-party procedure that it has used since 1891. View "Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Deputy Swoap, in his police cruiser near Bowling Green, saw an oncoming car with only one operational headlight. Swoap followed and switched on his overhead lights. Getz did not stop. Swoap followed Getz into a driveway (Getz’s home). Getz circled around and drove back in Swoap’s direction, stopping directly in front of the cruiser. As Swoap was radioing dispatch, Getz backed up to drive around Swoap’s cruiser. Swoap moved the cruiser, stood in the driveway, and repeatedly yelled for Getz to stop. Eventually, Swoap drew his sidearm. Getz complied. Once Getz was out of the car, Swoap holstered his gun. Getz told Swoap to “get the fuck off his property.” and “Do you know who I am?” Swoap informed Getz repeatedly that he was not free to leave, but Getz got back in his car. Swoap called for backup and reached into the car. Getz resisted. Swoap pulled Getz from the car, stated that he was under arrest, and ordered Getz to put his hands behind his back. Getz refused, stating he was going inside the house. Swoap performed a hip-check to unbalance Getz, gain control, and handcuff him. Getz continued to resist. Swoap finally handcuffed Getz, but did not check for tightness. Getz’s daughter and another officer arrived. Accounts differ from that point. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Getz’s excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, agreeing that Swoap was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Getz v. Swoap" on Justia Law

Puckett retired from the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) Division of Police in 2009, after 36 years of service; Vance retired from the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services in 2010, after 24 years of service. Both (plaintiffs) are members of the LFUCG Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, governed by the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund Act, KRS 67A.360-67A.690. As members of the Fund, plaintiffs receive service retirement annuities under the Act with cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The Act has been amended several times. After 2013 legislation reduced the COLA, plaintiffs sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming violations of the Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs had no such contractual right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have no property right in a particular COLA. The legislation had a rational basis: When it amended the Act, the Kentucky General Assembly explained the need to keep the Fund financially sound and resolve its financial difficulties. View "Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law

An Ohio State Dental Board-recognized specialist must complete a postdoctoral education program in a specialty recognized by the American Dental Association and limit the scope of his practice to that specialty. The use of the terms “specialist”, “specializes” or “practice limited to” or the terms “orthodontist”, “oral and maxillofacial surgeon”, “oral and maxillofacial radiologist”, “periodontist”, “pediatric dentist”, “prosthodontist”, “endodontist”, “oral pathologist”, or “public health dentist” or similar terms is limited to licensed Board-recognized specialists.. Any general dentist who uses those terms in advertisements can have his dental license placed on probationary status, suspended, or revoked. Kiser, a licensed dentist with postdoctoral education in endodontics (root-canal procedures). does not to limit his practice exclusively to endodontics. The Board’s regulations treat him as a general dentist. He is banned from using the word “endodontist” in his advertisements. In 2009, the Board warned Kiser with respect to the regulations, but did not take further action. In 2012, Kiser requested that the Board review signage that would include the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” The Board neither approved nor rejected Kiser’s proposed signage, but recommended that he consult legal counsel. Kiser challenged the regulations as violating: the First Amendment right to commercial speech; substantive and procedural due process; and equal protection. The district court twice dismissed Kiser’s claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Kiser had stated viable claims with respect to the First Amendment, substantive due process, and equal protection. View "Kiser v. Kamdar" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party challenged Ohio’s ballot qualification law, Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1), arguing selective enforcement and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the law, a political party may qualify by obtaining at least “three percent of the total vote cast” for governor or president “at the most recent regular state election” or through a petition. A petition-formed party must nominate a candidate for the general election by petition, filed “[n]ot later than one hundred ten days before the” general election, and, for statewide offices, “signed by at least fifty qualified electors who have not voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the current year or the immediately preceding two calendar years.” For local office, five qualifying signatures are required. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Party did not establish state action with respect to its selective enforcement claim. The Party did not demonstrate that Ohio law deprives it of membership or affiliation in a general sense and was not severely burdened by the requirement that it select candidates by petition, rather than by primary. The state articulated a legitimate interest in its law, sufficient in light of the Party’s claimed burdens. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted" on Justia Law

In 2000, Embry pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. In calculating his sentencing range, the court treated him as a career offender based on prior convictions for robbery and wanton endangerment, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. In 2016, he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). The court of appeals may authorize a successive motion to vacate a sentence or conviction if the inmate “makes a prima facie showing” that his proposed claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Embry relied on the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson decision, later made retroactive, which voided for vagueness the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Johnson was sentenced under an identically worded clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court to be held in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court’s decision (next term) in Beckles v. United States. The court noted “respectable constitutional arguments that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the advisory Guidelines.” View "In re: Embry" on Justia Law

On April 28, 2010, Thompson was driving his car erratically on a two-lane Tennessee highway. After nearly colliding head-on with City of Lebanon Police Officer McKinley, Thompson sped away. McKinley gave chase, later joined by Officer McDannald. After approximately six minutes of high-speed driving, Thompson swerved, spun 360 degrees, and ran off the road into a ditch. McKinley ran toward Thompson’s crashed car and fired one round. McDannald then aimed at Thompson’s car and fired 13 rounds. The shooting ended within 19 seconds of the crash. Thompson sat behind the wheel of his vehicle the entire time and did not make any threatening moves. Thompson died at the scene, from gunshot wounds. In his estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the city summary judgment on Thompson’s claims of failure to screen, train, supervise, investigate, and discipline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a jury believed the plaintiff’s asserted facts, it could find that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing into Thompson’s vehicle and person violated his Fourth Amendment rights “when Thompson had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence.” View "Thompson v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law