Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

D.E., then 19 years old, took a wrong turn on his way to a Michigan summer camp and inadvertently ended up at the border with Canada. The toll-booth operator provided him with a laminated card, prepared by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that stated: You are being allowed to turn around without traveling to Canada. Please present this card, along with your identification to an open CBP inspection booth prior to departing. Thank you. The back stated: All persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States or from places outside thereof are liable to inspection and search by a Customs official. The operator directed him to turn around without crossing the border and to merge into traffic containing motorists arriving from Canada. That lane funneled D.E. to a CBP inspection booth. Despite his explanation that he had not crossed the border, CBP officers searched his vehicle and discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia. After pleading guilty to a misdemeanor charge in state court, D.E. filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. A traveler’s subjective intent not to leave the country does not provide an exception to the government’s authority to conduct suspicionless searches of vehicles at the border. View "D.E. v. Doe" on Justia Law

Michigan amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Mich. Comp. Laws 28.723, so that, in addition to the online public registry of sex offenders’ names, addresses, biometric data, and photographs, it prohibits registrants (with exceptions) from living, working, or “loitering” within 1,000 feet of a school and divides registrants into three tiers of “dangerousness,” based solely on the crime of conviction. Recent amendments also require all registrants to appear in person “immediately” to update information such as new vehicles or “internet identifiers” (new email accounts). Violations carry heavy criminal penalties. Registered offenders challenged SORA’s validity, asserting that parts are unconstitutionally vague; that it should not be construed as creating strict liability offenses; that SORA violates the First Amendment; that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing oppressive restrictions on their ability to parent, work, and travel; and that SORA’s retroactive application amounts to an unconstitutional Ex Post Facto punishment. The district court rejected most of the arguments but held that some of SORA’s provisions were unconstitutionally vague, that those required to register cannot be held strictly liable for violating its requirements, and that its retroactive requirement that offenders register on-line aliases for life violated the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the Ex Post Facto argument. SORA does impose punishment and that retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments is unconstitutional. View "Does v. Snyder" on Justia Law

One sitting judge and two aspiring Kentucky judges challenged the Commonwealth’s Code of Judicial Conduct clauses prohibiting “campaign[ing] as a member of a political organization,” “endors[ing] . . . a candidate for public office,” “mak[ing] a contribution to a political organization,” making any “commitments” with respect to “cases, controversies, or issues” likely to come before the court, making “false” or “misleading” statements. The sitting judge, previously appointed, made statements regarding being “re-elected,” and concerning penalties for heroin use. A candidate for the judiciary referred to himself as a Republic and his opponents as Democrats. The Third plaintiff wanted to publicly participate in Republican Party functions. The district court struck some of these provisions and upheld others. The Sixth Circuit found contributions, leadership, false statements and endorsement clauses valid. The campaigning, speeches, clauses are unconstitutional. The misleading statements prohibition is valid on its face, but may be unconstitutional as applied to one of the plaintiffs. View "Winter v. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, in a 2007 Detroit police raid on their home, Geraldine heard a loud boom and went upstairs where an officer put a gun to her face and said, “on the floor.” She explained that she had undergone two knee replacements. Another officer shoved her. She fell, hitting her head, shoulder, neck, and back against a table. Another officer walked on top of her body. When Geraldine’s adult daughter, Caroline, entered, an officer allegedly put a gun to her face and threw her onto the floor. Caroline yelled, “I’ve had back surgeries.” Another officer placed his foot on her back. The officers allegedly concealed their identities, wearing black clothing with their faces covered except for their eyes. The officers would only say that they were “Team 11,” from a multi-agency task force. It took two years for Wayne County to disclose a report that purportedly revealed the identities of the officers who executed the warrant. The federal defendants did not assert their lack of involvement during early discovery, but, after the limitations period had run, alleged that they did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the federal officers .On remand, the jury found that defendants did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the district court’s decision not to “shift[] the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement.” View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law

ATF investigated the theft of firearms from Michigan gun dealers, leading to two arrests. Both men admitted trading the stolen firearms with Doxey, in exchange for heroin. Another informant stated that Doxey was a heroin dealer and described his vehicle. Doxey, known to be on parole, was seen at a gas station, engaging in an apparent “hand-to-hand” narcotic transaction with another man in Doxey's vehicle. Officers watched Doxey drive away with female passengers. Doxey had a suspended license. Before officers stopped him, Doxey pulled over and exited his car. Officers approached, searched Doxey with his consent, and removed $1,560 in cash from Doxey’s pocket. Searching the car, they found a partially burnt marijuana cigarette and a digital scale. With written consent from one of the passengers, the officers searched her house and found a jar, containing heroin residue. Doxey consented to and initially cooperated with a search of his genitals and rectum, pulling his clothing down. He then began clenching his butt cheeks. He was taken to the police station. Doxey’s parole officer stated his parole required Doxey to allow complete body searches. Doxey continued to resist and had to be restrained. Officers could see “the corner tie bag in between his butt crack.” A field test confirmed that the substance in the plastic bag was heroin, weighing 8.17 grams. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), rejecting a challenge to the body search and an argument that the informer's identity should have been disclosed. View "United States v. Doxey" on Justia Law

Michigan has offered “straight-party” voting since 1891. Previous attempts to eliminate straight-party voting were defeated by referendum. In 2015, the Michigan legislature passed PA 268, eliminating straight-party voting and appropriating $5 million to purchase voting equipment to implement the change. Because PA 268 includes an appropriation, it cannot be repealed by referendum. Opponents alleged that PA 268 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Plaintiffs’ expert report prepared by a demographer and former U.S. Census Bureau Regional Information Specialist, included a statistical analysis demonstrating “that African Americans are more likely to use the straight party voting option and that its elimination will disproportionately affect African-American voters.”The plaintiffs attached declarations from county election administrators, indicating that the elimination of straight-party voting would cause a demonstrable increase in wait times for voting. The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their ADA claim, but were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act claims. The Sixth Circuit denied an emergency motion for a stay of the injunction, stating that the case does not involve the potential disruption of complicated election administration procedures on the eve of Election Day; denying the request for a stay here will merely require Michigan to use the same straight-party procedure that it has used since 1891. View "Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Deputy Swoap, in his police cruiser near Bowling Green, saw an oncoming car with only one operational headlight. Swoap followed and switched on his overhead lights. Getz did not stop. Swoap followed Getz into a driveway (Getz’s home). Getz circled around and drove back in Swoap’s direction, stopping directly in front of the cruiser. As Swoap was radioing dispatch, Getz backed up to drive around Swoap’s cruiser. Swoap moved the cruiser, stood in the driveway, and repeatedly yelled for Getz to stop. Eventually, Swoap drew his sidearm. Getz complied. Once Getz was out of the car, Swoap holstered his gun. Getz told Swoap to “get the fuck off his property.” and “Do you know who I am?” Swoap informed Getz repeatedly that he was not free to leave, but Getz got back in his car. Swoap called for backup and reached into the car. Getz resisted. Swoap pulled Getz from the car, stated that he was under arrest, and ordered Getz to put his hands behind his back. Getz refused, stating he was going inside the house. Swoap performed a hip-check to unbalance Getz, gain control, and handcuff him. Getz continued to resist. Swoap finally handcuffed Getz, but did not check for tightness. Getz’s daughter and another officer arrived. Accounts differ from that point. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Getz’s excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, agreeing that Swoap was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Getz v. Swoap" on Justia Law

Puckett retired from the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) Division of Police in 2009, after 36 years of service; Vance retired from the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services in 2010, after 24 years of service. Both (plaintiffs) are members of the LFUCG Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, governed by the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund Act, KRS 67A.360-67A.690. As members of the Fund, plaintiffs receive service retirement annuities under the Act with cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The Act has been amended several times. After 2013 legislation reduced the COLA, plaintiffs sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming violations of the Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs had no such contractual right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have no property right in a particular COLA. The legislation had a rational basis: When it amended the Act, the Kentucky General Assembly explained the need to keep the Fund financially sound and resolve its financial difficulties. View "Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law