Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Humberto Llantada pleaded guilty to charges arising from a drug conspiracy in 2014. The district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment, followed by terms of supervised release ranging from one to five years, and imposed a number of special conditions that would apply when he was released. He challenged those conditions on vagueness grounds. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to award him a sentence reduction because of his relatively minor role in the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence and conditions: "Our decision in 'United States v. Munoz,( ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 502863 (10th Cir. 2016)) resolves most of the challenges to the special conditions imposed in this case. […] The conditions of supervised release imposed here are sufficiently clear to inform a parolee of what conduct will result in a return to prison." View "United States v. Llantada" on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Smith was convicted by jury on eight counts of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. Defendant raised two grounds for appeal: (1) that the eight counts of distribution were multiplicitous, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy; and (2) the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) at sentencing when it adopted the presentence-report (PSR) account of his pending child-rape charge over his pro se objection without making a finding based on the preponderance of the evidence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: Defendant did not raise the double-jeopardy issue below and he has not shown plain error; and the district court’s refusal to address a pro se objection by a defendant represented by counsel was not an abuse of discretion and, in any event, was harmless. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Myron Harry appealed his conviction of sexual assault at the home of friends while the victim was sleeping after a party. On appeal, he argued that all but one of his text messages were used against him at trial, but none of the host’s messages were presented, therefore his right to due process was violated by the failure to preserve text messages sent to him by the host, whose cell phone had been provided to officers as evidence. The other two challenges related to the district court’s grant of the government’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude any evidence that the victim flirted with Defendant during the party. Finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law

In 2015, Petitioner Embry Loftis received a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his section 2254 habeas petition as time-barred. The Tenth Circuit considered the merits of Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under the unique circumstances of this case. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that Petitioner made reasonable, diligent efforts to comply with state law under the unique circumstances he faced, and the state district court “led [him] to believe that he . . . had done all that [wa]s required under the circumstances” by granting his request for an extension of time to file his appeal. "The record clearly shows that Petitioner did not sleep on his federal rights, but rather diligently pursued his habeas claims through a state process that he reasonably believed to be sufficient." The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Accordingly the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s habeas petition as time-barred was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Loftis v. Harvanek" on Justia Law

Jesus Munoz was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He pled guilty and was sentenced to time served or thirteen days, whichever was less, and two years of supervised release. The term of the supervised release included twelve “standard” conditions of supervised release and two “special” conditions. On appeal, Munoz raised substantive and procedural challenges to twelve of the fourteen conditions. Rejecting all, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Munoz" on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law

Oklahoma state prisoner Antonio Milton requested a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. In 2007, Milton was prosecuted in two separate cases pending simultaneously before a state district court: a charge for crack cocaine trafficking; the other, involvement in a drive-by shooting. Because Milton had two earlier felony drug-trafficking convictions, the crack-cocaine-trafficking charge mandated life without parole if convicted. The State extended Milton at least one plea offer that covered at least one of Milton’s two cases. Milton ultimately rejected the offered plea deal(s) and went to trial in the drug-trafficking case, where he was convicted. After this, the State let the drive-by-shooting case lapse, leaving the court to dismiss it for lack of prosecution. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed all of Milton’s convictions and sentences, including the drug-trafficking conviction with its mandatory life-without-parole sentence. Later, Milton filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing in Oklahoma state district court. Relevant here, Milton argued “that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert on direct appeal that Milton’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Milton of a plea-bargain offer made by the prosecution prior to the preliminary hearing.” The state district court denied Milton’s application for post-conviction relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. As Milton’s application for post-conviction relief proceeded through Oklahoma courts, the courts considered conflicting evidence about offers for a 20/20 Deal, a 25/20 Deal, and a supposed 23-year deal. The timing, communication, and existence of each of these deals were the basis of Milton's grounds for appeal here: had one of Milton's defense counsel offered Milton the 20/20 Deal minutes before the preliminary hearing, Milton could not have suffered prejudice from any earlier failure by his counsel to communicate a less favorable 23-year offer. But had defense counsel offered Milton the 25/20 Deal before the preliminary hearing, Milton could have suffered prejudice if his counsel failed to communicate a more favorable 23-year deal before the preliminary hearing. But the state courts denied Milton relief without ever determining whether the 23-year deal was ever offered, and if so, whether Milton’s counsel had told Milton about it. Milton sought a COA to appeal the denial of habeas relief, arguing again, he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. New evidence discovered at the federal evidentiary hearing assisted the Tenth Circuit's de novo review of Milton’s ineffective-assistance claims, and the Court concluded that all of them lacked merit. Accordingly, the Court denied Milton’s request for a COA on all bases presented. View "Milton v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Independence Institute, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, conducts research and educates the public on public policy. During the 2014 Colorado gubernatorial campaign, the Institute intended to air an advertisement on Denver-area television that was critical of the state’s failure to audit its new health care insurance exchange. The Institute was concerned that the ad qualified as an “electioneering communication” under the Colorado Constitution and, therefore, to run it the Institute would have to disclose the identity of financial donors who funded the ad. The Institute resisted the disclosure requirement, arguing that the First Amendment prohibited disclosure of donors to an ad that is purely about a public policy issue and is unrelated to a campaign. The Tenth Circuit court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Colorado Secretary of State. "Colorado’s disclosure requirements, as applied to this advertisement, meet the exacting scrutiny standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. . . . The provision serves the legitimate interest of informing the public about the financing of ads that mention political candidates in the final weeks of a campaign, and its scope is sufficiently tailored to require disclosure only of funds earmarked for the financing of such ads." View "Independence Institute v. Williams" on Justia Law