Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Federal prisoner William Kurtz appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). His appointed counsel submitted an "Anders" brief stating this appeal presented no non-frivolous grounds for reversal. After carefully examining the record, the Tenth Circuit agreed, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed this appeal. View "United States v. Kurtz" on Justia Law

Defendant Ismael Mendoza appealed the denial of his motion to suppress drugs found in two ice chests in a vehicle he was driving. He argued: (1) that his consent to search the vehicle was invalid because he gave his consent while an officer was unlawfully detaining him; (2) that the search of the first chest exceeded the scope of his consent when the officer dumped its packaged contents (frozen seafood) on the pavement and pried open the chest’s lining; and (3) that the search and destruction of the second ice chest was unlawful because the officers did not have probable cause specific to that chest. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The officer had reasonable suspicion justifying Defendant’s detention when he consented to the search. The search of the first chest did not exceed the scope of Defendant’s consent; Defendant, who was observing the search, raised no objection to the manner of the search, and the officers’ actions did not destroy or render useless the chest or its contents before they saw a drug package in the lining. And the search of the second chest was lawful because the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and destruction of the chest was reasonable in the circumstances. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Several organizations, individuals, and businesses brought suit against Colorado’s governor, John Hickenlooper, arguing Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-12-112 and Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-12-302 (effective July 1, 2013) violated the Second Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Tenth Circuit court surmised that from this litigation’s inception, "plaintiffs’ standing to assert these claims was less than assured." The district court concluded several Colorado sheriffs lacked standing to bring their claims and dismissed them from the case. After a nine-day bench trial, the district court expressed skepticism that any of the remaining plaintiffs had established standing to challenge the statutes at issue here. Nevertheless, “with the benefit of some generous assumptions,” it found that at least one plaintiff had standing to challenge each statute. After winning the jurisdictional battle, however, the plaintiffs ultimately lost the war; the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded the jurisdictional issue was not resolved as the district court had found. The Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing to bring any of their claims, and therefore vacated the district court’s order granting judgment for the defendant. The case was remanded with directions to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. View "Colorado Outfitters v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Defendant Marvin Iverson was convicted by jury of engaging in a scheme to defraud JPMorgan Chase and Big Horn Federal Savings. The statute under which he was convicted required that the victims be “financial institutions.” To establish that element of the offense, the government offered the testimony of an FBI agent to try to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). On appeal Defendant argued that the agent’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated the best-evidence rule. He also argued that even if the evidence was admissible, it was insufficient to prove that JPMorgan and Big Horn had FDIC insurance at the time of the offense. Despite the government’s concession to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agent’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay; it was either not hearsay or fell within a hearsay exception. As for the best-evidence rule, Defendant did not raise the issue below and he had not shown plain error. The Court also rejected defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. View "United States v. Iverson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Keith Courtney was convicted by jury of three counts of wire fraud, for which he received a 24-month prison sentence followed by three years’ supervised release and ordered to forfeit $1,601,825.84, the full value of the fraudulent wire transfers at issue in the underlying case. In addition, the court imposed $493,230.88 in restitution. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the forfeiture order must be reduced by the amount the lenders received from the properties through mortgage payments and the sale of the properties; and (2) he should have been allowed to inform the jury of the possible sentence and its power to acquit him if they believed the conviction would be unjust. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with defendant on his first contention and reversed, and affirmed on the second. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Ashley Stephens, an agent with the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, received several tips that defendant-appellant Ralph Carloss, a previously convicted felon, was unlawfully in possession of a firearm, possibly a machine gun, and was selling methamphetamine. In order to investigate these tips, Agent Stephens, along with Tahlequah, Oklahoma police investigator Elden Graves, went one afternoon to the home where Carloss was staying to talk with him. There was no evidence of any fence or other enclosure around the house or yard, but there were several “No Trespassing” signs placed in the yard and on the front door. Specifically there was a “No Trespassing” sign on an approximately three-foot-high wooden post located beside the driveway, on the side farthest from the house, and another sign tacked to a tree in the side yard, both stating “Private Property No Trespassing.” In this direct criminal appeal, Carloss contended that the two police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by knocking on his front door seeking to speak with him. Ordinarily a police officer, like any citizen, has an implied license to approach a home, knock on the front door, and ask to speak with the occupants. Carloss, however, claimed that “No Trespassing” signs posted around the house and on the front door of his home revoked that implied license. After review of this matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded, to the contrary, that under the circumstances presented here, those “No Trespassing” signs would not have conveyed to an objective officer that he could not approach the house and knock on the front door seeking to have a consensual conversation with the occupants. "Nor did the officers exceed the implied license to knock on the front door by knocking too long." The Court also upheld the district court’s factual finding that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers entering the house. Therefore, the district court’s decision to deny Carloss’ motion to suppress evidence that the officers discovered as a result of their consensual interaction with Carloss after he responded to their knocking, was affirmed. View "United States v. Carloss" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Humberto Llantada pleaded guilty to charges arising from a drug conspiracy in 2014. The district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment, followed by terms of supervised release ranging from one to five years, and imposed a number of special conditions that would apply when he was released. He challenged those conditions on vagueness grounds. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to award him a sentence reduction because of his relatively minor role in the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence and conditions: "Our decision in 'United States v. Munoz,( ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 502863 (10th Cir. 2016)) resolves most of the challenges to the special conditions imposed in this case. […] The conditions of supervised release imposed here are sufficiently clear to inform a parolee of what conduct will result in a return to prison." View "United States v. Llantada" on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fabian Rangel-Perez challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) characterization of his Utah misdemeanor conviction as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The BIA concluded that Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction for unlawful sexual activity with a minor fell within the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies that includes “sexual abuse of a minor” offenses. Rangel-Perez argued that his prior Utah conviction is not an “aggravated felony” under the INA because the INA’s generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense required proof of both mens rea and a four-year age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, yet neither was an element of the Utah statute under which he was convicted. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Rangel-Perez that the INA’s category of “aggravated” felonies for “sexual abuse of a minor” included only offenses that require proof of at least a “knowing” mens rea or scienter. Therefore, Rangel-Perez’s Utah conviction was not a “sexual abuse of a minor” offense under the INA. Thus, the Court reversed the BIA’s decision to treat Rangel-Perez’s prior conviction as an “aggravated felony” and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rangel-Perez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Smith was convicted by jury on eight counts of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. Defendant raised two grounds for appeal: (1) that the eight counts of distribution were multiplicitous, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy; and (2) the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) at sentencing when it adopted the presentence-report (PSR) account of his pending child-rape charge over his pro se objection without making a finding based on the preponderance of the evidence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: Defendant did not raise the double-jeopardy issue below and he has not shown plain error; and the district court’s refusal to address a pro se objection by a defendant represented by counsel was not an abuse of discretion and, in any event, was harmless. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law