Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Myron Harry appealed his conviction of sexual assault at the home of friends while the victim was sleeping after a party. On appeal, he argued that all but one of his text messages were used against him at trial, but none of the host’s messages were presented, therefore his right to due process was violated by the failure to preserve text messages sent to him by the host, whose cell phone had been provided to officers as evidence. The other two challenges related to the district court’s grant of the government’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude any evidence that the victim flirted with Defendant during the party. Finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Harry" on Justia Law

In 2015, Petitioner Embry Loftis received a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his section 2254 habeas petition as time-barred. The Tenth Circuit considered the merits of Petitioner’s argument that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under the unique circumstances of this case. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that Petitioner made reasonable, diligent efforts to comply with state law under the unique circumstances he faced, and the state district court “led [him] to believe that he . . . had done all that [wa]s required under the circumstances” by granting his request for an extension of time to file his appeal. "The record clearly shows that Petitioner did not sleep on his federal rights, but rather diligently pursued his habeas claims through a state process that he reasonably believed to be sufficient." The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Accordingly the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s habeas petition as time-barred was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Loftis v. Harvanek" on Justia Law

Jesus Munoz was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He pled guilty and was sentenced to time served or thirteen days, whichever was less, and two years of supervised release. The term of the supervised release included twelve “standard” conditions of supervised release and two “special” conditions. On appeal, Munoz raised substantive and procedural challenges to twelve of the fourteen conditions. Rejecting all, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Munoz" on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law

Oklahoma state prisoner Antonio Milton requested a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. In 2007, Milton was prosecuted in two separate cases pending simultaneously before a state district court: a charge for crack cocaine trafficking; the other, involvement in a drive-by shooting. Because Milton had two earlier felony drug-trafficking convictions, the crack-cocaine-trafficking charge mandated life without parole if convicted. The State extended Milton at least one plea offer that covered at least one of Milton’s two cases. Milton ultimately rejected the offered plea deal(s) and went to trial in the drug-trafficking case, where he was convicted. After this, the State let the drive-by-shooting case lapse, leaving the court to dismiss it for lack of prosecution. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed all of Milton’s convictions and sentences, including the drug-trafficking conviction with its mandatory life-without-parole sentence. Later, Milton filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing in Oklahoma state district court. Relevant here, Milton argued “that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert on direct appeal that Milton’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Milton of a plea-bargain offer made by the prosecution prior to the preliminary hearing.” The state district court denied Milton’s application for post-conviction relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. As Milton’s application for post-conviction relief proceeded through Oklahoma courts, the courts considered conflicting evidence about offers for a 20/20 Deal, a 25/20 Deal, and a supposed 23-year deal. The timing, communication, and existence of each of these deals were the basis of Milton's grounds for appeal here: had one of Milton's defense counsel offered Milton the 20/20 Deal minutes before the preliminary hearing, Milton could not have suffered prejudice from any earlier failure by his counsel to communicate a less favorable 23-year offer. But had defense counsel offered Milton the 25/20 Deal before the preliminary hearing, Milton could have suffered prejudice if his counsel failed to communicate a more favorable 23-year deal before the preliminary hearing. But the state courts denied Milton relief without ever determining whether the 23-year deal was ever offered, and if so, whether Milton’s counsel had told Milton about it. Milton sought a COA to appeal the denial of habeas relief, arguing again, he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. New evidence discovered at the federal evidentiary hearing assisted the Tenth Circuit's de novo review of Milton’s ineffective-assistance claims, and the Court concluded that all of them lacked merit. Accordingly, the Court denied Milton’s request for a COA on all bases presented. View "Milton v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Independence Institute, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, conducts research and educates the public on public policy. During the 2014 Colorado gubernatorial campaign, the Institute intended to air an advertisement on Denver-area television that was critical of the state’s failure to audit its new health care insurance exchange. The Institute was concerned that the ad qualified as an “electioneering communication” under the Colorado Constitution and, therefore, to run it the Institute would have to disclose the identity of financial donors who funded the ad. The Institute resisted the disclosure requirement, arguing that the First Amendment prohibited disclosure of donors to an ad that is purely about a public policy issue and is unrelated to a campaign. The Tenth Circuit court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Colorado Secretary of State. "Colorado’s disclosure requirements, as applied to this advertisement, meet the exacting scrutiny standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. . . . The provision serves the legitimate interest of informing the public about the financing of ads that mention political candidates in the final weeks of a campaign, and its scope is sufficiently tailored to require disclosure only of funds earmarked for the financing of such ads." View "Independence Institute v. Williams" on Justia Law

Amidst the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the Office of the State Bank Commissioner of Kansas declared The Columbian Bank and Trust Company insolvent, seized the bank’s assets, and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. The FDIC then sold many of the bank’s assets. Columbian Financial Corporation, the bank’s sole shareholder, sued the state bank commission and four commission officials (Judi Stork, Deryl Schuster, Edwin Splichal, and J. Thomas Thull). Columbian Financial alleged denial of due process from the seizure of bank assets, and sought equitable remedies and damages. The district court dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed, with the parties raising two issues: (1) whether the district court properly abstained under "Younger v. Harris," (401 U.S. 37 (1971)); and (2) whether Stork and Thull were entitled to qualified immunity on the claims for damages. The Tenth Circuit found that a state court proceeding was ongoing when the federal complaint was filed, and the state proceeding terminated while this appeal was pending. In light of this change of circumstances, the Court vacated the dismissal without prejudice on the equitable claims and remand for further proceedings. The Court also found that Stork and Thull enjoyed qualified immunity on the claim for damages because the alleged conduct would not have violated a clearly established constitutional right. View "Columbian Financial Corp. v. Stork" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Fager appealed the denial of his Motion to Suppress a firearm police officers discovered on his person during a roadside frisk. A Topeka Police Department deputy stopped defendant's car for a turn signal violation near an apartment complex in a high-crime area of Topeka. The deputy noticed defendant’s eyes were watery, his speech was soft, and an unopened beer can sat in the center console of the vehicle (signs that indicated defendant may have been impaired). Furthermore, defendant's passenger continually leaned forward in a way that made the deputy think the passenger was trying to obstruct his view of defendant, an action which the deputy found suspicious. Although the deputy discovered Defendant had at least one prior DUI, he determined defendant was not then impaired. The deputy asked for and received permission to search defendant's car. Prior to the search, the deputy conducted a pat-down search of defendant, when he discovered defendant was carrying a firearm. Defendant would ultimately be indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, and he moved to suppress evidence of the firearm arguing the pat-down search was unlawful. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether the officers’ concerns for their own safety gave them the requisite reasonable suspicion to frisk Defendant. The Court held that these concerns sufficiently justified the frisk under the totality of the circumstances and affirmed. View "United States v. Fager" on Justia Law

In May 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Claud Koerber on one count each of mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax evasion. In November 2009 and September 2011, the grand jury returned two additional superseding indictments, ultimately charging Koerber with 20 counts related to his alleged Ponzi scheme. Koerber’s case remained pending for more than five years without ever reaching trial. In August 2014, on Koerber’s motion, the district court found a violation of the Speedy Trial Act (STA), exercised its discretion and dismissed Koerber’s case with prejudice. The government appealed, arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. Although the Tenth Circuit disagreed with most of the government’s arguments, the Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in two respects: (1) by including improper factors in its consideration of the seriousness-of-the-offense factor, and (2) by failing to fully consider Koerber’s own actions that may have contributed to the speedy-trial delay. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice, and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "United States v. Koerber" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant James Beierle of being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The sentencing court found him eligible for a sentence enhancement under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant appealed, raising three contentions: (1) he was denied due process when he was not present for a conference to settle jury instructions; (2) the district court committed plain error by permitting the deputy sheriff to whom he confessed to testify that there were no indications during the interview that defendant was being untruthful; and (3) his sentence under the ACCA was unlawful. After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected defendant’s first two contentions and accepted his third. "Defendant’s absence from the instruction conference did not deprive him of due process because he had nothing to contribute to the purely legal matters that were decided at the conference. Even if the admission of the deputy’s testimony was error, Defendant failed to show prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. And Defendant’s sentence must be set aside because the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague." The Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the district court for resentencing. View "United States v. Beierle" on Justia Law