Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Delray Quiver pled guilty to assaulting, resisting, and injuring a federal officer. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for Quiver’s “use” of a “dangerous weapon” (the officer’s Taser) during the assault. Quiver appealed the application of the enhancement. As the officer tried to subdue Quiver to arrest him, Quiver managed to turn over and punch the officer in the face, breaking his glasses. During the ensuing struggle, Quiver took control of the Taser and drive-stunned the officer’s leg. Quiver’s pressing the Taser against the officer’s thigh left two burn marks. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Taser, even in stun-mode, was a dangerous weapon. The Court also concluded that in Quiver momentarily taking control of the Taser, he “used” it against the officer. For these simple reasons, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the four-level enhancement applied. View "United States v. Quiver" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose from a sting operation designed to determine if police officers in the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department’s (KCKPD) “SCORE” Unit were stealing from residences while executing search warrants. As a result of the sting operation, three officers were indicted and pled guilty to federal crimes. The remaining officers brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of their Fourth Amendment rights for arrests without probable cause. The individual Defendants-Appellants appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The entity Defendant-Appellant (Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City) also appealed, arguing that should the Tenth Circuit determine a constitutional violation did not occur, it should reverse and render judgment in its favor. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the basis that the law was not clearly established at the time of the arrests in question. The Court dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Callahan v. Unified Govt of Wyandotte" on Justia Law

In July 2005, defendant-appellant Laura Wetzel-Sanders pled guilty to one count of bank robbery. For purposes of sentencing, she was deemed a career offender based upon a 2000 Kansas state conviction for criminal threat (for which she received a seven-month sentence) and a 2002 federal conviction for bank robbery (for which she received an 18-month sentence). On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendant argued that she was sentenced on materially incorrect information: that after the Court’s decision in “United States v. Brooks,” (751 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014)), defendant’s state criminal threat conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of applying the career-offender guideline. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that this appeal was defendant’s third successive section 2255 motion, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s order on the merits and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Wetzel-Sanders" on Justia Law

Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to 57 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging several violations. Flaugher stipulated to one of the violations, use of methamphetamine. The district court revoked his supervised release, resentenced him to another 12 months and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s objections, the court also imposed a condition to the supervised release, requiring Flaugher to be subject to a search of his house, car or person, by a probation officer. On appeal, Flaugher argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) prohibited district courts from imposing warrantless-search conditions except in cases involving felons required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He challenged the condition because he was not required to register under SORNA. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Flaugher" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Shelton Jackson appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence. In 1997, Jackson was charged with the murder of Monica Decator in Tulsa, Oklahoma and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Jackson raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether the state court’s submission to the jury of an allegedly invalid sentencing aggravator unconstitutionally skewed the jury’s deliberations during the penalty phase of his trial; (2) whether his defense lawyers provided constitutionally deficient representation during the penalty phase; and (3) whether the combined effect of these two errors warrants habeas relief even if, viewed individually, each error is harmless. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. Warrior" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of defendant-appellee Zachary Krueger motion to suppress evidence seized in Oklahoma pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate judge in Kansas. Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) learned that child pornography was being distributed over the internet from an IP address registered to Krueger, a Kansas resident. An HSI agent thereafter obtained a warrant from a United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas to search Krueger’s Kansas residence for items such as computers and cell phones that may be used to depict child pornography visually. Upon executing the warrant, the agent discovered that Krueger was not home and that his computer and cell phone were not in the residence. Krueger’s roommate, who was present at the time, indicated that Krueger was in Oklahoma City visiting a friend, and that Krueger may have taken his computer and cell phone with him to Oklahoma. Based on this information, the Kansas-based HSI agent asked an Oklahoma-based HSI agent to verify Krueger’s whereabouts and execute a second warrant, obtained from a different United States magistrate judge in the District of Kansas. This warrant authorized law enforcement to search both the Oklahoma residence and Krueger’s automobile parked outside the Oklahoma residence for electronic devices belonging to Krueger or in his possession. Krueger was present when the agents executed the second warrant, and they seized (among other things) Krueger’s computer and external hard drive. In granting Krueger’s motion to suppress this evidence, the district court concluded that suppression was necessary because: (1) the warrant violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, which generally limits a federal magistrate judge’s warrant-issuing authority to the district where he or she sits; and (2) Krueger established that he was prejudiced by the Rule 41 violation. On appeal, the Government argued that reversal was necessary because the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining that Krueger established prejudice. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression order. View "United States v. Krueger" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Jesus Ibarra-Diaz appealed his possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine conviction, arguing: (1) the district court violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by admitting various statements of testimonial hearsay at trial; (2) he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of inflammatory testimony from the government’s key witness; (3) he was deprived of a unanimous jury verdict by an allegedly duplicitous indictment; and (4) there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support his conviction. Taking each argument in turn, the Tenth Circuit rejected defendant’s arguments on appeal and affirmed his conviction. View "United States v. Ibarra-Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kelvin Hill boarded an east-bound Amtrak train in Los Angeles, California. The train stopped in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and was boarded by Agent Kevin Small of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) to conduct drug-interdiction activities. Small proceeded to a common luggage area, noticing a black and white “Coogi” brand suitcase with no name tag. He removed the Coogi suitcase from the common luggage area; carried it to the passenger area; and rolled it down the center aisle of the coach, asking each passenger if the bag belonged to him. All passengers present in the coach, including defendant, denied ownership of the bag. Deeming it abandoned, Small searched the bag, finding a large quantity of cocaine and items of clothing linking the bag to defendant. A grand jury charged defendant with possessing with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing that Small’s taking the Coogi bag from the common storage area and moving it about the coach amounted to an illegal seizure, rendering defendant’s subsequent abandonment of the bag legally invalid. The district court denied the motion. Defendant’s appeal of the denial of his suppression motion framed a particularly narrow legal question for the Tenth Circuit’s review: did Small’s actions in removing defendant’s bag from the train’s common luggage area and carrying it through the coach as he questioned passengers constitute a seizure of the bag? The Tenth Circuit answered in the affirmative: Small’s actions amounted to a “meaningful interference with [Hill’s] possessory interests in” the Coogi bag. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Rodella, the former sheriff of Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, was convicted by a jury of one count of depriving a person of his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable force and seizure, resulting in bodily injury and including the use of a dangerous weapon. The conviction stems from a “road rage” incident in 2014 in which Michael Tafoya, outraged he was being tailgated by a Jeep containing Rodella, “flipped off” the driver, Rodella’s son Thomas Junior. According to Tafoya, both men started walking towards his Mazda in an aggressive fashion while simultaneously telling Tafoya to “come on.” At no point, according to Tafoya, did Rodella flash a badge or otherwise identify himself as a law enforcement officer. Tafoya, unaware of either man’s identity and believing that the two men wanted to fight him, sped off in his vehicle. Rodella and his son got back in their Jeep and, with Rodella Jr. again driving, began to follow Tafoya. In an attempt to elude the Jeep, Tafoya’s vehicle got stuck on a metal pole. The Jeep caught up with Tafoya. Rodella and Tafoya struggled before additional deputies arrived on the scene. Tafoya was arrested and jailed before being bailed out by his grandfather. The criminal charges were ultimately dismissed. Tafoya recounted this experience to the FBI. For violating Tafoya’s Constitutional rights, Rodella was sentenced to a total term of 121 months. On appeal, Rodella challenged his convictions on several grounds. But finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Rodella" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this matter was whether appellant Jonathan Madrid’s prior conviction for statutory rape in Texas qualified as a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In light of “Johnson v. United States,” (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Tenth Circuit held that it did not. Accordingly, the Court vacated Madrid’s sentences as a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Madrid" on Justia Law