Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Michael Harris pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The maximum sentence for a felon-in-possession conviction is typically ten years. But because the sentencing court found Harris had three qualifying "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses," as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the court applied the section 924(e)(1) enhancement and sentenced Harris to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. Harris moved to vacate his sentence due to a change in the law, particularly with regard to what then constituted a "violent felony." Statutory robbery was a "violent felony" under the ACCA. But the Tenth Circuit found that eleven circuit-level decisions reached varying results on the narrow question of whether robbery was considered a "violent felony." In examining various state statutes, five courts found no violent felony and six found a violent felony. Upon independent examination of the Colorado robbery statute here, however, the Tenth Circuit believed Colorado robbery qualified as a violent felony. "Although requiring more analysis than needed at first blush, we, in the end, return to the obvious: Statutory robbery in Colorado is a violent felony under the ACCA" because it had as an element the use or threatened use of "physical force" against another person that is capable of causing physical pain or injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Harris' sentence. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The property at issue here was a backpack owned by defendant-appellant Nicolas Juszczyk, who was repairing his motorcycle in the backyard of Tina Giger. A concerned neighbor contacted police, who came to investigate. When they did, Juszczyk threw the backpack onto Giger's roof, where the backpack was later retrieved by police and searched. Methamphetamine, a firearm, and documents bearing Juszczyk's name were found inside. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether Juszczyk lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy after throwing his backpack onto the roof. The Court concluded that any expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable; as a result, Juszczyk abandoned the backpack and the search was lawful. View "United States v. Juszczyk" on Justia Law

Defendant Jasonn Gonzales pleaded guilty to four counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft, arising out of a scheme to obtain unemployment benefits from three state agencies. On appeal his sole argument was that the district court erred in calculating his sentencing-guidelines offense level by including as victims those persons whose identities had been stolen even though they suffered no financial loss. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an administrative action against Colorado businessman David Bandimere, alleging he violated various securities laws. An SEC ALJ presided over a trial-like hearing. The ALJ's initial decision concluded petitioner Bandimere was liable, barred him from the securities industry, ordered him to cease and desist from violating securities laws, imposed civil penalties, and ordered disgorgement. The SEC reviewed the initial decision and reached a similar result in a separate opinion. In his petition to the Tenth Circuit, petitioner challenged the SEC's opinion as a whole, including both his securities fraud and registration liability, based on a constitutional argument, contending that the ALJ that presided over his hearing had been appointed in violation of Appointments Clause. The Tenth Circuit's decision with respect to this argument "relieves Mr. Bandimere of all liability." During the SEC's review, the agency addressed petitioner's argument that the ALJ was an "inferior officer," as was contemplated by the Federal Constitution. The SEC conceded the ALJ had not been constitutionally appointed, but rejected petitioner's argument because, in its view, the ALJ was not an inferior officer. The Tenth Circuit, after careful consideration, concluded that indeed, the ALJ was an inferior officer. "Nothing in this opinion should be read to answer any but the precise question before this court: whether SEC ALJs are employees or inferior officers. [. . .] Having answered the question before us, and thus resolved Mr. Bandimere's petition, we must leave for another day any other putative consequences of that conclusion." The SEC ALJ held his office unconstitutionally when he presided over petitioner's hearing. View "Bandimere v. U.S. SEC" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Wells appealed his conviction after a jury trial of sexual exploitation of a child, for which he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. The only issue he raised by Wells was whether the jury had sufficient evidence to convict him of sexual exploitation of a child. Finding that it did, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant Tommy Taylor was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Tenth Circuit remanded for resentencing because Taylor’s sentence was based in part on the application of the residual clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2), which had been held to be unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the district court sentenced Taylor to a term of imprisonment of 87 months. Taylor again appealed, arguing that the district court incorrectly calculated his base and total offense levels by improperly treating a prior state conviction as a “crime of violence” pursuant to U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.2(a)(1) and 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). After review, the Tenth Circuit rejected Taylor’s arguments and affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at the Topeka Correctional Facility (TCF - an all-female state prison), Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Keith was raped by a prison maintenance employee. Plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit alleging that prison officials, including Warden Richard Koerner, violated her Eighth Amendment rights by creating an environment in which sexual misconduct was likely to occur. The Warden defended primarily on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment to Warden Koerner on qualified immunity. Plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Warden Koerner created an atmosphere where “policies were honored only in the breach, and, as a result, he failed to take reasonable measures to ensure inmates were safe from the risk of sexual misconduct by TCF employees.” Because plaintiff possessed “a clearly established constitutional right” and presented evidence of a constitutional violation by Warden Koerner, the Tenth Circuit concluded summary judgment was inappropriate on qualified-immunity grounds. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Keith v. Koerner" on Justia Law

A New Mexico statute and a resolution adopted by the Otero County Board of County Commissioners purported to authorize the Board to mitigate fire danger in the Lincoln National Forest without first obtaining permission from the U.S. Forest Service. The United States obtained a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico invalidating the statute and the resolution. The Board appealed. but finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "The Property Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes the federal government to promulgate regulations governing use of national forest lands; and under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and binding precedent, those regulations prevail over any contrary state or local law." View "United States v. Board of Commissioners of Otero County" on Justia Law

The Estate of Clayton Lockett, through its personal representative Gary Lockett, filed suit against the Governor of Oklahoma Mary Fallin; corrections officials, medical officials, EMTs and drug manufacturers, all in relation to the execution of Clayton Lockett. In 1999, Lockett kidnapped, assaulted, and killed nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman. Lockett shot Neiman with a shotgun and then had an accomplice bury her alive. In 2000, a jury found Lockett guilty of 19 felonies arising from the same incident, including the murder, rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, and assault and battery of Neiman. The jury recommended that the court impose the death penalty. Oklahoma used a common drug protocol previously administered in at least 93 Oklahoma executions: three drugs (1) sodium thiopental; (2) pancuronium bromide; and (3) potassium chloride. In 2010, facing difficulty obtaining sodium thiopental, Oklahoma officials amended the Field Memorandum to substitute in its place pentobarbital. In 2014, Oklahoma officials amended their “Field Memorandum” to allow several new alternate procedures for use in executions by lethal injection. As one of these new procedures, officials substituted midazolam as he first drug used in the protocol. Before Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma had not used midazolam during an execution. Warden Anita Trammell and Director of Corrections Robert Patton chose this new protocol. The Estate asserted several constitutional violations related to Lockett’s execution with respect to the new procedures, essentially arguing that changing of the drugs caused Lockett intense pain as additional drugs were entered into the mix. The State parties moved to dismiss the estate’s suit against them, asserting qualified immunity (among other defenses). The district court granted the motion, reasoning that the estate failed to show defendants violated any established law. Finding no error in this judgment, the Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "Estate of Clayton Lockett v. Fallin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Jeremy Gilmore was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Due to two prior drug felonies, he was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. He moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with a retroactive sentencing amendment, arguing his prison term was not “based on” a guidelines sentencing range, as required by 18 U.S.C. 3582 (c)(2). To be afforded a sentencing reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a defendant had to show that his term of imprisonment was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Defendant argued that his 168 month sentence mirrored the low end of a guideline sentence corresponding to a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of IV, and was thus “based on” a guidelines sentencing range. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reduce his sentence because the sentence was based on the parties’ stipulation and not on a “sentencing range” that had been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Defendant argued to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction, and that the stipulation did not bind the district court in reaching his sentence. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court however, that Defendant’s sentence was not “based on” a guidelines sentencing range, and affirmed. View "United States v. Gilmore" on Justia Law