Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC, along with John F. Rudman and Andre Jesus Soto, challenged a New Jersey law that restricts charging for advice on claiming veterans benefits. Veterans Guardian, a consulting company, provides paid advice to veterans on how to claim benefits. The plaintiffs argued that the New Jersey law, which mirrors federal regulations but adds civil enforcement mechanisms, violates their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the law did not trigger First Amendment scrutiny because it regulated conduct, not speech. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court made several errors. The Third Circuit held that Veterans Guardian's services likely constitute speech and that New Jersey's law burdens that speech by prohibiting charging for it. The court emphasized that laws restricting compensation for speech must survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Third Circuit also noted that the District Court failed to analyze the separate provisions of the New Jersey law, which impose different restrictions on speech. The court expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of the provision that bans accepting payment for services rendered before a veteran appeals the VA's initial benefits decision.The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration, instructing the lower court to develop a fuller record and reconsider the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction with the guidance provided. View "Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin" on Justia Law

Carolyn Jackson and John Jackson were convicted of severe child abuse after a thirty-nine-day jury trial. They were charged with conspiracy and multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The jury found John guilty on several counts and Carolyn guilty on all counts. The charges included both "omission counts" (withholding food, water, and medical care) and "commission counts" (forcing ingestion of harmful substances and physical assault). The Jacksons' sentences were vacated multiple times on appeal due to improper sentencing by the original judge, leading to a reassignment for resentencing.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially sentenced the Jacksons, but the sentences were vacated and remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The case was reassigned to Judge Susan Wigenton, who imposed new sentences of 140 months for Carolyn and 108 months for John. The Jacksons appealed these new sentences, arguing violations of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, procedural and substantive unreasonableness, and that the new sentences contradicted prior rulings (law of the case).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not violate the Jacksons' constitutional rights by finding facts at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence, since these findings did not increase the statutory maximum sentence. The court also held that the Jacksons had no reasonable expectation of finality in their sentences while under appeal, so no double jeopardy or due process violation occurred. The court found no procedural errors in the District Court's sentencing process and concluded that the sentences were substantively reasonable. The Third Circuit affirmed the sentences imposed by the District Court. View "U.S. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

John Adams was involved in a case where he picked up two runaway girls, aged 15 and 16, and brought them to his home in Philadelphia. He coerced them into having sex with him and engaging in commercial sex acts, threatening to kick them out if they refused. Adams advertised the minors' sexual services on a European website and collected a portion of the money. He instructed the minors to conceal their ages and delete incriminating text messages. Law enforcement discovered the girls during a traffic stop, and they revealed Adams's actions. Adams attempted to cover up his activities by soliciting another minor to help him blackmail one of the victims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted Adams on six counts, including sex trafficking of a minor, tampering with evidence, witness tampering, and making false statements. Adams moved to dismiss the sex trafficking charges, arguing that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act did not apply to his conduct and that Congress lacked the power to enact the statute. The District Court denied his motions, holding that the Act criminalized domestic sex trafficking and was valid under the Commerce Clause. Adams pleaded guilty to all charges but reserved the right to challenge the applicability of the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act applies to both foreign and domestic sex trafficking and that Adams's conduct fell within the statute's scope. The court also found that Congress had the authority to enact the statute under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, the court upheld the District Court's denial of Adams's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding no breach of the plea agreement by the government and rejecting Adams's claim of innocence. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment of conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. Adams" on Justia Law

A New York wine retailer, Jean Paul Weg LLC, and its owner, Lars Neubohn, challenged New Jersey's regulations that require wine retailers to have a physical presence in the state and to purchase their products from New Jersey licensed wholesalers. These regulations prevent the retailer from directly shipping wine to New Jersey customers. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including the Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the Attorney General of New Jersey. The District Court found that New Jersey's regulations were justified by legitimate local purposes, such as ensuring alcohol sold to New Jersey consumers passes through the state's three-tier system and facilitating inspections to ensure compliance with regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that New Jersey's regulations, while discriminatory in effect, were justified on legitimate nonprotectionist grounds. The court found that the physical presence requirement facilitates inspections and investigations, while the wholesaler purchase requirement helps quickly identify sources of contamination and facilitates product recalls. Additionally, the court determined that these regulations are essential features of New Jersey's three-tier system of alcohol regulation, which is "unquestionably legitimate" under the Twenty-first Amendment. Therefore, the challenged regulations were upheld as constitutional. View "Jean-Paul Weg LLC v. Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

George Pitsilides, a successful restaurateur and professional poker player, was convicted in 1998 in Pennsylvania for criminal conspiracy to commit pool selling and bookmaking, and two counts of pool selling and bookmaking. These offenses are classified as first-degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Consequently, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Pitsilides is barred from possessing a firearm. Despite these convictions, Pitsilides continued to engage in illegal gambling activities, leading to further convictions in Virginia in 2011 for operating an illegal gambling enterprise.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, applying the two-step framework from Binderup v. Attorney General. The court concluded that Pitsilides failed to show his convictions were not serious and rejected his argument that his offenses fell within the carveout for business-related offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the legal landscape had changed significantly since the District Court's decision, particularly with the Supreme Court's rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. These cases emphasized the need for individualized assessments of whether a felon poses a danger to public safety when challenging firearm prohibitions under the Second Amendment.The Third Circuit concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Pitsilides. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for further factual development to assess whether Pitsilides poses a special danger of misusing firearms. View "Pitsilides v. Barr" on Justia Law

Corrigan Clay, an American citizen, pleaded guilty to sexually abusing his minor adopted daughter while living in Haiti, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). Clay argued that Congress lacked the power to enact § 2423(c), which criminalizes illicit sexual conduct by U.S. citizens abroad. He contended that his non-commercial conduct did not fall under Congress's authority to regulate foreign commerce or its treaty power.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Clay's motion to dismiss the indictment, ruling that § 2423(c) was a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate the channels of foreign commerce. The court did not address the treaty power arguments. Clay then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 235 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range. He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of § 2423(c) and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that § 2423(c) is a permissible exercise of congressional power under both the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The court reasoned that Congress has broader authority to regulate foreign commerce than interstate commerce, and § 2423(c) fits within this power as it regulates the channels of foreign commerce and activities that substantially affect foreign commerce. Additionally, the court found that § 2423(c) is rationally related to implementing the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, thus falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause.The Third Circuit also found no procedural or substantive errors in Clay's sentencing, affirming the District Court's judgment. The court concluded that the sentence was reasonable and appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. View "USA v. Clay" on Justia Law

Aqudre Quailes and Ayinda Harper were separately charged with being felons in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Harper was on Pennsylvania state probation and parole when his probation officer discovered photographs of him holding firearms on social media. During a home visit, officers found a semiautomatic pistol in his residence. Harper had thirteen prior felony convictions. Quailes, on parole for one of his six prior felony convictions, was arrested for absconding from parole. Authorities found firearms and ammunition in his girlfriend’s apartment, where he had been staying.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed both indictments, ruling that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the defendants' status as parolees or probationers did not negate their Second Amendment rights. The Government appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to state parolees and probationers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Quailes and Harper because neither had completed their criminal sentences. The court referenced its en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General, which held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional for a felon who had completed his sentence, and United States v. Moore, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) for felons still serving their sentences. The court concluded that historical practices support disarming convicts who are still serving their sentences, including those on state parole or probation. Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s orders and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "USA v. Quailes" on Justia Law

A Harrisburg, Pennsylvania ordinance prohibits persons to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from any portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a health care facility.” Individuals purporting to provide “sidewalk counseling” to those entering abortion clinics claimed that the ordinance violated their First Amendment rights to speak, exercise their religion, and assemble, and their due process and equal protection rights. The court determined that the ordinance was content-neutral because it did not define or regulate speech by subject-matter or purpose, so that intermediate scrutiny applied, and reasoned that it must accept as true (on a motion to dismiss) claims that the city did not consider less restrictive alternatives. The claims proceeded to discovery. In denying preliminary injunctive relief, the court ruled that plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs normally bear the burden of demonstrating likelihood of prevailing on the merits. In First Amendment cases where the government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of a statute’s constitutionality, plaintiffs must be deemed likely to prevail for purposes of considering a preliminary injunction unless the government has shown that plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than the statute. View "Reilly v. City of Harrisburg" on Justia Law

Roquet, is a psychologist at the Avenel Special Treatment Unit (STU), where Oliver, a sexually violent predator, has been civilly committed for treatment. At least annually, the Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC) interviews each detainee and considers a range of materials to formulate a recommendation about whether the patient should progress to the next step in the program. Roquet, a member of the TPRC, wrote a report that recommended that Oliver not advance in treatment. The Report recognized that this was “not consistent” with Oliver’s treatment team's recommendation, but concluded that Oliver “had not fully met the treatment goals,” provided a detailed overview of Oliver’s sexual and non-sexual offenses, diagnostic history, and clinical treatment, and summarized the results of Oliver's interview, including that “it appears that he denies, minimizes or justifies much of his documented offense history,” and that “[h]e did not demonstrate remorse for his crimes or empathy for his victims.” Oliver sued, alleging retaliation for his First Amendment-protected participation in legal activities on behalf of himself and other STU residents. The Third Circuit concluded that Roquet was entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that Oliver pleaded facts reflecting that Roquet based her recommendation on the medically-relevant collateral consequences of his protected activity, but has not sufficiently pleaded that the recommendation was based on the protected activity itself. View "Oliver v. Roquet" on Justia Law

Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to jury instruction concerning eyewitness testimony, using the words “may not” rather than “need not.” Bey was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and possessing an instrument of crime, based on a nonfatal shooting and a fatal shooting that took place in 2001. Philadelphia Police Officer Taylor was in the parking lot during the shooting: his identification of Bey as the shooter was consistent and unequivocal. However, in statements to Bey’s then-defense counsel, the surviving victim said that his shooter was not Bey. Defense counsel requested a “Kloiber” jury instruction. In instructing the jury, the court changed a word, telling jurors that they “may not” receive an identification with caution rather than instructing them that they “need not” receive the identification with caution. Defense counsel did not object. In his unsuccessful petition for state post-conviction relief, Bey raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the Kloiber instruction, but failed to highlight the “may not” language. The federal district court held that, to the extent that Bey’s ineffective assistance claims were not procedurally defaulted, Bey could not show prejudice because “there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.” The Third Circuit reversed, based on the Kloiber claim, finding cause to excuse Bey’s procedural default. View "Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law