Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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Pretrial detainee’s due process rights were not violated by placement in administrative segregation and restriction of phone privileges pending investigation of misconduct. While Steele was a pretrial detainee at New Jersey’s Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, officials received credible information that Steele was threatening other detainees in order to coerce them into using Speedy Bail Bond Service and was receiving compensation from Speedy. After interviewing Steele and advising him of the allegations, officials placed him in administrative segregation while they investigated. Steele’s telephone privileges were restricted to legal calls only. Steele filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his due process rights when the defendants transferred him to administrative segregation and restricted his phone privileges, interfering with his ability to find a co-signer for his own bail. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. Defendants’ limitation of Steele’s phone privileges did not “shock the conscience.” Steele has not met his heavy burden of showing that defendants exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that actuated his move. Steele’s transfer was for institutional security reasons rather than for discipline or punishment and he was accorded the required level of process. View "Steele v. Cicchi" on Justia Law

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In 2008, the Delaware correctional system was facing scandal for its handling of inmate releases. One inmate committed suicide in his cell on the day he was supposed to be—but was not—released. Dozens of others had either been released too early or too late. Reform consisted of establishment of a new Central Offender Records office within the Delaware Department of Corrections. Inmates who were over-detained sued top correctional officials in a putative class action, claiming that Delaware’s problems with over-detentions have, if anything, gotten worse since 2008. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court noted that “hard, reliable data about the number of over-detentions occurring each year is more or less missing from the record.” To survive summary judgment on an allegation of deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs needed more than speculation connecting any increase in over-detentions with the COR policies they deem ineffective. View "Wharton v. Danberg" on Justia Law

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Brandon, convicted of burglary, was sentenced to 16–48 months’ imprisonment. During intake, Brandon informed mental health staff that he had attempted suicide, had recently engaged in self-harm, and had plans about how to kill himself. Brandon was diagnosed with serious mental disorders, identified as a “suicide behavior risk,” and placed on the mental health roster. During his incarceration at Pennsylania's SCI Cresson, Brandon reported suicidal thoughts. Brandon did not receive counseling or evaluation; any mental health interviews were conducted “through the cell door slot in the solitary confinement unit.” Brandon was repeatedly subjected to solitary confinement. Most SCI Cresson incidents of self-harm occurred in solitary confinement. During Brandon’s incarceration, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated allegations that SCI Cresson provided inadequate mental health care, failed to adequately protect prisoners, and subjected them to excessive periods of isolation. Ultimately, the DOJ reported “systemwide failure” to consider mental health issues appropriately, a “fragmented and ineffective” mental healthcare program, insufficient staffing, poor recordkeeping, screening and diagnostic procedures, deficient oversight and lack of training in the proper response to warning signs by mentally ill prisoners. Brandon, age 23, committed suicide while in solitary confinement. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of his parents’ civil rights claims. Their allegations support an inference that, despite knowing of Brandon’s vulnerability and the increased risk of suicide in solitary confinement, the defendants disregarded that risk and permitted Brandon to be repeatedly isolated in solitary confinement. View "Palakovic v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

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Wagner, age 15, was walking home, when a man demanded that she get into his car. Wagner refused and told him that she would call the police. He sped away. Stowe Township Officers Sciulli and Ruiz responded and recorded the girl’s description of the vehicle as a red, four-door sedan with a Pennsylvania license plate bearing the letters ACG, driven by a white male with dark hair, around 35 years old. The next day, her mother was driving Wagner home when Wagner saw a red car. She told her mother that it was the car that had stopped her the day before. The license number was JDG4817. They followed the car to a parking lot and saw the driver. Wagner’s mother drove her to the police station. Officers identified the car as belonging to Andrews, obtained Andrews’ license photo, and created a photo array. Wagner identified Andrews. Sciulli went to the parking lot and saw Andrews’ vehicle, a three-door coupe. Sciulli drafted an affidavit of probable cause. A magistrate issued an arrest warrant. Andrews was charged with, but acquitted of, luring a child into a motor vehicle, stalking, corruption of a minor, and harassment. He filed suit. The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that Sciulli was entitled to qualified immunity, noting Siulli’s omission of information about the license plate and vehicle description discrepancies from the affidavit. View "Andrews v. Scuilli" on Justia Law

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The Mirabellas alleged that their neighbors extended their backyard into wetlands owned by Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania by fencing the open space, placing playground equipment, and landscaping. They complained to the Township, which removed the fence, required the neighbors to move their playground equipment and required the neighbors to stop landscaping the open space. The Mirabellas alleged the neighbors continued to “cut and clear.” They continued to complain. The Township gave the neighbors permission to mow the open space. The Mirabellas, both attorneys, notified the Township Board that they intended to sue their neighbors and stated that, as the owner of the open space, “the Township will be an indispensable party.” Officials interpreted this as a threat that the Mirabellas would sue the Township and responded that the Township would seek sanctions. The Board’s chair, Walsh, emailed the Mirabellas to “direct all further communications to the Township attorney. Please never contact me, the Board of Supervisors or the Township employees directly.” The Mirabellas attended a Board meeting and protested the destruction of the open space and the emails. The Mirabellas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations. The district court rejected claims of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. While the Mirabellas adequately alleged a retaliation claim and a violation of their right to petition, those rights were not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. View "Mirabella v. Villard" on Justia Law

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While investigating Doe concerning online child pornography, agents executed a warrant and seized iPhones and a computer with attached hard drives, all protected with encryption software. Forensic analysts discovered the password for the computer and found an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, logs showing that it had been used to visit sites with titles common in child exploitation, and that Doe had downloaded thousands of known child pornography files, which were stored on the encrypted external drives and could not be accessed. Doe's sister related that Doe had shown her hundreds of child pornography images on those drives. A magistrate, acting under the All Writs Act, ordered Doe to produce his devices and drives in an unencrypted state. Doe did not appeal the order but unsuccessfully moved to quash, arguing that his decrypting the devices would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege. The magistrate held that, because the government possessed Doe’s devices and knew the contents included child pornography, the decryption would not be testimonial. Doe did not appeal. Doe produced the unencrypted iPhone, which contained adult pornography, a video of Doe’s four-year-old niece wearing only underwear, and approximately 20 photographs focused on the genitals of Doe’s six-year-old niece. Doe stated that he could not remember the hard drive passwords and entered incorrect passwords during the examination. The court held Doe in civil contempt and ordered his incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that Doe bore the burden of proving that he could not produce the passwords and had waived his Fifth Amendment arguments. View "United States v. Apple Macpro Computer" on Justia Law

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Pearson, a Pennsylvania prisoner, was hospitalized twice in April 2007: first for surgery to remove his appendix and later for surgery to repair a urethral tear caused by insertion of a catheter during the first surgery. Pearson claims that he was in intense pain for several hours before each hospitalization and that medical staff were dismissive of his complaints. In 2009, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials and an independent medical contractor were deliberately indifferent to those needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After remands, the district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to one defendant, a nurse, but otherwise affirmed. Rhodes claimed that the nurse refused to examine him and forced him to crawl to a wheelchair, claims that do not require extrinsic proof or expert testimony. Pearson did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the other defendants were deliberately indifferent. View "Pearson v. Prison Health Service" on Justia Law

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In 2005, off-duty police officer Flomo was shot to death while sitting in his car in North Philadelphia. The shooting occurred after Flomo had stopped his car and solicited Bowens, a prostitute and Slaughter’s and Johnson’s long-time drug customer. Johnson and Slaughter were charged with murder based on witness identifications and forensic testimony. A jury acquitted both defendants of first-degree murder, but convicted Slaughter on third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. It failed to reach a verdict on remaining charges as to Johnson. At Johnson’s retrial, the prosecution introduced a statement that Slaughter had given police that implicated Johnson, in violation of Johnson’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. A jury found Johnson guilty of third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy; he was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 20-40 years and 10-20 years. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Johnson unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, based on the introduction of that statement and the prosecutor’s calling Slaughter to testify knowing that Slaughter would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Third Circuit affirmed. denial of Johnson’s habeas petition, reasoning that Slaughter’s statement was cumulative so that Johnson could not show prejudice and that the prosecutor did not necessarily know that Slaughter would invoke the Fifth Amendment. View "Johnson v. Lamas" on Justia Law

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In 1998, McKernan was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his former roommate, Gibson. McKernan admitted to hitting Gibson with a bat but claimed that it was self-defense and that Gibson’s injuries arose from Gibson hitting his head on the curb. During McKernan’s bench trial, after the Commonwealth had rested but before the defense had started its case-in-chief, the judge called the victim’s mother, his brother, the prosecutor, and defense counsel, into her robing room. McKernan was not present. The meeting was transcribed. The judge discussed online criticism of her decisions, including statements on the Gibsons’ website, and stated that she “want[ed] to make sure that you folks are happy with me.” Defense counsel did not object. The judge and Gibson’s brother agreed that the judge could “redline” the website. After conferring with McKernan, defense counsel told the judge and prosecutor that his client had “concerns” because “he thinks that you may be constrained to lean over backwards,” but advised McKernan to continue before the judge. After exhausting state remedies, McKernan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of relief, finding that the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent as to whether McKernan’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek and for advising McKernan not to seek the judge’s recusal. View "McKernan v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI" on Justia Law

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Before his trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, Jackson unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of coconspirators’ cellphone calls intercepted as authorized by court orders. The interceptions, pursuant to Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, comprised a significant amount of the trial evidence, though Jackson was a participant in only a few calls. Intercepted calls were placed and received outside Pennsylvania, but concerned, in part, cocaine trafficking in Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania state court had authorized wiretaps sought by state law enforcement officers and information obtained from those wiretaps was used in affidavits when federal wiretap orders were sought. Jackson argued that the state court lacked jurisdiction to permit the underlying wiretaps of cellphones outside of Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit affirmed Jackson’s conviction, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress; admission of a case agent’s testimony interpreting the contents of telephone calls; admission of co-conspirators’ testimony about their convictions and guilty pleas for the same crime; and the prosecutor’s mention of a co-conspirator’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify when she was prompted to identify the evidentiary rule that permitted the admission into evidence of what otherwise would have been inadmissible hearsay. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law