Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2002, at a New Jersey wedding reception, Nguyen shot another guest eight times, killing him. Nguyen shot at another guest, but missed. The bullet lodged in the wall. Several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, identified him to the police as the shooter and stated that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda with Alabama license plates. They provided Nguyen’s Brooklyn address. When officers arrived at his residence, Nguyen barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and stated that he would shoot his son and the officers if they attempted to enter. After a four-hour standoff, Nguyen was taken into custody. Nguyen pleaded guilty to New York indictments and was sentenced to five-to-15 years. A gun found hidden in Nguyen’s car was confirmed to be the weapon used in the wedding shootings. A New Jersey grand jury indicted him for the shootings. After extensive motion practice and three years pursuing an insanity defense, he pleaded guilty, in 2009, to aggravated manslaughter and attempted murder. Nguyen was sentenced to 20 years, to run concurrently with his New York sentence from the date of his New Jersey guilty pleas. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his habeas petition, in which Nguyen argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements. Counsel had, in fact, raised the speedy trial issue. View "Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of NJ" on Justia Law

At the request of the Lackawanna County Drug Task Force, federal agents assisted in the search for an elusive heroin dealer. Using confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents concluded that a hip-hop radio station and recording studio, Hood Promo, was the Scranton hub of a heroin ring. Agents identified Stevenson as a member of the distribution ring. Agents obtained a warrant to search five properties, including Stevenson’s residence, where they found hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun (found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards, and other inculpatory items and documents. Eight individuals were arrested in connection with the conspiracy. Only Stevenson did not plead guilty. The prosecution conceded that Stevenson’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. After trial on a third superseding indictment, Stevenson was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, in denying Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the false identification count, in denying his suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in sentencing Stevenson. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 1956, the New Kensington Eagles donated to Valley High School a six-foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, an eagle, an American flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, and Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. It is near the gymnasium entrance, which is accessible from the student parking area. In 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated to promoting separation of church and state, unsuccessfully requested the monument's removal. Schaub saw a story on television and contacted FFRF. Schaub had visited Valley and seen the monument while taking her daughter to a karate event, picking the girl up from the swimming pool, and dropping off her sister, whose child attends Valley. Schaub’s daughter was to attend Valley beginning in August 2014. Schaub views the monument as “commanding” students and visitors to worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the monument endorses,” and makes her “stomach turn.” She wishes to raise her daughter without religion. While a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, Schaub’s daughter began attending a different high school. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Schaub has standing to seek nominal damages and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief was not moot. With respect to FFRF’s claims, the court remanded for consideration of whether Schaub was an FFRF member when the complaint was filed. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

On October 9, 2009, Lieutenant Fink escorted Robinson to his cell. Removing his handcuffs, Fink allegedly twisted Robinson’s arm “real hard” and said, “since today is my last day, I wanted to leave you with a present.” Robinson submitted a sick call request the next day. He was prescribed medication but continued to experience pain. Under the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Abuse Allegation Monitoring Policy, an inmate could report abuse verbally or in writing to any staff member; file a grievance under the DOC Grievance Policy; or report in writing to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Once an inmate reported abuse, all subsequent procedures were to be conducted at the initiative of the prison administration; the staff member “shall complete” a report to a supervisor and the facility’s Security Office, which “shall” investigate and report to OPR. Robinson submitted Form DC-135A, describing the incident and asking the Unit Manager to investigate. He also filed a Sick Call Request, again describing the incident. Other than confirming that Robinson received an assessment and medication, no staff member followed up on Robinson’s reports. The Third Circuit vacated a finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment in favor of Fink. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was satisfied by Robinson’s attempts to avail himself of the prison’s administrative processes and the prison’s noncompliance with its own deadline. View "Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI" on Justia Law

EMTs found three-year-old Jordan not breathing and without a pulse; there were bruises all over Jordan’s body, particularly severe across his ribs. Jordan’s mother, Candice, blamed the bruising on prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-year-old brother, Kamden. A pathologist concluded that the bruises were too severe to have been caused by a four-year-old; he found gray material and bruising, consistent with being bound with duct tape. Candice lived with her three children and Candice’s mother, Lois. Candice was charged with first- and third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Lois pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children, regarding the condition of her home. Before trial, Candice told cellmates different stories about what happened to Jordan. Kamden stated to several people, and in a videotaped interview, that “mommy hit [Jordan] and pushed him . . . he fell down and died.” A judge determined that Kamden was competent to testify. For two years, Lois maintained that she did not cause Jordan’s death. Shortly before trial, Lois admitted to an investigator that she had abused Jordan by repeatedly hitting his ribs with a pipe, throwing him against the wall, and restraining him with duct tape. Lois refused to repeat her confession to the prosecutor or to testify at Candice’s trial. The court refused to admit the hearsay confession. There was testimony that Kamden sometimes referred to Lois as “mommy” and that both women abused Jordan. A jury convicted Candice of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child; she was sentenced to 18-40 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of violation of Candice’s due process right to present her defense. “Lois’ statements had no indicia of credibility. Lois ... was attempting to have her cake and eat it too.” View "Staruh v. Superintendent, Cambridge Springs SCI" on Justia Law

New Jersey ATF agents met with Burk, a convicted felon facing forgery charges who was a confidential informant. Questioned about associates who were involved in robberies or violent crimes, Burk responded that Dennis had spoken of conducting home invasions and other robberies. The agents were previously unaware of Dennis. They confirmed that Dennis had several felony convictions relating to drugs and burglary. Burk told agents that Dennis had previously requested his help in robbing a check-cashing operation. At the direction of the agents, Burk tried, several times, to enlist Dennis’ help in various robbery schemes. When Burk told him that the job was necessary to help Burk's mother who had cancer, Dennis agreed. At trial, a defense witness testified that Dennis suffers from neurocognitive impairments, with an IQ score of 74. After the “reverse sting,” Dennis was convicted of conspiracy to rob a narcotics “stash house,” 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and of carrying a firearm during the commission of the crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction; the court should have given an entrapment instruction on the robbery and gun possession charges. The court affirmed on the remaining drug charge. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

The 1988 Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act requires producers of visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” to keep records documenting the identity and age of every performer in those depictions, 18 U.S.C. 2257(a). The 2006 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 2257A, extended similar requirements to producers of depictions of “simulated sexually explicit conduct.” Producers are required to examine “an identification document” for each performer and maintain records listing each performer’s name and birthdate, available for inspection “at all reasonable times.” Producers must “affix[] to every copy” of covered depictions “a statement describing where the records . . . may be located.” After the district court dismissed a challenge, the Third Circuit identified viable as-applied and facial claims under the First and Fourth Amendments. Following remand, the Third Circuit held that the administrative search regime violates the Fourth Amendment, but that the laws did not violate the First Amendment. Reviewing the case for a third time, in light of 2015 Supreme Court holdings (Reed v. Town of Gilbert and City of Los Angeles v. Patel), the Third Circuit determined that the statutes are content-based, and require strict scrutiny review under the First Amendment and remanded. View "Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Aspiring political parties and their members challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the constitutionality of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code: 25 Pa. Stat. 2911(b) and 2937. The provisions, respectively, regulate the number of signatures required to attain a position on the general election ballot and govern the process by which private individuals can sue in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge the validity of a candidate’s nomination paper or petition. At the summary judgment stage, the district court held that, acting in combination, the two provisions, as applied, violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that neither named state official has a sufficient connection to the challenged provisions to be a proper defendant and that the court’s order was “incoherent on its face” The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the “technical issues” raised by the Commonwealth. Both the Secretary of the Commonwealth and its Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation had a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged provisions as required under Ex Parte Young. View "Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes" on Justia Law

A 2005 Pittsburgh ordinance states that: [n]o person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending fifteen (15) feet from any entrance to the hospital and or health care facility," with exceptions for safety personnel and those assisting patients and others. A preamble states: “The exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures is a First Amendment activity that must be balanced against another person’s right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.” Plaintiffs, who engaged in “sidewalk counseling” outside of a Planned Parenthood facility to persuade women to forego abortion services, challenged the ordinance, citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley, which struck down a similar Massachusetts law. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of the First Amendment claims. Considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, those claims are sufficient to go forward. The speech at issue is core political speech entitled to maximum First Amendment protection; the city cannot burden it without first trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that would achieve its legitimate, substantial, and content-neutral interests. McCullen indicates that the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each case, so dismissal of such challenges is rarely appropriate at the pleading stage. View "Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Lewisburg Pennsylvania Penitentiary inmate Nerius bit a correctional employee and broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing a flood. Nerius pled guilty to resisting correctional officers and damaging property, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1363. The PSR base offense level was increased to 17 because the section 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of violence that qualified Nerius as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Nerius received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. Nerius unsuccessfully argued that violation of section 111(a) did not constitute a crime of violence. The court considered Nerius’s long criminal history, acknowledged that Nerius had recently improved his behavior, found “that a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and imposed a 37-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause void for vagueness. At resentencing, the court found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] guideline range to be reasonable,” and sentenced Nerius to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The revised sentence did not trigger the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness; the new sentence was lower than the original. View "United States v. Nerius" on Justia Law