Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Watson claims that during a 2011 cell search Officer Kline pulled the antenna of Watson’s radio so that it broke off. Kline claims the antenna was already broken and secured with tape. Kline explained that a broken radio was considered contraband that had to be confiscated. Watson accompanied Kline to fill out the confiscation paperwork. Watson asked Kline to prepare an incident report documenting that Kline broke the antenna. Kline refused. Watson then unsuccessfully requested a grievance form. Later that day Watson was summoned to the security office where he was reprimanded for giving officers a “hard time” and was told that he would receive a misconduct. Watson then obtained a form from another prison and filed his grievance against Kline. Watson was ultimately found guilty of misconduct. The penalty was confiscation of Watson’s radio. The Department of Corrections’ Program Review Committee denied an appeal. The district dismissed Watson’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, reasoning that prison officials would have issued the misconduct regardless of Watson’s protected activity. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded the retaliation claims. Not every violation of prison protocols supported by some evidence will bar a First Amendment retaliation claim, particularly relatively minor offenses, such as a radio antenna secured by tape. View "Watson v. Rozum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on appeal, rejecting Defendant’s claims that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s application for postconviction relief. Defendant then filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Defendant a conditional writ of habeas corpus and directed the Commonwealth to retry Defendant or release him, concluding that the prosecution had breached its obligations under Brady by withholding three pieces of exculpatory and material information. The Third Circuit initially vacated the district court’s order, but subsequently, acting en banc, affirmed. The suppressed Brady material—a receipt corroborating Dennis’s alibi, an inconsistent statement by the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness, and documents indicating that another individual committed the murder — effectively gutted the Commonwealth’s case against Dennis. The withholding of these pieces of evidence denied Dennis a fair trial in state court. View "Dennis v. Sec'y PA Dept. of Corrs." on Justia Law

In 2001, Mary Edmond was shot near a North Philadelphia gas station. She died from her injuries. During the investigation, Garcia gave a confession to the police that was self-incriminating, but indicated that Lambert pulled the trigger. When Lambert and Garcia are jointly tried in Pennsylvania state court, Garcia declined to testify, depriving Lambert of the ability to cross-examine him about the confession. The judge redacted the confession in an effort to comply with the Supreme Court holding in Bruton v. United States (1968). When the jury heard Garcia’s confession, Lambert’s name was replaced with terms like “the other guy.” During closing arguments, however, the prosecutor made statements that the defense believed revealed that Lambert was “the other guy.” The judge denied a motion for mistrial, but instructed the jury that the confession could only be used against Garcia and must not be considered as evidence against Lambert. Both were convicted. The Third Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief, based on the Sixth Amendment violation caused by the closing arguments. The error was not harmless. View "Brown v. Greene" on Justia Law

After a fellow Bucknell University student (Stefanowicz) claimed that Dempsey had sexually assaulted her in his dorm room, the University’s Public Safety Officers (who are police officers) investigated and eventually filed a criminal complaint with an affidavit of probable cause. The charges were later dropped. Dempsey brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Bucknell University, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In light of the evidence corroborating in substantial part Stefanowicz’s story and the existence of a period of time in which no one disputes the two were alone together in Dempsey’s room, “even taking into account certain facts recklessly omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause.” View "Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ." on Justia Law

S.D. suffers from “multiple medical problems including chronic sinusitis with frequent acute exacerbations, allergic rhinitis, and intermittent asthma” that allegedly “substantially limit him in . . . the life activity of learning.”. S.D.’s doctor concluded that these medical problems “make it likely that he will have frequent school absence[s] due to acute [and] underlying chronic illness,” and suggested that S.D. “should qualify for [Section] 504 plan modifications for school” under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). Dissatisfied with the school’s plan, which involved Saturday sessions and a summer course, his parents sued, citing the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, the First and Fourteenth Amendments (42 U.S.C. 1983), and New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust the administrative process provided for by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the claims alleged discrimination and retaliation for enforcement of the child’s rights under a non-IDEA statute, the alleged injuries are educational in nature and implicate services within the purview of the IDEA, so administrative remedies must be exhausted. View "S. D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Parkell, a Delaware state prisoner, claims that state officials deprived him of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting him to unreasonable thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches and harsh conditions and by depriving him of adequate medical care. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, concluding that: Parkell could not pursue damages from corrections officials in their official capacities because of the Eleventh Amendment, and any claim for prospective relief was rendered moot when Parkell was moved; his medical needs Eighth Amendment claim failed because any deficiencies in his medical care did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to his needs; his conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment claim failed because the conditions did not constitute a denial of basic human needs, and the defendants were not personally involved in creating the conditions; and his due process claim​ failed because the conditions of his confinement did not constitute atypical and significant hardship in comparison to general prison conditions. The Third Circuit reversed only as to Parkell’s claim under the Fourth Amendment; that the state defendants lacked personal involvement in past constitutional violations does not preclude Parkell from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations. View "Parkell v. Danberg" on Justia Law

In 2002, at a New Jersey wedding reception, Nguyen shot another guest eight times, killing him. Nguyen shot at another guest, but missed. The bullet lodged in the wall. Several eye witnesses, each of whom knew Nguyen, identified him to the police as the shooter and stated that Nguyen fled the scene in a 1996 Honda with Alabama license plates. They provided Nguyen’s Brooklyn address. When officers arrived at his residence, Nguyen barricaded himself inside with his two-year-old son, and stated that he would shoot his son and the officers if they attempted to enter. After a four-hour standoff, Nguyen was taken into custody. Nguyen pleaded guilty to New York indictments and was sentenced to five-to-15 years. A gun found hidden in Nguyen’s car was confirmed to be the weapon used in the wedding shootings. A New Jersey grand jury indicted him for the shootings. After extensive motion practice and three years pursuing an insanity defense, he pleaded guilty, in 2009, to aggravated manslaughter and attempted murder. Nguyen was sentenced to 20 years, to run concurrently with his New York sentence from the date of his New Jersey guilty pleas. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his habeas petition, in which Nguyen argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and concerning the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of his post-arrest statements. Counsel had, in fact, raised the speedy trial issue. View "Nguyen v. Att'y Gen. of NJ" on Justia Law

At the request of the Lackawanna County Drug Task Force, federal agents assisted in the search for an elusive heroin dealer. Using confidential sources, physical surveillance, undercover purchases, body wires, and a pole camera, the agents concluded that a hip-hop radio station and recording studio, Hood Promo, was the Scranton hub of a heroin ring. Agents identified Stevenson as a member of the distribution ring. Agents obtained a warrant to search five properties, including Stevenson’s residence, where they found hundreds of glassine baggies of heroin, a loaded handgun (found in Stevenson’s room and later confirmed to be stolen), fraudulent driver’s licenses and credit cards, and other inculpatory items and documents. Eight individuals were arrested in connection with the conspiracy. Only Stevenson did not plead guilty. The prosecution conceded that Stevenson’s Speedy Trial Act rights were violated. The district court dismissed the indictment without prejudice. After trial on a third superseding indictment, Stevenson was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in dismissing the first indictment without prejudice, in denying Stevenson’s motion to dismiss the false identification count, in denying his suppression motions, in making a statement obviously geared toward pacifying an emotional witness at trial, or in sentencing Stevenson. View "United States v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 1956, the New Kensington Eagles donated to Valley High School a six-foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, an eagle, an American flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, and Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. It is near the gymnasium entrance, which is accessible from the student parking area. In 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated to promoting separation of church and state, unsuccessfully requested the monument's removal. Schaub saw a story on television and contacted FFRF. Schaub had visited Valley and seen the monument while taking her daughter to a karate event, picking the girl up from the swimming pool, and dropping off her sister, whose child attends Valley. Schaub’s daughter was to attend Valley beginning in August 2014. Schaub views the monument as “commanding” students and visitors to worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the monument endorses,” and makes her “stomach turn.” She wishes to raise her daughter without religion. While a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, Schaub’s daughter began attending a different high school. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Schaub has standing to seek nominal damages and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief was not moot. With respect to FFRF’s claims, the court remanded for consideration of whether Schaub was an FFRF member when the complaint was filed. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

On October 9, 2009, Lieutenant Fink escorted Robinson to his cell. Removing his handcuffs, Fink allegedly twisted Robinson’s arm “real hard” and said, “since today is my last day, I wanted to leave you with a present.” Robinson submitted a sick call request the next day. He was prescribed medication but continued to experience pain. Under the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Abuse Allegation Monitoring Policy, an inmate could report abuse verbally or in writing to any staff member; file a grievance under the DOC Grievance Policy; or report in writing to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Once an inmate reported abuse, all subsequent procedures were to be conducted at the initiative of the prison administration; the staff member “shall complete” a report to a supervisor and the facility’s Security Office, which “shall” investigate and report to OPR. Robinson submitted Form DC-135A, describing the incident and asking the Unit Manager to investigate. He also filed a Sick Call Request, again describing the incident. Other than confirming that Robinson received an assessment and medication, no staff member followed up on Robinson’s reports. The Third Circuit vacated a finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment in favor of Fink. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was satisfied by Robinson’s attempts to avail himself of the prison’s administrative processes and the prison’s noncompliance with its own deadline. View "Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI" on Justia Law