Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Aspiring political parties and their members challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the constitutionality of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code: 25 Pa. Stat. 2911(b) and 2937. The provisions, respectively, regulate the number of signatures required to attain a position on the general election ballot and govern the process by which private individuals can sue in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge the validity of a candidate’s nomination paper or petition. At the summary judgment stage, the district court held that, acting in combination, the two provisions, as applied, violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that neither named state official has a sufficient connection to the challenged provisions to be a proper defendant and that the court’s order was “incoherent on its face” The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the “technical issues” raised by the Commonwealth. Both the Secretary of the Commonwealth and its Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation had a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged provisions as required under Ex Parte Young. View "Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes" on Justia Law

A 2005 Pittsburgh ordinance states that: [n]o person or persons shall knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending fifteen (15) feet from any entrance to the hospital and or health care facility," with exceptions for safety personnel and those assisting patients and others. A preamble states: “The exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures is a First Amendment activity that must be balanced against another person’s right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.” Plaintiffs, who engaged in “sidewalk counseling” outside of a Planned Parenthood facility to persuade women to forego abortion services, challenged the ordinance, citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley, which struck down a similar Massachusetts law. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of the First Amendment claims. Considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, those claims are sufficient to go forward. The speech at issue is core political speech entitled to maximum First Amendment protection; the city cannot burden it without first trying, or at least demonstrating that it has seriously considered, substantially less restrictive alternatives that would achieve its legitimate, substantial, and content-neutral interests. McCullen indicates that the constitutionality of buffer zone laws turns on the factual circumstances giving rise to the law in each case, so dismissal of such challenges is rarely appropriate at the pleading stage. View "Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Lewisburg Pennsylvania Penitentiary inmate Nerius bit a correctional employee and broke the sprinkler head in his cell, causing a flood. Nerius pled guilty to resisting correctional officers and damaging property, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and 1363. The PSR base offense level was increased to 17 because the section 111(a)(1) charge was deemed a crime of violence that qualified Nerius as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Nerius received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a criminal history category of VI, his Guidelines range was 37-46 months’ imprisonment. Nerius unsuccessfully argued that violation of section 111(a) did not constitute a crime of violence. The court considered Nerius’s long criminal history, acknowledged that Nerius had recently improved his behavior, found “that a sentence at the bottom of the [career offender] guideline range is reasonable, appropriate, and is not greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives,” and imposed a 37-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court found the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause void for vagueness. At resentencing, the court found “a sentence at the high end of the [non-career offender] guideline range to be reasonable,” and sentenced Nerius to 36 months. The Third Circuit affirmed. The revised sentence did not trigger the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness; the new sentence was lower than the original. View "United States v. Nerius" on Justia Law

The National Firearms Act requires ATF permission for manufacture of a firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5822. Separately, the Gun Control Act, prohibits private manufacture of machineguns, with exceptions for government entities and machineguns lawfully possessed before 1986, 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Watson, as sole trustee of the Watson Family Gun Trust, applied to permit an M-16-style machinegun. An ATF examiner mistakenly approved the application. Watson had a machinegun manufactured. Weeks later, ATF informed Watson that the approval was mistaken. Watson argued that the trust was not a “person” under the Act. ATF explained that although a trust is not a “person” under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold property, so it considers the individual acting on behalf of the trust. Watson surrendered his gun under protest, then filed suit, claiming that the provisions are a de facto ban on an entire class of arms in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments; due process violations; equal protection violations; and detrimental reliance. The government initiated a forfeiture action. The district court held that Watson had standing, but failed to state a claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns; a trust is not exempt from Section 922(o) because a trust is not an entity distinct from its trustees and cannot own property. View "United States v. One Palmetto State Armory PA 15 Machinegun" on Justia Law

An arrest warrant issued for Rivera, a homicide suspect. U.S. Marshal Duncan received information from another officer and from street informants that Rivera was “staying” or “residing” at a Harrisburg address. Officers arrived at the apartment and knocked. They received no response but heard noises, indicating that a person was inside and forcibly entered the home. Rivera did not live there and was not present. The officers saw Algarin, and, during a protective sweep, saw sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and what appeared to be powder cocaine. An officer obtained a search warrant while the others waited at the apartment. During the subsequent search, officers discovered incriminating items, including car keys, which opened a stolen Mazda found across from the apartment. Algarin, who had no outstanding warrants, was charged with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). During a hearing on a motion to suppress, Duncan testified that he had checked records, but was unable to recall whether he had identified the apartment's renter. The Third Circuit vacated Algarin’s conviction. Officers need an arrest warrant and a search warrant to apprehend a suspect at what they know to be a third party’s home. If the suspect resides at the address, officers need only an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the individual is present. Here, officers acted on information short of the probable cause standard with respect to Rivera’s residence. View "United States v. Vasquez-Algarin" on Justia Law

The Sunrise Motel's owner told Bensalem Township police that he had seen a woman he believed to be a prostitute being picked up by a green Cadillac. Later that day, a “tip” was called in, that a man at the nearby Knights Inn, driving a green Cadillac, was in possession of drugs. That evening, officers observed a green Cadillac outside the nearby Neshaminy Inn and learned that it was registered to Murray in Room 302. The officers knew that Murray had rented rooms at the Knights Inn, paying cash. Officers knocked at Room 302. A woman wearing lingerie (Burns) answered the door, and asked if the officer was “looking for a date.” The officers then proceeded to the Knights Inn, where they saw the Cadillac in front of Room 158, a woman leaving Room 158, and Murray inside the room. Later, at the Neshaminy Inn, Burns admitted the officers and stated that she was a prostitute and that a drug dealer that provided her with drugs. She later testified that she had made the “tip” call because she felt she was in danger. Murray arrived; officers patted him down and found large amounts of cash and hotel keys. Murray attempted to flee. With warrants, the officers found 192 grams of crack cocaine at the Knights Inn. Murray entered a guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed; the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered the room or when they frisked Murray., View "United States v. Murray" on Justia Law

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Mammaro filed a civil rights suit, claiming that the temporary removal of her child from her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency was a violation of her substantive due process right as a parent. The removal, following a domestic violence incident between Mammaro and her husband, was based on allegations of neglect by Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law, supplemented by two positive drug tests of Mammaro, and Mammaro’s decision to take the child from supervised housing, The district court held that several individual caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was no clearly established law, so that a reasonable caseworker would have understood that temporarily removing a child in these circumstances would violate substantive due process. View "Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency" on Justia Law

Officer Grenier was notified by radio of multiple calls reporting shots fired near the intersection of East 23rd and Crosby Streets, a well-known drug trafficking location. The dispatcher reported that there was a white vehicle heading east on East 23rd Street toward Madison Street. The dispatcher did not further describe the vehicle, its passengers, the identity of the callers, or when the shooting reportedly occurred, but Grenier interpreted the dispatcher’s use of priority tone to indicate that the shooting was in progress. Driving on Madison Street in his marked police car, Grenier observed a white vehicle, driven by West, coming from the location of the reported shooting. Grenier stopped the car. West unsuccessfully moved to suppress a firearm found during a subsequent search. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, finding the stop constitutional. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law