Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An arrest warrant issued for Rivera, a homicide suspect. U.S. Marshal Duncan received information from another officer and from street informants that Rivera was “staying” or “residing” at a Harrisburg address. Officers arrived at the apartment and knocked. They received no response but heard noises, indicating that a person was inside and forcibly entered the home. Rivera did not live there and was not present. The officers saw Algarin, and, during a protective sweep, saw sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and what appeared to be powder cocaine. An officer obtained a search warrant while the others waited at the apartment. During the subsequent search, officers discovered incriminating items, including car keys, which opened a stolen Mazda found across from the apartment. Algarin, who had no outstanding warrants, was charged with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii). During a hearing on a motion to suppress, Duncan testified that he had checked records, but was unable to recall whether he had identified the apartment's renter. The Third Circuit vacated Algarin’s conviction. Officers need an arrest warrant and a search warrant to apprehend a suspect at what they know to be a third party’s home. If the suspect resides at the address, officers need only an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the individual is present. Here, officers acted on information short of the probable cause standard with respect to Rivera’s residence. View "United States v. Vasquez-Algarin" on Justia Law

The Sunrise Motel's owner told Bensalem Township police that he had seen a woman he believed to be a prostitute being picked up by a green Cadillac. Later that day, a “tip” was called in, that a man at the nearby Knights Inn, driving a green Cadillac, was in possession of drugs. That evening, officers observed a green Cadillac outside the nearby Neshaminy Inn and learned that it was registered to Murray in Room 302. The officers knew that Murray had rented rooms at the Knights Inn, paying cash. Officers knocked at Room 302. A woman wearing lingerie (Burns) answered the door, and asked if the officer was “looking for a date.” The officers then proceeded to the Knights Inn, where they saw the Cadillac in front of Room 158, a woman leaving Room 158, and Murray inside the room. Later, at the Neshaminy Inn, Burns admitted the officers and stated that she was a prostitute and that a drug dealer that provided her with drugs. She later testified that she had made the “tip” call because she felt she was in danger. Murray arrived; officers patted him down and found large amounts of cash and hotel keys. Murray attempted to flee. With warrants, the officers found 192 grams of crack cocaine at the Knights Inn. Murray entered a guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed; the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they entered the room or when they frisked Murray., View "United States v. Murray" on Justia Law

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Mammaro filed a civil rights suit, claiming that the temporary removal of her child from her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency was a violation of her substantive due process right as a parent. The removal, following a domestic violence incident between Mammaro and her husband, was based on allegations of neglect by Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law, supplemented by two positive drug tests of Mammaro, and Mammaro’s decision to take the child from supervised housing, The district court held that several individual caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was no clearly established law, so that a reasonable caseworker would have understood that temporarily removing a child in these circumstances would violate substantive due process. View "Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency" on Justia Law

Officer Grenier was notified by radio of multiple calls reporting shots fired near the intersection of East 23rd and Crosby Streets, a well-known drug trafficking location. The dispatcher reported that there was a white vehicle heading east on East 23rd Street toward Madison Street. The dispatcher did not further describe the vehicle, its passengers, the identity of the callers, or when the shooting reportedly occurred, but Grenier interpreted the dispatcher’s use of priority tone to indicate that the shooting was in progress. Driving on Madison Street in his marked police car, Grenier observed a white vehicle, driven by West, coming from the location of the reported shooting. Grenier stopped the car. West unsuccessfully moved to suppress a firearm found during a subsequent search. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, finding the stop constitutional. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

Michtavi, a prisoner, had an operation to treat his prostate performed by Dr. Chopra, who is not a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee. After surgery, Michtavi noticed that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde ejaculation. Dr. Chopra advised that Psuedofel be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery, to prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder. Michtavi was concerned that without treatment, he might become impotent. The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary, and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a prohibited sexual act.” The district court stated that “prisoners retain a fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from custody” and, because Michtavi had alleged that retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, held that his Eighth Amendment claims should survive summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established. View "Michtavi v. Scism" on Justia Law

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, since January 2002, the New York City Police Department has conducted a secret program “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding states, particularly New Jersey.”.The claim that NYPD mounts remotely-controlled surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at mosques and sends “undercover officers” into mosques, student organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.” Plaintiffs allege that the program is based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity “is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.” The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed. The allegations “tell a story in which there is standing to complain and which present constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, redressed.” The court analogized the situation to that faced by Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II. View "Hassan v. City of New York" on Justia Law