Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977, D.C. Code 2-1404.01 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a, against the City, alleging that she had suffered sexual harassment during the course of her employment with the DCFEMS. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, dismissed plaintiff's Title VII claim with prejudice because she had not filed a timely Charge with the EEOC, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. Human Rights Act claim. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff neither pursued her rights diligently nor proved that some extraordinary circumstance prevented her from satisfying the statute of limitations. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dyson v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Appellee Sue Reisinger requested access to reports made by an independent consultant to evaluate AIG's internal policies and past transactions, asserting both common law and First Amendment rights of access. The district court concluded, over the opposition of the SEC and AIG, that Reisinger had a common law right of access and ordered public disclosure of redacted copies of the reports. AIG appealed. The court held that the reports were neither judicial records nor public records. Even assuming the First Amendment right of access applied, the reports were not "aspects of court proceedings" and have no bearing on monitoring judicial conduct. Accordingly, there was no common law or First Amendment right of access to the reports and the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "SEC v. American Int'l Group" on Justia Law

The DEA, under the authority of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 812(b)(1)(B), classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, the most restricted drug classification under the Act. Petitioners challenged the DEA's denial of its petition to initiate proceedings to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule III, IV, or V drug. The principal issue on appeal was whether the DEA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. First, the court denied the Government's jurisdictional challenge because the court found that at least one of the named petitioners had standing to challenge the agency's action. On the merits, the court held that the DEA's denial of the rescheduling petition survived review under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard where the petition asked the DEA to reclassify marijuana, which, under the terms of the Act, required a "currently accepted medical use." A "currently accepted medical use" required, inter alia, "adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy." The court deferred to the agency's interpretation of these regulations and found that substantial evidence supported the agency's determination that such studies did not exist. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Americans for Safe Access, et al v. DEA" on Justia Law

ARTBA challenged the EPA's regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles several years after the regulations were promulgated. As such, ARTBA's challenges to the regulations were time-barred under the Clean Air Act's, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 60-day filing period. ARTBA also challenged the EPA's approval of California's State Implementation Plan, but that challenged must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "American Road & Transportation v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, together with the Second Amendment Foundation, contended that 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) was inapplicable to common-law misdemeanants as a class and, alternatively, that application of the statute to this class of individuals violated the Second Amendment. Plaintiff was convicted some forty years ago for common-law misdemeanor assault and battery and consequently was barred for life from ever possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1). The court held that plaintiff's statutory arguments were unpersuasive and that disarmament of common-law misdemeanants as a class was substantially related to the important governmental objective of crime prevention. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's statutory and constitutional challenges, affirming the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Schrader, et al v. Holder, Jr., et al" on Justia Law

Appellant alleged that the District of Columbia violated rights conferred upon him by Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Appellant is a national of Jamaica and currently incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. Assuming without deciding that Article 36(1)(b) conferred individually enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded that appellant's suit was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District of Columbia. View "Earle v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant brought suit against officials of the Administrative Office, solely in their official capacities, alleging that they rejected her job application in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed appellant's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Administrative Office had sovereign immunity from suit. The court reversed the judgment and held that appellant's claim fell within the Larson-Dugan exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity. Since the district court did not address appellees' alternative jurisdiction arguments, the court left all of these arguments for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollack v. Duff, et al" on Justia Law

Recognizing the growing importance of mobile data in a wireless market in which smartphones are increasingly common, the FCC adopted a rule requiring mobile-data providers to offer roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. Verizon challenged the data roaming rule on multiple grounds. The court held that Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., plainly empowered the FCC to promulgate the data roaming rule. And although the rule bears some marks of common carriage, the court deferred to the FCC's determination that the rule imposed no common carrier obligations on mobile-internet providers. In response to Verizon's remaining arguments, the court concluded that the rule did not effect an unconstitutional taking and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Cellco Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law

Military chaplains, all non-liturgical Protestants, alleged that the Navy systematically discriminated against members of their religious denominations in the awarding of promotions. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they lacked Article III standing and, alternatively, were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court concluded that at least those plaintiffs whose promotions would likely be considered by future selection boards operating under the challenged policies have standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the district court's resolution of plaintiffs' denominational preference theory was not based on factual findings that the court could review for clear error. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. The court also vacated the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Church, et al v. United States Navy, et al" on Justia Law