Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Air Force invoked Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which covers information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute to deny Newport Aeronautical Sales' request for certain technical information concerning military equipment. The nondisclosure statute the Air Force invoked was 10 U.S.C. 130. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 130(a) is an Exemption 3 statute, and it covers the FOIA requests that Newport made to the Air Force; and (2) even assuming that the Air Force was violating the Defense Department's Directive 5230.25 by restricting the disclosure of technical information that does not depict "critical technology," the information fell within the relevant nondisclosure statute and was therefore exempt from disclosure under the Act.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of multiple offenses, including possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, related to the shooting of an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Defendant was sentenced to 270 months in prison, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to modify his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a reduction and sentence and seeking a hearing to see if his sentence should be reduced. The district court denied the motion. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err by finding that it reached Defendant's ultimate sentence by starting with Sentencing Guideline 2K2.1, which covers convictions for felons in possession of a firearm.

This appeal was the latest step in a long-running controversy over the use of post office sidewalks to gather signatures on petitions. Before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was a facial challenge to a ban on collecting signatures on post office sidewalks that do not run along public streets. Appellants also asked the district court to enjoin enforcement of the regulation on Grace sidewalks. The district court concluded that the ban did not violate the First Amendment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding (1) interior postal sidewalks are not public forums; (2) a ban on collection in these circumstances is reasonable; and (3) because the challenged regulation no longer applied to Grace sidewalks, declaratory and injunctive relief would not longer be appropriate.

Carlos Marino, who was incarcerated for a conviction for drug conspiracy, submitted a request to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking documents that Marino alleged belonged to a co-conspirator who testified against him at trial. Marino suspected the prosecution engaged in various forms of misconduct during trial, especially in its dealings with the co-conspirator. The DEA denied Marino's FOIA request. Marino appealed, and the district court granted summary judgment against him, concluding that Marino lacked a sufficient defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. In its motion, the DEA invoked FOIA exemption 7(C), which allows an agency to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Marino subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the district court denied. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the public domain exception provided Marino with a meritorious defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. Remanded.

Plaintiff, a former British soldier, was severely wounded in an ambush in Afghanistan, where he was working for a private security contractor. Plaintiff sued the transport company that furnished the helicopter he flew in on and the construction company that contracted with his employer for his security services, alleging that they had negligently failed to take appropriate security measures for his trip. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants because Plaintiff failed to proffer, as required by District of Columbia law, an expert to testify regarding the standard of care for such security precautions. Plaintiff appealed, maintaining that no expert was required because, inter alia, "every juror will have seen" such films as High Noon. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's reliance on old Westerns rather than expert testimony to establish the standard of care was fatal to his negligence claim; and (2) the Erie doctrine was fatal to Plaintiff's alternative contention that the Court should disregard D.C.'s expert testimony requirement altogether.

Plaintiff was a black male who worked in the United State Department of Agriculture's (Department) Foreign Agricultural Service. Plaintiff's employment was terminated after it was discovered that Plaintiff submitted false receipts for reimbursement, failed to report his required financial interests, and failed to properly submit to the Department a credit issued by a hotel to his government-issued credit card, among other things. Plaintiff filed suit in district court, alleging various claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the Department summary judgment on nine of Plaintiff's ten counts, including his race discrimination claim. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was terminated because of racial discrimination.

Appellee, an employee of the FBI, alleged that FBI officials retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when, by reporting unfounded security concerns to the Bureau's Security Division, they prompted an investigation into his continued eligibility for a security clearance. In the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' earlier opinion in this case, Rattigan v. Holder, the Court held that although the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent shields the Security Division's security clearance-related decisions from judicial review, the Title VII claim could nonetheless go forward so long as it challenged only the reporting of Appellee to the Security Division and not the Division's decision to investigate. On rehearing, however, the Court vacated the district court judgment and narrowed the scope of Title VII liability in these circumstances, holding that Appellee's Title VII claim could proceed only if he could show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive in reporting or referring information that they knew to be false. Remanded for further proceedings.

Intercollegiate Broadcasting, Inc. appealed a final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) setting the default royalty rates and terms applicable to internet-based webcasting of digitally recorded music. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the positions of the CRJs, as currently constituted, violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. To remedy that violation, the Court followed the Supreme Court's approach in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. by invalidating and severing the restrictions on the Librarian of Congress's ability to remove CRJs. The Court concluded that with such removal power in the Librarian's hands, the CRJs are "inferior" rather than "principal" officers, and no constitutional problem remained. Because of the Appointments Clause violation at the time of the decision, the Court vacated and remanded the determination challenged here.

Appellant pled guilty to racketeer influenced corrupt organization conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that his conviction was obtained in violation of Kastigar v. United States, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the government breached his plea agreement. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to consider certain of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance but denied his appeal in all other respects, holding (1) with respect to the Kastigar hearing, there was nothing deficient about counsel's performance; but (2) as to the other claims of ineffective assistance, the cause should be remanded for factual development, as Appellant raised the claims for the first time on appeal, and the Court could not tell from the record whether he was entitled to relief.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules: (1) an Endangerment Finding, in which the EPA determined that greenhouse gases may "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"; (2) the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks; and (3) the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which the EPA determined that only the largest stationary sources would initially be subject to the requirements for major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenged all these rules. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules and denied the remainder of the petitions, holding (1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; (2) EPA's interpretation of the governing Clean Air Act provisions is unambiguously correct; and (3) no Petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules.