Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Edwina Bigesby was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for various drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. Bigesby appealed, contending her convictions should be vacated because the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence critical to her defense. Alternatively, Bigesby claimed her sentence should be reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) the trial judge did not improperly exclude evidence relevant to Bigesby's defense; and (2) Bigesby was not entitled to re-sentencing under the FSA.

Assistant United States Attorney Richard Convertino led the prosecution of the Detroit Sleeper Cell defendants in 2003. Convertino was later removed from the case for alleged violations committed during the prosecution. The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) began an internal investigation into whether Convertino knowingly withheld evidence from the defense. A few months later, a reporter published an article in the Detroit Free Press including details of the OPR referral. Convertino brought suit, alleging that an unidentified DOJ employee willfully or intentionally disclosed confidential information protected by the Privacy Act to the reporter. After several years, Convertino moved for a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground he was pursuing discovery to learn the source's identity. The district court granted summary judgment to DOJ and denied Convertino's motion to stay. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment, holding that the district court committed an abuse of discretion in denying Convertino's motion to stay, as (1) the district court mistakenly assumed Convertino could maintain discovery proceedings even after the Privacy Act litigation ended; and (2) Convertino submitted ample evidence to suggest that additional discovery could reveal the source's identity. Remanded.

Appellee, a government contractor, underwent military detention in Iraq. After his release, he filed this action in the district court alleging claims under the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd et seq., and a Bivens action for violation of his due process rights. Secretary Rumsfeld moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion as to the claims under the DTA and some other claims, but did imply an action under the Bivens due process theory and denied Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss as to those claims. Secretary Rumsfeld appealed from the denial of his motion, arguing both that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action in the first instance. The court agreed that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action and reversed the order.

Five Medicaid recipients filed a class action against the District, alleging that the District systematically denied Medicaid coverage of prescription medications without providing the written notice required by federal and D.C. law. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. At least with regard to one plaintiff, John Doe, the allegations sufficiently established injury, causation, and redressability and the court concluded that Doe had standing to pursue his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the court had no need to decide whether the other plaintiffs had standing and reversed the judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

The Libertarian Party, along with its 2008 presidential candidate Bob Barr, contended that the District's failure to report the number of votes cast for Barr violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court concluded that because the party had failed to show that the District's law placed a severe burden on its rights, the District's important regulatory interests were generally sufficient to justify the restrictions pursuant to Burdick v. Takushi. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendants were convicted for their roles in a PCP-distribution enterprise. Defendants challenged their convictions on various grounds. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant Price's motion to sever; in denying defendant Suggs' motion to suppress evidence seized from his house; in denying the recordings obtained from the wiretap of Suggs' cell phone; by allowing an agent to testify as a lay witness; by dismissing a juror because she knew defendant Glover's wife; and by responding to a jury's question. The court also rejected Glover's and Price's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of conviction.

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules.

On July 16, 2010, the court remanded this case to the Secretary of the State Department, concluding that the Secretary had violated the due process rights of PMOI by maintaining its designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. 1189. It has been nearly two years since the court's remand and the Secretary has yet to issue a reviewable ruling on PMOI's petition. PMOI now seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the delisting of PMOI or, alternatively, requiring the Secretary to make a decision on PMOI's petition or the court setting aside her FTO designation. Consequently, the court ordered the Secretary to act on PMOI's petition no later than four months from the issuance of this opinion; failing that, the petition for writ of mandamus setting aside the FTO designation will be granted.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Library of Congress, brought this action against, inter alia, his former supervisor (defendant), alleging that his termination for publication of articles critical of high-level public officials violated the First and Fifth Amendments and entitled him to damages relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that a Bivens action was not available under the circumstances of the case and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court concluded that the courts should not imply a new form of Bivens action on the facts of this case, the court reversed the order of the district court denying defendant's motion to dismiss.

Shelby County contended that when Congress reauthorized section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a), in 2006, it exceeded its enumerated powers. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. Applying the congruence and proportionality standard of review in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.