Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant alleged that his employer, the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency, repeatedly rejected him for promotions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims stemming from John Milne's promotion where the district court never reached the issue; reversed its grant of summary judgment with respect to his age and race discrimination claims stemming from Mark Reefe's promotion where genuine issues of material fact existed; and remanded for further proceedings. The court disposed of appellant's remaining arguments and affirmed in all other respects.

Plaintiffs opposed the use of vaccines that contain thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative, and believed that vaccines containing mercury harm young children and pregnant women. Plaintiffs filed an action alleging that the FDA, by allowing thimerosal-preserved vaccines, violated its statutory duty to ensure the safety of vaccines. Plaintiffs asked for a court order requiring the FDA to prohibit the administration of vaccines containing more than a trace level of thimerosal to young children and pregnant women and sought to force the FDA to remove thimerosal-preserved vaccines from the market. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. The court concluded that plaintiffs were not required to receive thimerosal-preserved vaccines; they could readily obtain thimerosal-free vaccines; they did not have standing to challenge the FDA's decision to allow other people to receive the vaccines; and plaintiffs could advocate that the Legislative and Executive Branches ban the vaccines. But because plaintiffs were suffering no cognizable injury as a result of the FDA's decision to allow the vaccine, their lawsuit was not a proper subject for the Judiciary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the duration and conditions of his supervised release. As a threshold matter, the court rejected the government's contention that defendant waived any appeal of the length and conditions of his supervised sentence or "invit[ed]" the alleged error. The court disagreed with defendant's contention that his offenses did not fall within U.S.S.G. 5D1.2 because they were not "perpetrated against a minor." The court found that the district court's reasons for imposing a 40-year sentence to be apparent from the record and rejected defendant's claim that the district court failed to adequately explain his sentence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c). In light of the particular factual circumstances of the case and the caselaw approving similar sentences, the court found that the district court did not substantively err in ordering a 40-year term of supervised release. The court further held that the district court did not plainly err in imposing any of the challenged conditions, though the court subjected the prohibition on patronizing any place where pornography was available to a limiting construction to prevent it from being impermissibly vague. Finally, the district court held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where counsel made strategic choices in representing defendant. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and his sentence after he entered a conditional plea to possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence where, upon arresting defendant with probable cause to believe he was driving in possession of an open container of alcohol, the police had a reasonable basis to search the car for evidence of that offense. Given the district court's consideration of the statutory facts and of defendant's arguments in aid of sentencing, and the district court's reasoned explanation of its sentencing determination, there was neither procedural error nor substantive abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

Appellants, as representatives of the estates of their deceased sons, brought this action against federal officials and employees in district court seeking money damages relating to the alleged mistreatment and eventual death of those sons while they were detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The district court granted the motion of the United States to be substituted as defendant and the motion of the United States for dismissal of the claims. Because the court was satisfied that neither the district court nor this court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action due to the jurisdictional bar created by section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court did not declare section 2241(e)(2) unconstitutional under Boumediene v. Bush and that provision retained vitality to bar those claims. Therefore, the decision of the district court dismissing the claims should be affirmed, although for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Defendant was indicted for charges related to a premeditated murder while armed. At issue was whether defendant's statements, which the government conceded the police obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, were nonetheless admissible for purposes of impeachment should he testify at trial. The court held that the government met its burden in demonstrating that defendant's statements were voluntary where, although it was possible that the police could subtly overcome the will of a 33-year-old man even if he was provided water, had no apparent mental impairment, and generally answered questions intelligently, nothing in this case undermined the record evidence of voluntariness. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose when Conrail sold its Harsimus Embankment in Jersey City to developers. The City, together with others interested in the historic and environmental value of the Embankment, sued Conrail alleging that the sale was unlawful because Conrail failed to obtain authority from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the property. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the City enjoyed Article III standing where Conrail's refusal to invoke STB proceedings injured the City by depriving it of the benefits of those proceedings and the City's injury could be redressed by a district court ruling that the Embankment qualified as "railroad line" that Conrail could not abandon without STB approval.

Plaintiff contended that his supervisor at the Department of State gave him negative performance reviews in retaliation for his opposition to discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that because plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he opposed a practice that could "reasonably be thought" to violate Title VII, he failed to satisfy the first element of his cause of action. Plaintiff also failed to establish the third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: that the employer took a materially adverse action against the employee "because" the employee opposed a protected practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department.