Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to a one-count information charging a conspiracy with three objects: bribery of federal officials; money-or-property mail and wire fraud; and honest services mail and wire fraud. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his "motion to amend or modify his plea agreement." The court affirmed the denial of the motion because courts were not authorized to order modification or amendment of plea agreements.

Appellant, an African American man employed by the IRS, alleged that the IRS discriminated against him on the basis of race and gender when it awarded a temporary detail and then a permanent promotion to a white female employee. Appellant also claimed that the IRS retaliated against him when he pursued the matter with the Equal Employment Opportunity office. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on all claims. The court agreed that appellant failed to exhaust his claim regarding the temporary detail and so affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment. But because the court concluded a reasonable jury could find that the government's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying appellant the permanent promotion was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the discriminatory promotion claim and remanded to allow that claim to proceed to trial. And because the court concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of retaliation, the court remanded that claim for further proceedings.

Roger Rudder, two other adults, and two juveniles sued the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police officers for using excessive force against them at the 2008 Caribbean Carnival Parade in violation of their civil rights. The district court dismissed their suit with prejudice. The court concluded that, although plaintiffs unambiguously conceded all their common law claims, the juvenile plaintiffs' common law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice because those claims were not time-barred. The complaint also alleged facts stating facially plausible claims against two officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed.

Defendant was convicted of illegally possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition seeking relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that counsel told defendant of the plea offer and therefore that counsel made no error on which to base a Strickland claim.

Appellant, an African-American female attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel of the PBGC, filed suit in district court against the PBGC, claiming employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Appellant appealed two issues: first, claims of race and gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation, arising out of four discrete episodes; second, a claim of retaliatory hostile work environment arising not only out of the four discrete episodes but also out of various other events as to which she raised claims that were time-barred. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims of race and gender discrimination and of unlawful retaliation where the court did not believe that the PBGC's failure to remedy the various critiques and epithets to which appellant's fellow employees subjected her would have persuaded a reasonable employee to refrain from making or supporting charges of discrimination. The court held, however, that the district court erred to the extent that it categorically excluded her time-barred complaints in considering the hostile work environment claim, thus failing to employ the Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan analysis, including a determination of which acts exhibit the relationship necessary to be considered part of the same actionable hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court remanded for a determination of which, if any acts, should have been included under Morgan.

Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant had unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff, a medical student who was diagnosed with dyslexia and a mild processing-speed disorder, contended on remand that the district court erred by failing to apply the 2008 amendments to the ADA and in relying on her prior academic achievement in assessing whether she suffered from a disability under the ADA. The court held that because plaintiff failed to show legal or clear factual error by the district court, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellant and a co-defendant were extradited from Panama following their indictment on one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, intending or knowing that it would be imported into the United States from Columbia, Panama, Nicaragua, and elsewhere outside of the United States. Appellant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the charged conspiracy because appellant's extradition conformed with the governing treaty between the United States and Panama, and appellant waived his venue challenge by not raising it in the district court. Appellant identified no plain error affecting his substantial rights in the district court's acceptance of his guilty plea. Further, appellant failed to show he was denied effective assistance of counsel as would entitle him to reversal of his conviction. Because appellant presented no grounds for setting aside the judgment based on his guilty plea, the waiver of his right to appeal a below-Guidelines sentence set forth in the plea agreement was valid. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal of his sentence and affirmed the judgment of conviction

Defendant sought reversal of his conviction by a jury for unlawful possession with intent to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting, claiming trial evidentiary errors. Because defendant elicited testimony concerning the officer's law enforcement experience with drug trafficking in an attempt to demonstrate he was conditioned to see the benign items seized from defendant's bedroom as drug paraphernalia, and elicited his opinion regarding one of those items, defendant failed to show prejudice even assuming the testimony was improperly admitted. Circuit precedent confirmed defendant's other contentions were without merit. The district court neither abused its discretion in excluding expert evidence on the ultimate question in the case, nor erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask guilt-assuming hypothetical questions of a character witness testifying about her personal opinion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring with a male accomplice to extort money from an ex-lover, a doctor, by threatening to expose their brief extramarital affair to his wife and the medical licensing board. Defendant appealed her conviction on the grounds that the district court improperly denied her a duress instruction and improperly instructed the jury on venue. The court held that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of duress where no reasonable juror could have found defendant lacked a legal alternative to committing the crime. Further, the conspiracy instruction given by the district court did not require the jury to find that any overt act occurred in Washington, D.C., and defendant did not ask the district court to have the jury determine venue. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error of any kind. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.

The District of Columbia appealed the denial of its motion to vacate a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The injunction was issued in 1995 in response to a class action complaint alleging that the District of Columbia was violating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., by failing to timely pay private providers of special education services and thereby jeopardizing students' special education placements. The district court denied the motion on two grounds: (1) dissolving the injunction and subsequent payment orders "would be disruptive to the status quo" and "counter-productive to the goal" of settling the case "in short order," and (2) the District of Columbia had "overstated both the relevance and the significance" of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Horne v. Flores. The court held that the district court failed to address changed circumstances, as Flores instructed, and reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether, in view of changed circumstances, the District of Columbia's Rule 60(b)(5) motion should be granted.