Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

McGuire leased farmland in Arizona from the Colorado River Indian Tribes with approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. After the BIA removed a bridge that he used to access portions of the leased property, McGuire filed a Fifth Amendment claim. McGuire does not claim that removal of the bridge was itself a taking, but rather that the BIA’s alleged refusal to authorize replacement of the bridge was a taking of his property rights. The Court of Federal Claims rejected the claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the regulatory takings claim never ripened because McGuire failed to pursue administrative remedies. Even if McGuire’s claim had ripened, he had no cognizable property interest in the bridge, which he neither possessed nor controlled because it was in a BIA right-of-way. No federal regulation gave him a property interest and he was not entitled to an easement by necessity. View "McGuire v. United States" on Justia Law

Young served as a Public Housing Revitalization Specialist in the Office of Public Housing in the Cleveland office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development for 10 years. Young was representing himself at an arbitration hearing, appealing his five-day suspension for disruptive behavior, misrepresentation of authority, and use of insulting language to and about other employees. One of the witnesses testifying against him was Darr, Executive Director of the Coschocton Metropolitan Housing Authority and a HUD client. Following Darr’s testimony, there was a recess; Darr claims that while he was walking down the hallway, about 25-30 feet away from Young, Young shouted from immediately outside the door of the hearing room, “[y]ou are a racist. You are a member of the KKK, and you should be shot.” Young was later placed on administrative leave; notice of proposed removal issued. Interviews were conducted after Young submitted his oral and written statements, so that Young was unaware of the content and substance of the interviews and was unable to respond to anything unearthed during those interviews. An arbitrator rejected a challenge to Young’s termination. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the agency violated Young’s due process rights and its own procedures.View "Young v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

Under 35 U.S.C. 292(a) it is unlawful to engage in specified acts of false patent marking, such as affixing a mark that falsely asserts that the item is patented, with intent to deceive the public. Prior to 2011, the statute authorized private parties (relators) to bring a qui tam or informer’s suit for violations, but did not specify procedures or authorize the government to file its own suit to collect the penalty. The 2011 AIA eliminated the qui tam provision, but authorized actions for damages by any person “who has suffered a competitive injury as a result of a violation.” The AIA provides that marking products with expired patents is not a violation and that it applies to all pending cases. In 2010, Brooks sued, alleging that Dunlop marked a guitar string winder with the number of a patent that was both expired and invalidated. The AIA was enacted while the case was stayed, pending the outcome in another case. The district court held that the application of the AIA to pending actions did not violate the Due Process Clause and that the legislation rationally furthered a legitimate legislative purpose. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996, CP sued the United States, claiming that CP owned minerals underlying Louisiana property (Groups A, B, and C mineral servitudes), and that between 1943 and 1978, the government imposed a drilling and operations moratorium while the surface was used for bombing and artillery practice. It alleged that starting in 1992, the government, claiming ownership, has granted oil and gas leases covering the property. The district court granted the government summary judgment with regard to Groups A and B because the prescription period was not suspended by the moratoriums. Concerning Group C, the court granted CP summary judgment, finding that servitude imprescriptible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed; certiorari was denied. In1998, CP filed another complaint in the Claims Court, alleging taking without just compensation, as an alternative to its district court action. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the Groups A and B claims and limited the C claim to post-1992 action. The court found that the government’s issuance of leases after 1997 constituted a compensable temporary taking, but subsequently dismissed, finding that the facts alleged in the district court complaint were nearly identical. The complaints were “for or in respect to” the same claim and 28 U.S.C. 1500 precluded jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cent. Pines Land Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1989 Ethics Reform Act, 103 Stat. 1716, limited a federal judge’s ability to earn outside income, but provided for automatic, non-discretionary cost of living adjustments (COLA); whenever a COLA for General Schedule federal employees takes effect under 5 U.S.C. 5303, the salary of judges “shall be adjusted.” The only limitation on General Schedule COLAs is a presidential declaration of a “national emergency or serious economic conditions” 5 U.S.C. 5303(b). Nonetheless, in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999, General Schedule employees received adjustments, but Congress blocked adjustments for judges. Judges alleged violation of Article III, which provides that “Compensation” for federal judges “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” The district court agreed, but the Federal Circuit reversed, based on United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). In 2001, Congress enacted legislation blocking COLAs in certain years. Judges sought back pay. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed; the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. On remand, the Federal Circuit held that the claim was not precluded, but affirmed dismissal. On rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit overruled its earlier decision, holding that the 1989 Act triggered the Compensation Clause’s basic protections. In this unique context, the Constitution prevents Congress from abrogating that precise commitment to COLAs. The 1989 Act controls over the 2001 enactments. View "Beer v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1942, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation dammed the upper San Joaquin River near Friant, California. Friant Dam still operates, generates electricity and collects water for agriculture, but causes portions of the river to dry up, leading to extermination of Chinook salmon and other ecological consequences. In 1988 environmental groups sued the federal government, claiming violations of state and federal environmental protection laws. In 2006, the parties reached a settlement that obliged the government to release water to restore and maintain fish populations downstream, while continuing to support surrounding landowners, who depend on the water. Congress subsequently passed the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, 123 Stat. 1349, directing the Secretary of the Interior to implement the Settlement. In 2009 the Bureau of Reclamation initiated the first release of water. In August 2010, downstream owners sued the government for takings, alleging that the releases unlawfully impaired property rights in the water and inundated their land. Two of the environmental groups involved in the first case moved to intervene as of right. The Court of Federal Claims denied their motion, finding that the groups’ interests were sufficiently aligned with the government’s as to create no foundation for intervention. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1978, Hages acquired a ranch in Nevada occupying approximately 7,000 acres of private land and approximately 752,000 acres of federal lands under grazing permits. Their predecessors had acquired water rights now located on federal lands, 43 U.S.C. 661. Hages had disputes with the government concerning release of non-indigenous elk onto federal land for which Hages had grazing permits, unauthorized grazing by Hages’ cattle, and fence and ditch maintenance. After a series of incidents, in 1991, Hages filed suit alleging takings under 43 U.S.C. 1752(g), and breach of contract. After almost 20 years, the Claims Court awarded compensation for regulatory taking of water rights; physical taking of water rights; and range improvements. The court awarded pre-judgment interest for the takings, but not for the range improvements. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The regulatory takings claim and 43 U.S.C. 1752 claim are not ripe. To the extent the claim for physical taking relies on fences constructed 1981-1982, it is untimely. To the extent the physical takings claim relies on fences constructed 1988-1990, there is no evidence that water was taken that Hages could have put to beneficial use. Hages are not entitled to pre-judgment interest for range improvements because Hages failed to identify a cognizable property interest.

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen employed in international disaster relief assistance, returned from an overseas business trip and was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at Dulles International Airport. An agent seized his laptop and two flash drives after permitting him to copy and retain one computer file and providing Customs Form 6051D indicating that the equipment would be detained for up to 30 days. While the laptop was detained, its hard drive failed, destroying much of its business software. A Customs representative sent a letter seeking to assure plaintiff that a prompt resolution of the issue would be addressed. About 10 weeks after its seizure, the laptop was returned. Plaintiff’s suit alleged breach of an implied-in-fact contract and a taking, with damages totaling $469,480.00 due to lost contracts resulting from inability to access files as well as replacement hardware, software, and warranty costs. The Claims Court dismissed, finding that the complaint did not sufficiently allege a bailment contract and that the property was not taken for a public use within the context of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

Incentives under the National Housing Act, to encourage private developers to meet the needs of moderate income families, included below-market 40-year mortgages, with an option to prepay after 20 years. Restrictions, for example, on rent increases, were in effect until the mortgage was paid off. The prepayment option gave developers an opportunity to convert to market rate housing. To avoid a shortage of affordable housing, Congress enacted Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988), and Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990) under which an owner needed HUD approval to prepay or to go through regulatory hoops. In 1996 Congress restored prepayment rights. Plaintiff was prohibited from prepayment for five years, 10 days. The Court of Federal Claims held that the restriction of prepayment rights constituted a taking but did not constitute a breach of contract, because there was no privity between HUD and plaintiff. The Federal Circuit affirmed on the contract claim, but reversed with respect to temporary taking. The evidence did not demonstrate that plaintiff's investment backed expectations were objectively reasonable in light of industry practice,