Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The district court increased the length of Henderson’s sentence so he could participate in a prison drug rehabilitation program. Henderson’s counsel did not object to the sentence, but, on appeal, Henderson claimed plain error. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided, in Tapia v. United States, that it is error for a court to impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment pro¬gram or otherwise to promote rehabilitation. The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 52(b) did not give it authority to correct the error, reasoning that an error is “plain” only if it was clear under law at the time of trial. The Supreme Court reversed. Regardless of whether a legal question was settled or unsettled at the time of trial, an error is “plain” under Rule 52(b) if it was plain at the time of appellate review. If “plain error” covers trial court decisions that were plainly correct when made and those that were plainly incorrect when made, it should cover cases where the law was unsettled. A “time of review” interpretation furthers the basic principle that “an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” works little harm upon the competing principle that insists that counsel call a potential error to the trial court’s attention, and is consistent with Rule 52(b)’s purpose of creating a fairness-based exception to the general requirement that an objection be made at trial to preserve a claim of error. View "Henderson v. United States" on Justia Law

After the State of Michigan rested its case at Evans’ arson trial, the court granted a directed verdict of acquittal, concluding that the state had failed to prove that the burned building was not a dwelling, a fact the court mistakenly believed was an “element” of the statutory offense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for retrial. In affirming, the state’s highest court held that a directed verdict based on an error of law that did not resolve a factual element of the charged offense was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court reversed; the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. An acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. Unlike procedural rulings, which lead to dismissals or mistrials on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, acquittals are substantive rulings that conclude proceedings absolutely, and raise significant double jeopardy concerns. The trial court clearly evaluated the state’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation of governing legal principles, but that error affects only the accuracy of the determination to acquit, not its essential character. View "Evans v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009 upon learning that she had pleaded guilty to mail fraud in 2004. To avoid removal, she sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis, contending that her former attorney’s failure to advise her of the guilty plea’s immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. While her petition was pending, the Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty pleas. The district court vacated Chaidez’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed. Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. A case does not announce a new rule if it merely applies a principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts. Padilla’s ruling answered an open question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions, breaking new ground and imposing a new obligation. View "Chaidez v. United States" on Justia Law

Officer Wheetley pulled Harris over for a routine traffic stop. Wheetley sought consent to search Harris’s truck, based on Harris’s nervousness and seeing an open beer can. When Harris refused, Wheetley executed a sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo, who alerted at the driver’s-side door, leading Wheetley to conclude that he had probable cause to search. The search turned up nothing Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine. Harris was charged with illegal possession of those ingredients. In a subsequent stop while Harris was out on bail, Aldo again alerted on Harris’s truck but nothing of interest was found. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that if an officer failed to keep records of field performance, including how many times a dog falsely alerted, he could never have probable cause to think the dog a reliable indicator of drugs. The Supreme Court reversed. Training and testing records supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that evidence, so Wheetley had probable cause to search. Whether an officer has probable cause depends on the totality of the circumstances, not rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries. Requiring the state to introduce comprehensive documentation of a dog’s prior hits and misses in the field is the antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evidence, and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements. View "Florida v. Harris" on Justia Law

While police were preparing to execute a search warrant for a basement apartment, detectives in an unmarked car outside the apartment saw two men, later identified as Bailey and Middleton, leave the gated area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away. The detectives followed for about a mile, then stopped the car. They found keys during a pat-down search of Bailey, who said that he resided in the apartment. He later denied it when informed of the search. The men were handcuffed and driven to the apartment, where the search team had found a gun and illicit drugs. One of Bailey’s keys unlocked the apartment’s door. The district court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the key and statement, holding that Bailey’s detention was justified under Michigan v. Summers, as a detention incident to execution of a search warrant, and, in the alternative, that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio. Bailey was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed, without ruling on the Terry claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for determination of whether Terry applies. The rule in Summers, permitting detention even if there is no particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to officers, is limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. None of the law enforcement interests identified in Summers applies with similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. View "Bailey v. United States" on Justia Law

Gonzales, an Arizona death row inmate, sought federal habeas relief. Counsel sought a stay, contending that mental incompetence prevented Gonzales from rationally communicating with or assisting counsel, and that 18 U. S. C.3599(a)(2) requires a stay when a petitioner is adjudged incompetent. The district court denied a stay, finding that Gonzales’ claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit held that Gonzales had a right to a stay pending a competency determination. Carter, an Ohio death row inmate, initiated federal habeas proceedings but later moved for a competency determination and stay. The district court granted the motion, found Carter incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit identified a right to competence in 18 U. S. C. 4241 and ordered indefinite stay with respect to claims requiring assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 3599 does not provide a state prisoner a right to suspension of federal habeas proceedings when he is adjudged incompetent and that Section 4241 does not provide a right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. Review of record-based claims, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is limited to the record before the state court that heard the case on the merits and extra-record evidence concerning such claims is inadmissible. View "Ryan v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Lefemine and members of CCL demonstrate, carrying pictures of aborted fetuses, to protest abortions. In 2005, Lefemine and about 20 other CCL members demonstrated at a busy intersection in Greenwood County, South Carolina. Citing complaints about the signs, a police officer informed Lefemine that if the signs were not discarded, he would be ticketed for breach of the peace. Lefemine objected, but disbanded the protest. A year later, Lefemine’s attorney sent a letter to the sheriff, informing him that the group intended to return to the same site with the disputed signs. The department responded that the police had not violated Lefemine’s rights and warned that “should we observe any protester or demonstrator committing the same act, we will again order the person(s) to stop or face criminal sanctions.” Fearing sanctions, the group did not protest in the county for two years. Lefemine filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permanently enjoined content-based restrictions on Lefemine’s display of graphic signs under similar circumstances, but refused Lefemine’s requests for nominal damages, based on qualified immunity, and attorney fees. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court vacated, holding that the injunction, which altered the legal relationship between the parties, made Lefemine a “prevailing party” under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U. S.C. 1988. View "Lefemine v. Wideman" on Justia Law

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that West Virginia's 2011 congressional redistricting plan violated the "one person, one vote" principle that the Court held to be embodied in Article I, section 2, of the United States Constitution. A three-judge District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia agreed, declaring the plan "null and void" and enjoining West Virginia's Secretary of State from implementing it. The state defendants appealed directly to the Court. Because the District Court misapplied the standard for evaluating such challenges set out in Karcher v. Daggett, and failed to afford appropriate deference to West Virginia's reasonable exercise of its political judgment, the Court reversed. View "Tennant v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provides an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved, 18 U. S. C. 704 (b),(c). After pleading guilty to falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, Alvarez challenged the Act as unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that the Act is invalid under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Characterizing the law as a content-based restriction on protected speech, the Court applied the “most exacting scrutiny.” Falsity alone does not take speech outside the First Amendment. While the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question, the First Amendment requires a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented; that link was not established. The government had no evidence that the public’s general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims or that counter-speech, such as the ridicule Alvarez received online and in the press, would not suffice to achieve its interest. The law does not represent the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” The government could likely protect the integrity of the military awards system by creating a database of Medal winners accessible and searchable. Dissenting Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas viewed the Act as significantly limited and necessary to the important governmental objective.