Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Betterman pleaded guilty to bail jumping after failing to appear on domestic assault charges. He was then jailed for over 14 months awaiting sentence, in large part due to institutional delay. He was eventually sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, with four of the years suspended. The Montana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to post-conviction, presentencing delay. The Speedy Trial Clause right attaches upon a defendant’s arrest or formal accusation, but detaches upon conviction. Before conviction, the accused is shielded by the presumption of innocence, which the Speedy Trial Clause implements by minimizing the likelihood of lengthy incarceration before trial, lessening the anxiety and concern associated with a public accusation, and limiting the effects of long delay on the accused’s ability to mount a defense. The sole remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right— dismissal of the charges—fits the preconviction focus of the Clause; it would be an unjustified windfall to remedy sentencing delay by vacating validly obtained convictions. View "Betterman v. Montana" on Justia Law

Hinojosa was serving a sentence for armed robbery when, in 2009, prison officials “validated” him as a prison-gang associate and placed him in secured housing (Cal. Penal Code 2933.6). In 2010, the state amended the law so that secured housing prison-gang associates placed could no longer earn future good-time credits. Hinojosa filed a state habeas petition, arguing violation of the Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws. The Orange County Superior Court denied the claim on venue grounds. Challenges to conditions of confinement should be filed in the superior court of county of confinement. Rather than file a new petition, Hinojosa turned to the appellate court, which summarily denied his petition. Hinojosa then sought an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California, which summarily denied relief. The federal district court denied Hinojosa’s ex post facto claim under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to exhaust state remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). If the state courts adjudicate a federal claim “on the merits,” AEDPA mandates deferential, rather than de novo, review, unless the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,”, or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” The Ninth Circuit decided that the Supreme Court of California’s summary denial was not “on the merits.” The Supreme Court reversed. While, generally, “silence implies consent," strong evidence can refute that presumption. Improper venue could not possibly have been a ground for the high court’s summary denial of Hinojosa’s claim. There is only one Supreme Court of California, so its denial “obviously rested upon some different ground” and was on the merits. View "Kernan v. Hinojas" on Justia Law

Employers must cover certain contraceptives as part of their health plans unless the employer submits a form to their insurer or to the federal government, stating that they object on religious grounds to providing contraceptive coverage. The plaintiff-employers alleged that submitting this notice substantially burdened the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. In supplemental briefing, the parties acknowledged that contraceptive coverage could be provided to employees, through insurance companies, without such notice. Plaintiffs “need to do nothing more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of contraception,” and employees could receive cost-free contraceptive coverage from the same insurance company, seamlessly, with the rest of their coverage. Based on these stipulations, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments below and remanded to determine an approach that will accommodate the employers’ religious exercise while ensuring that women covered by their health plans “receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” The Court did not decide whether the employers’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened, whether the government has a compelling interest, or whether the current regulations are the least restrictive means of serving that interest. View "Zubik v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Spokeo operates a “people search engine,” which searches a wide spectrum of databases to gather and provide personal information about individuals to various users, including prospective employers. After Robins discovered that his Spokeo-generated profile contained inaccurate information, he filed a class-action complaint alleging that the company willfully failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b). The district court dismissed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Robins’ “personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized.” The Supreme Court vacated. A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing by demonstrating an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct, likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. A plaintiff must show that he suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The Ninth Circuit’ focused on particularization: the requirement that an injury “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” but an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized. Concreteness requires an injury to actually exist; a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a right and purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it. The violation of a statutory procedural right granted can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact, so that a plaintiff need not allege additional harm beyond the one identified by Congress. The Court did not rule on the correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion, but stated that Robins cannot satisfy Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. View "Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins" on Justia Law

The Paterson, New Jersey, chief of police and Officer Heffernan’s supervisor were appointed by Paterson’s incumbent mayor, who was running for re-election against Heffernan's friend, Spagnola. Heffernan was not involved in Spagnola’s campaign. As a favor to his bed-ridden mother, Heffernan delivered her Spagnola campaign yard sign. Other officers reported seeing Heffernan at a Spagnola distribution point while holding that sign. The next day, Heffernan’s supervisors demoted him from detective to patrol officer as punishment for “overt involvement” in Spagnola’s campaign. Heffernan filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Affirming the district court, the Third Circuit concluded that Heffernan’s claim was actionable under Section 1983 only if his employer’s action was prompted by Heffernan’s actual, rather than his perceived, exercise of free-speech rights. The Supreme Court reversed. When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and Section 1983 even if the employer’s actions are based on a factual mistake. An employer’s motive, and the facts as the employer reasonably understood them, matter in determining violation of the First Amendment. The harm— discouraging employees from engaging in protected speech or association—is the same, regardless of factual mistake. The lower courts should decide whether the employer may have acted under a neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign and whether such a policy would comply with constitutional standards. View "Heffernan v. City of Paterson" on Justia Law

After the 2010 census, Arizona’s Redistricting Commission, with two Republicans, two Democrats, and one Independent, redrew legislative districts. The initial plan had a 4.07% maximum population deviation from absolute equality of districts, but a statistician reported that the Justice Department might not approve the plan under the Voting Rights Act requirement that a new plan, compared to the existing plan, not diminish the number of districts in which minority groups can elect their preferred candidates. The Commission adopted a revised plan with an 8.8% deviation on a 3-to-2 vote, with Republican members dissenting. Under the final plan, a Republican-leaning district became more competitive. The Justice Department approved the plan as consistent with the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the plan, concluding that the “deviations were primarily a result of good-faith efforts to comply with the Voting Rights Act . . . though partisanship played some role.” Mathematical perfection is not required. Deviations may be justified by legitimate considerations, including compactness and contiguity, and state interests in maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, competitive balance among political parties, and, before the Supreme Court’s 2013 Shelby County decision, compliance with the Act. Because the deviation here is under 10%, objectors cannot rely on numbers to show a constitutional violation, but must show that it is more probable than not that the deviation reflects predominantly illegitimate reapportionment factors. Objectors failed to meet that burden: the deviations reflected efforts to achieve compliance with the Act, not to secure advantage for the Democratic Party. View "Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

American nationals may seek damages from state sponsors of terrorism in U.S. courts, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, but face difficulties enforcing their judgments. Concerned with specific terrorism cases, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, making designated assets available to satisfy judgments underlying a consolidated enforcement proceeding (identified by docket number), 22 U.S.C. 8772. Section 8772(a)(2) requires a court to determine,“whether Iran holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets.” Plaintiffs obtained default judgments and sought turnover of about $1.75 billion in bonds held in a New York bank account, allegedly owned by Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. Bank Markazi maintained that Section 8772 violated the separation-of-powers doctrine, contending that Congress had usurped the judicial role by directing a particular result in a pending enforcement proceeding. The district court, Second Circuit, and Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that Section 8772 permissibly changed the law applicable in a pending litigation. Although Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply pre-existing law to particular circumstances, Congress may amend a law and make the amended prescription retroactively applicable in pending cases. Nor is Section 8772 invalid because it prescribes a rule for a single, pending case identified by caption and docket number. Measures taken by the political branches to control the disposition of foreign-state property, including blocking specific foreign-state assets or making them available for attachment, have never been rejected as invasions upon the Article III judicial power. View "Bank Markazi v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity sales. States regulate retail sales. In states that have deregulated their energy markets, “load serving entities” (LSEs) purchase wholesale electricity from generators for delivery to retail consumers. PJM, which manages segments of the electricity grid, operates an auction to identify need for new generation and to accommodate long-term contracts. PJM predicts demand for three years and assigns a share of that demand to each participating LSE. Producers enter bids. PJM accepts bids until it purchases enough capacity to satisfy anticipated demand. All accepted sellers receive the highest accepted rate (clearing price). LSEs then must purchase, from PJM, electricity to satisfy their assigned share. FERC regulates the auction to ensure a reasonable clearing price. Concerned that the auction was not encouraging development of sufficient new in-state generation, Maryland enacted a program, selected CPV to construct a new power plant and required LSEs to enter into 20-year contracts with CPV. Under the contract, CPV sells its capacity to PJM through the auction, but—through mandated payments from LSEs—receives the state price rather than the clearing price. The district court issued a declaratory judgment holding that Maryland’s program improperly sets CPV's rate for interstate wholesale capacity sales to PJM. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Maryland’s program is preempted because it disregards the rate FERC requires under its exclusive authority over interstate wholesale sales, 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1). FERC has approved PJM’s capacity auction as the sole rate-setting mechanism for those sales. Maryland attempts to guarantee CPV a rate distinct from the clearing price, contrary to the Federal Power Act’s division of authority; states may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority. View "Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC" on Justia Law

Hyatt claims that he moved from California to Nevada in 1991, but the Franchise Tax Board of California claimed that he moved in 1992 and owed California millions in taxes, penalties, and interest. Hyatt sued in Nevada state court, which had jurisdiction over California under the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision, Nevada v. Hall, seeking damages for abusive audit and investigation practices. After the Supreme Court affirmed that Nevada courts, as a matter of comity, would immunize California to the same extent that Nevada law would immunize its own agencies and officials, Hyatt was awarded almost $500 million. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed $1 million of the award and ordered a retrial on another damages issue, declining to apply a $50,000 cap that would apply in a similar suit against its own officials because California’s efforts to control its agencies were inadequate as applied to Nevada’s citizens. The Supreme Court vacated the award, while affirming Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction. The Constitution does not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Nevada law that awards damages against California that are greater than it could award against Nevada in similar circumstances. The rule applied here is not only “opposed” to California’s law of complete immunity, it is inconsistent with general principles of Nevada immunity law. The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision lacked a “healthy regard for California’s sovereign status.” “Nevada’s hostility toward California is clearly evident in its decision to devise a special, discriminatory damages rule that applies only to a sister state.” View "Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt" on Justia Law

Possession of a firearm by a felon is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, 18 U.SC. 922(g), 924(a)(2), but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) increases that sentence to a mandatory 15-years-to-life if the offender has three or more prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” The definition of “violent felony” includes a “residual clause,” covering any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Welch's ACCA sentence, holding that his prior Florida conviction for robbery qualified as a “violent felony” under the residual clause. The district court denied collateral relief. In Johnson (2013), the Supreme Court held the residual clause unconstitutional for vagueness. The Eleventh Circuit denied Welch a certificate of appealability three weeks before the Johnson opinion. The Supreme Court vacated: Johnson announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review and, on the record, reasonable jurists could at least debate whether Welch should obtain relief. Substantive rules alter “the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” while procedural rules “regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Since Johnson made the residual clause invalid, it can no longer mandate or authorize any sentence; the decision had nothing to do with the range of permissible methods a court might use to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced. View "Welch v. United States" on Justia Law