Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after examining “whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected by the Second Amendment.” The court explained that stun guns are not protected because they “were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” that stun guns are “dangerous per se at common law and unusual,” and that “nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] are readily adaptable to use in the military.” The U.S. Supreme Court, per curiam, vacated, reiterating that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” and that it has rejected the proposition “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” View "Caetano v. Massachusetts" on Justia Law

V. L. and E. L. were in a relationship from 1995-2011. Through assisted reproductive technology, E. L. gave birth to a child. in 2002 and to twins in 2004. The women raised the children as joint parents. V. L. rented a house and filed a petition to adopt the children in Georgia. E. L. gave express consent to the adoption, without relinquishing her own parental rights. A final decree recognized both V. L. and E. L. as the legal parents of the children. The women ended their relationship in 2011, while living in Alabama. V.L filed suit, alleging that E. L. had denied her access to the children and interfered with her ability to exercise her parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and award her custody or visitation rights. The Family Court of Jefferson County awarded V. L. scheduled visitation. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Georgia court had no subject-matter jurisdiction under Georgia law to enter a judgment allowing V. L. to adopt the children while still recognizing E. L.’s parental rights and that Alabama courts were not required to accord full faith and credit to that judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on summary disposition, stating that the Georgia judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with jurisdiction; there is no established Georgia law to the contrary. View "V.L. v. E.L." on Justia Law

Walber was murdered in 1998. Two years later, Scott, then incarcerated, contacted authorities and initially reported that Wearry and others had confessed to shooting and driving over Walber, leaving his body on Blahut Road. Walber had not been shot; his body was found on Crisp Road. Scott changed his story in material ways four times. Another witness, Brown, recanted a prior inconsistent statement and agreed to testify. The prosecution stated that Brown “is doing 15 years on a drug charge… hasn’t asked for a thing” and “has no deal on the table.” Although the state presented no physical evidence, it offered additional circumstantial, but somewhat inconsistent, evidence linking Wearry to Walber. Three women testified that Wearry had been at a wedding reception 40 miles away. The bride testified that the reception had ended around 9:00, potentially leaving time for Wearry to have committed the crime. Jail employees testified that they had overheard Wearry say that he was present at the crime. The jury convicted Wearry of capital murder and sentenced him to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal, it emerged that the prosecution had withheld police records showed that two inmates had made statements that cast doubt on Scott’s credibility and that, contrary to the prosecution’s assertions, Brown wanted a deal for testifying. Police had told Brown that they would “‘talk to the D. A..’” Wearry’s trial attorney admitted at the state collateral-review hearing that he had conducted no investigation. Collateral-review counsel found many witnesses lacking any personal relationship with Wearry to corroborate his alibi until 11 pm. The lower courts and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the Brady claim, finding that the state withheld material evidence, and did not reach the ineffective assistance claim. View "Wearry v. Cain" on Justia Law

Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy in Louisiana. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty without capital punishment,” which carried an automatic sentence of life without parole. Nearly 50 years later, the Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The trial court denied his motion for relief. His application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in state collateral review. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts must give retroactive effect to new watershed procedural rules and to substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive constitutional rules include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, which is retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. A state may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. This would neither impose an onerous burden nor disturb the finality of state convictions and would afford someone like Montgomery, who may have evolved from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member of the prison community, the opportunity to demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change. View "Montgomery v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

A Kansas jury sentenced Gleason to death for killings to cover up a robbery. Another Kansas jury sentenced the Carr brothers to death after they were convicted of rape, kidnapping, and five execution-style shootings. The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the death sentences, holding that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment and that the Carrs’ rights to individualized capital sentencing determinations was violated. The Supreme Court reversed. The Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent do not require capital-sentencing courts to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Ambiguity in capital-sentencing instructions constitutes constitutional error only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. The instructions at issue clarified that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but that mitigating circumstances must merely be “found to exist.” No juror would reasonably speculate that “beyond a reasonable doubt” was the correct burden for mitigating circumstances. The Constitution did not require severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings. Claiming that admission of mitigating evidence by one Carr brother could have “so infected” jury consideration of the other’s sentence as to amount to a due process denial was “beyond the pale.” Joint proceedings are often preferable when the joined defendants’ criminal conduct arises out of a single chain of events. Limiting instructions, like those given in the Carrs’ proceeding, often suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. View "Kansas v. Carr" on Justia Law

Under Florida law, the maximum sentence a capital felon may receive based on a conviction alone is life imprisonment. He may be sentenced to death only after an additional sentencing proceeding, Fla. Stat. 775.082(1), with an evidentiary hearing before a jury. The jury renders an “advisory sentence.” Notwithstanding that recommendation, the judge must independently find and weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances before entering a sentence of life or death. A jury convicted Hurst of first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty. On remand, the jury again recommended death; the judge again found the facts necessary to sentence Hurst to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Hurst’s argument that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under the 2015 Supreme Court holding, Ring v. Arizona, that an Arizona sentencing scheme was unconstitutional for allowing a judge, rather than the jury, to find the facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Florida’s sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. Any fact that “expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict” is an “element” that must be submitted to a jury. That Florida provides an advisory jury is immaterial. The judge’s role is central and singular under Florida law. View "Hurst v. Florida" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police found the bodies of Malone and Warfield in their apartment. Malone had been stabbed. Warfield, then pregnant, had been strangled and scissors stuck out from her neck. Crime scene DNA matched Wheeler’s. During voir dire, Juror 638 gave equivocal answers about the death penalty, saying “I’m not sure that I have formed an opinion ... I believe there are arguments on both sides.” Asked about his ability to consider all available penalties, he noted he had “never been confronted with that situation in a, in a real-life sense of having to make that kind of determination.” “So it’s difficult … to judge how I would I guess act.” He agreed that he was “not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider” the death penalty and described himself as “a bit more contemplative on the issue of taking a life and, uh, whether or not we have the right to take that life.” Later, however, he stated that he could consider all the penalty options. The court granted a prosecution motion to strike Juror 638 for cause based on his inconsistent replies. Wheeler was convicted and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge “appropriately struck for cause those jurors that could not impose the death penalty.” After exhausting state postconviction procedures, Wheeler unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The Sixth Circuit reversed, granting relief as to Wheeler’s sentence. The Supreme Court reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court was not unreasonable in its application of clearly established federal law in concluding that Juror 638's exclusion did not violate the Sixth Amendment. View "White v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Sergeant Baker, with a warrant, approached Leija’s car at a restaurant and stated that he was under arrest. Leija sped onto I-27. Leija led Baker and Texas Trooper Rodriguez on an 18-minute chase at 85-110 mph. Leija twice called dispatch, claiming to have a gun and threatening to shoot the officers. The dispatcher broadcast Leija’s threats and a report that Leija might be intoxicated. Officer Ducheneaux, who was trained in using tire spike strips, manned a spike strip beneath an overpass. Trooper Mullenix drove to that overpass, where he radioed a plan to shoot and disable the car. Rodriguez responded “10– 4.” Mullenix asked the dispatcher to inform his supervisor, Byrd, of his plan Before receiving a response, Mullenix took a shooting position. Byrd responded to “see if the spikes work first.” Whether Mullenix heard the response is disputed. Deputy Shipman informed Mullenix that another officer was beneath the overpass. Approximately three minutes after Mullenix took his position, he spotted Leija’s vehicle and fired six shots. Leija’s car engaged the spikes, hit the median, and rolled. Leija was killed by Mullenix’s shots. Apparently, no shots hit the radiator, hood, or engine block. Leija’s estate sued Mullenix under 42 U. S. C. 1983. Mullenix unsuccessfully sought summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that immediacy of risk was a disputed fact. The Supreme Court reversed on the qualified immunity question, declining to address whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. Mullenix confronted a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice had threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer; whatever the wisdom of Mullenix’s choice, Supreme Court precedents do not indicate that he “beyond debate” acted unreasonably. View "Mullenix v. Luna" on Justia Law

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations implementing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) require that employers’ group health plans furnish preventive care and screenings for women without cost sharing requirements, 42 U.S.C. 300gg–13(a)(4). Nonexempt employers must provide coverage for 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including four that may have the effect of preventing a fertilized egg from developing. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from the contraceptive mandate. HHS has effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations; an insurer must exclude contraceptive coverage from such an employer’s plan and provide participants with separate payments for contraceptive services. Closely held for-profit corporations sought an injunction under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even by a rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that imposing the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” The Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious exercise” under RFRA and that the mandate imposed no requirements on corporate owners in their personal capacity. The Tenth Circuit held that the businesses are “persons” under RFRA; that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise; and that HHS had not demonstrated that the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling governmental interest.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the businesses, holding that RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations. The Court declined to “leave merchants with a difficult choice” of giving up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgoing the benefits of operating as corporations. Nothing in RFRA suggests intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which includes corporations, 1 U.S.C.1; no definition of “person” includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but excludes for-profit corporations. “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate law.” The Court rejected arguments based on the difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations and that the mandate itself requires only insurance coverage. If the plaintiff companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences; the government failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods. The government could assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives or could extend the accommodation already established for religious nonprofit organizations. The Court noted that its decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate, not all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions. View "Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The nominations of three members of the National Labor Relations Board were pending in the Senate when it passed a December 17, 2011, resolution providing for a series of “pro forma session[s],” with “no business ... transacted,” every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012. The President appointed the three members between the January 3 and January 6 pro forma sessions, invoking the Recess Appointments Clause, which gives the President the power “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” Art. II, section 2, cl. 3. The D.C. Circuit held that the appointments fell outside the scope of the Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Clause reflects the tension between the President’s continuous need for “the assistance of subordinates,” and the Senate’s early practice of meeting for a single brief session each year and should be interpreted as granting the President power to make appointments during a recess, but not offering authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation. Putting “significant weight” on historical practice, the Court found that the Clause applies to both intersession and intra-session recesses of substantial length. A three-day recess would be too short. In light of historical practice, a recess of more than three but less than 10 days is presumptively too short. The phrase “vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate” applies both to vacancies that come into existence during a recess and to vacancies that initially occur before a recess but continue during the recess. Although the Senate’s own determination of when it is in session should be given great weight, deference is not absolute. When the Senate is without the capacity to act, under its own rules, it is not in session even if it so declares. Under these standards, the Senate was in session during the pro forma sessions at issue. It said it was in session, and, under Senate rules, it retained the power to con-duct business. Because the Senate was in session, the President made the recess appointments at issue during a three-day recess, which is too short a time to fall within the scope of the Clause, so the President lacked the authority to make the appointments. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning" on Justia Law