Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was asked to determine whether Arkansas Code § 23-92-604(c), also known as Act 1103, was preempted by federal law. Act 1103 prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from limiting the ability of healthcare providers, who are eligible for drug pricing discounts under the Section 340B Program, to contract with outside pharmacies for drug distribution.The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sued the Commissioner of the Arkansas Insurance Department, arguing that Act 1103 was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the Section 340B Program and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, under theories of field, obstacle, and impossibility preemption.The court, however, disagreed with PhRMA's arguments. The court found that Act 1103 did not create an obstacle for pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with 340B, rather it assisted in fulfilling the purpose of 340B. The court also found that Act 1103 did not make it impossible for drug manufacturers and wholesale distributors to comply with the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) Program under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.Therefore, the court held that Act 1103 was not preempted by either the Section 340B Program or the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. As such, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Intervenors and against PhRMA. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs of America v. McClain" on Justia Law

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Two former police officers, Thomas Noon and Christopher Skidmore, were dismissed from their jobs in Platte Woods, Missouri, after submitting a letter of grievances about the police chief, James Kerns, to the city's mayor and Board of Aldermen. The officers filed a lawsuit against the mayor and police chief, claiming their First Amendment rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The defendants then brought an interlocutory appeal.Noon and Skidmore had raised several concerns about Kerns's performance as Chief of Police, including issues with department vehicles, radar equipment, personnel, and Kerns's use of department time for personal business. After their concerns were not addressed, the officers sent a document outlining their grievances to the mayor and the Board of Aldermen. After the officers admitted to authoring the document, they were both removed from the department's schedule and eventually fired.In reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the officers had established a First Amendment violation. The court determined that the officers' speech, criticizing the police chief's leadership and alleging corruption and financial mismanagement, was made as citizens on matters of public concern. The court also concluded that the defendants failed to show that the officers' speech had an adverse impact on the department's operations. Finally, the court determined that the officers' First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for protected speech was clearly established. Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Noon v. Smedley" on Justia Law

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The case involves Sanimax USA, LLC, who sued the City of South Saint Paul, Minnesota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city's zoning and odor ordinances violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause. Sanimax contended that the city enacted these ordinances in retaliation for Sanimax challenging prior ordinances and that the ordinances unfairly singled out Sanimax. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all counts.Sanimax operates a rendering plant in South Saint Paul that processes animal carcasses and organic byproducts, emitting pungent, foul odors that have drawn numerous complaints from nearby residents and businesses. Sanimax was designated as a "Significant Odor Generator" by the city, and later challenged the constitutionality of the city's odor ordinance, alleging that it was unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that Sanimax failed to show that the city's actions were a direct retaliation for Sanimax's prior lawsuits challenging the city's ordinances. Additionally, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that it was unfairly singled out, finding that Sanimax was not similarly situated to other businesses due to the significantly higher number of odor complaints it generated. Lastly, the Court rejected Sanimax's argument that the city's odor ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, finding that the ordinance provided sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct and did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. View "Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of South St. Paul" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a nonprofit organization that sought to unseal court filings from federal criminal investigations. The District Court in Minnesota dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, and the case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.The Reporters Committee's application aimed to unseal electronic-surveillance filings, which were required to be filed under seal by a local rule. The District Court believed the request was too broad since the majority of the materials requested become unsealed after six months. The court suggested negotiations with the United States Attorney’s Office to reach a solution.The Reporters Committee subsequently filed an amended application, seeking an order directing the clerk of the court to presumptively unseal warrants and related documents after 180 days and to begin docketing the government’s applications for electronic surveillance regardless of whether a judge granted them. The Committee claimed these duties arose under the First Amendment and the common-law right of access to public records and documents.The District Court dismissed the application, concluding that the Committee lacked standing because all it had was a “generalized, abstract interest” in unsealing the records. This decision was affirmed by the Appeals Court, which held that the Committee failed to establish it suffered a “concrete” and “particularized” injury. It was also noted that the Committee did not sue anyone who could provide the relief it sought, hence there was a lack of adversity necessary for federal court adjudication. View "Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. United States" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Jesse and Dustin Sierra, convicted of various charges including kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and aiding and abetting both offenses, respectively, appealed their convictions. Jesse Sierra challenged the district court’s decision to exclude evidence of the victim’s other traumatic experiences, arguing that it violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He also argued that the government suppressed exculpatory or impeachment material, violating the Brady v. Maryland precedent. Dustin Sierra challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions and argued that his trial should have been severed from Jesse's trial due to the prejudicial nature of the testimony and evidence presented. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the exclusion of the victim's other traumatic experiences did not violate Jesse's constitutional rights, and that no Brady violations had occurred. The court also found that the evidence against Dustin was sufficient for the convictions and that there was no severe prejudice warranting a separate trial. View "United States v. Jesse Sierra" on Justia Law

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In this case, Tony Doolin was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release for distribution of crack cocaine. After his release, Doolin lived in Iowa and possessed a medical-marijuana card, which permitted him to obtain medical marijuana under Iowa law. However, his supervised release was revoked due to his ongoing marijuana use and his distribution of medical marijuana to his girlfriend. Doolin appealed this decision, arguing that it violated the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution, due to the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA) of 2023. This act prohibits the Department of Justice (DOJ) from using funds to prevent states from implementing their own medical marijuana laws.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, holding that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release did not violate the Appropriations Clause or the CAA of 2023. The court noted that marijuana possession remains illegal under federal law, regardless of any state laws or limits on prosecutorial funding. Federal courts are required to impose a prohibition on a defendant’s unlawful possession or use of all controlled substances, including marijuana, as a condition of any term of supervised release. Even if section 531 of the CAA prohibits the DOJ from funding marijuana-related prosecutions or revocations, where doing so prevents a state from implementing its medical marijuana laws, the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin’s supervised release. Doolin engaged in unlawful conduct, even under Iowa’s medical-marijuana regime, as private distribution of marijuana is illegal under Iowa law, as is smoking marijuana, even for medical purposes. Therefore, the court found that the revocation of Doolin's supervised release was not prohibited by the CAA, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Doolin's supervised release. View "United States v. Doolin" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the defendant, Donavan Jay White Owl, appealed an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. White Owl had been indicted for felony murder and arson within Indian Country. A mistrial was declared during the initial trial after a dispute over White Owl’s access to information about a prosecution witness. White Owl argued that a new trial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.The Appeals Court, however, ruled that White Owl had impliedly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that while the defendant did not expressly request a mistrial, his actions and responses during the proceedings indicated his implicit agreement. Specifically, when the district court declared its intention to declare a mistrial and asked the parties for their views, White Owl did not object but instead emphasized the need for more time to prepare for cross-examination of a prosecution witness.In light of this, the court concluded that White Owl's lack of objection amounted to implied consent to a mistrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying White Owl's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Donavan White Owl" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision to deny defendant Ki-Jana Kolajuan Ivey's motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his cell phone. Ivey, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm following a traffic stop in which officers discovered a gun under his seat. Officers also obtained a warrant to search Ivey's phone, finding photos and videos of him with other firearms. Ivey argued that the search of his phone was not supported by probable cause and that the warrant was too general, violating the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause given the circumstances of the traffic stop, Ivey's possession of the phone, and his prior social media activity displaying firearms. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrant was sufficiently particular, as it specified the phone to be searched and the information to be seized. The court noted that the presence of unrelated information on Ivey's phone did not transform the warrant into an impermissible general warrant. View "United States v. Ivey" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in a case concerning a law in Iowa that penalized anyone who, while trespassing, knowingly placed or used a camera or surveillance device on the trespassed property. The law was challenged by five animal-welfare groups who argued that it unconstitutionally punished activity protected by the First Amendment. The lower court agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that the law was unconstitutional on its face because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's substantial interests. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the part of the law that penalized the use of cameras while trespassing (the "Use Provision"), but not the part penalizing the placement of cameras on trespassed property (the "Place Provision"). The court also disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the law was unconstitutional, holding that it survived intermediate scrutiny against a facial challenge and was not unconstitutionally overbroad, as it did not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court's decision that an Iowa law violated the First Amendment. The law prohibited accessing an agricultural production facility under false pretenses or making a false statement or misrepresentation as part of a job application at such a facility, with the intent to cause physical or economic harm or other injury to the facility. Various organizations challenged this law, arguing it was unconstitutional as it was "viewpoint-based", targeting speakers with negative views of agricultural production facilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa agreed and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining officials from enforcing the law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the law was constitutional as it restricted intentionally false speech carried out to cause a legally recognized harm. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law