Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

EEE Minerals, LLC, and a Trustee for The Vohs Family Revocable Living Trust, sued the State of North Dakota, the Board of University and School Lands, and the Board’s commissioner in a dispute over mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Plaintiffs alleged that state law related to mineral ownership was preempted by federal law and that the defendants had engaged in an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs’ mineral interests. Plaintiffs sought damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief. The district court dismissed the action.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs contend that the Flood Control Act impliedly preempts the North Dakota statute because the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” The court explained that it is not convinced that the State’s determination of a high-water mark, and the attendant settling of property rights under state law, stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the Flood Control Act. The court wrote that the interests of the United States and the goals of the Flood Control Act are unaffected by a dispute between the State and a private party over mineral rights that were not acquired by the federal government.   Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs have not established that the United States will be prevented from flooding or inundating any land covered by the 1957 deed in which the State claims ownership of mineral interests under state law. The Flood Control Act would not dictate that property rights be assigned to Plaintiffs. View "EEE Minerals, LLC v. State of North Dakota" on Justia Law

A jury found Sherman and Smith guilty of conspiracy to commit witness tampering resulting in death. The jury also found Smith guilty of witness tampering, resulting in death, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.  The district court denied Defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal on those counts and sentenced both men to life imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court considered whether the district court erred in denying Sherman’s repeated requests to be tried separately from Smith. The court explained that it was convinced that the district court’s repeated limiting instructions sufficiently cured whatever risk of prejudice existed. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to sever.   Further, the court explained that Sherman and Smith argue that the Government failed to establish a nexus between their conduct and an official proceeding. However, the court held that sufficient evidence demonstrates a nexus between the murder and the upcoming revocation hearing, as well as a potential future federal prosecution for distributing drugs.   Moreover, Smith claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and the related firearms charge. The court explained that because Smith’s challenge to his conviction on the firearms offense rests entirely on his argument that the evidence was not sufficient to prove a drug-distribution conspiracy, the court found the evidence sufficient to prove Smith’s guilt on the firearms offense as well. View "United States v. Samuel Sherman" on Justia Law

The BIA denied Petitioner’s request for cancellation of removal based on the failure to show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his United States-citizen children. The BIA granted voluntary departure to Mexico. Petitioner then discovered evidence of substandard attorney performance by his attorney before the IJ and filed a timely motion to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also submitted evidence obtained between the final order and the motion to reopen, asserting that two of his children suffered from emotional- and mental-health issues that could not be adequately addressed in Mexico. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, holding that even if counsel had been unprepared before the IJ, different counsel represented Petitioner in the initial appeal to the BIA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion. The court explained that here, considering all of the evidence presented, the BIA rationally determined that the addition of the later-submitted evidence of emotional- and mental health issues failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The evidence demonstrated neither that the health issues were severe nor that treatment would be unavailable in Mexico. The BIA also rationally determined there had been no showing of prejudice associated with the claim of attorney ineffectiveness. Further, on appeal, Petitioner failed to articulate how the initial counsel’s failures affected the outcome. View "Ignacio Trejo-Gamez v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota, designated Veterans Memorial Park as a limited public forum and granted permits to two groups to place monuments there. Before the Satanic Temple could place its monument, the City closed the Park as a limited public forum and terminated both permits. The Satanic Temple sued the City. The district court dismissed its claims, except for promissory estoppel. When the Satanic Temple moved to amend its complaint, a Magistrate Judg2denied its motion. The Satanic Temple filed a second suit, reasserting the dismissed claims and adding new ones. The district court held that res judicata bars the second suit and granted summary judgment to the City on the promissory estoppel claim from the first suit.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly allege that closing the Park as a limited public forum was unreasonable or viewpoint discriminatory. The court further explained that the Satanic Temple asserted that the City violated its free exercise rights. The court explained that although the Enacting and Recession Resolutions were facially neutral, facial neutrality is not a safe harbor if the City’s actions targeted the Satanic Temple’s religious conduct. However, the Satanic Temple failed to plausibly claim that its display was targeted. Moreover, the Satanic Temple has not plausibly alleged that it and the Veterans Club were similarly situated or that it was treated differently. The City gave a permit to both groups, had no control over the fact that the Veterans Club placed its statue first, and closed the Park as a limited public forum to everyone. View "The Satanic Temple v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

Defendant sexually abused C.M. and E.A.H. in his mother’s basement on separate occasions. L.M., the legal guardian of C.M. and E.A.H. and sister of Defendant’s mother, often brought the two children to the house for visits. At trial, the jury heard testimony from C.M., E.A.H., L.M., and a forensic examiner. The Government introduced evidence of Defendant’s prior conviction of abusive sexual contact of a person incapable of consent. Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied, and was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to life in prison for each sexual abuse count and 20 years for witness tampering, running concurrently. On appeal, Defendant alleged insufficient evidence to support the verdict, improper joinder of charges, improper introduction of evidence of his prior conviction, and procedural and substantive sentencing errors.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that because the sexual abuses of C.M. and E.A.H. involved different methods of penetration, victims of different ages, and different occurrences, the charges were improperly joined. However, the court explained that the victims do not have to be the same age. Further, the court wrote that joinder was proper because the offenses were of a similar character. “In applying the same or similar character standard, we have found joinder of offenses to be proper when the two counts refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short period of time, and the evidence as to each count overlaps.” View "United States v. Jerome Goodhouse, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 lawsuit against the City of St. Louis and Doc’s Towing, Inc., alleging that Defendants violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they detained her truck pursuant to a “wanted” report. On the first appeal of this case the Eighth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient for Plaintiff’s claims to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff then settled with Doc’s Towing, and her case against the City proceeded to trial. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the City on Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on her due process claim and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court denied the City’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law but partially granted its motion to reduce the damages award. Both the City and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as to Plaintiff’s assertion on cross-appeal that the district court erred by granting the City judgment as a matter of law on her unreasonable seizure claim, the court declined to reverse that ruling. The court explained that her due process claims and unreasonable seizure claim sought compensation for the same injury, and she concedes that she would not be entitled to additional compensatory damages beyond those that were already awarded by the jury. Accordingly, the court declined to remand because Plaintiff failed to articulate what relief she could obtain beyond what she has already achieved by way of the jury verdict. View "Mary Meier v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on his claims that his former employer, ADESA Missouri, LLC (ADESA), discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether ADESA’s reasons for terminating him were pretext for disability discrimination and retaliation. The court agreed with Plaintiff’s assertion that a reasonable jury could determine that the company’s VP made the decision to terminate Plaintiff  because of his medical restriction and only retroactively claimed a performance-based concern after HR advised her that terminating an employee due to his disability could be “an issue.” The evidence shows that the VP sent an email to HR about an employee with a “medical restriction” who had been “identified” for termination, asking if this could be “an issue.” Only after she learned that it could be a problem did the VP respond with specific criticisms of his performance. ADESA argues that because Plaintiff does not dispute he was underperforming compared to his peers, there can be no pretext. But neither the sales director nor the VP was able to say when they took these performance assessments into consideration. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised genuine doubt as to ADESA’s proffered reasons for his termination. View "Roby Anderson v. KAR Global" on Justia Law

Appellant Attorney Kezhaya represented The Satanic Temple, Inc., in its lawsuits against the City of Belle Plaine, Minnesota. The Temple sued the City, claiming that the City opened a limited public forum for a Christian monument, but closed the forum to exclude a Satanic monument. The City sought $33,886.80 in attorney’s fees incurred by responding to the complaint in the second lawsuit and preparing the motion for sanctions. The court determined that the rates charged by the City’s counsel were reasonable but observed that a portion of the work was duplicative of the first lawsuit and that the issues unique to the second lawsuit were not complex, novel, or difficult. The court thus reduced the requested amount by fifty percent and ordered the Temple’s counsel to pay the City $16,943.40 under Rule 11(c). Kezhaya appealed the sanctions order. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (i) imposing sanctions, (ii) failing to consider non-monetary sanctions, and (iii) granting an arbitrary amount of sanctions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the circumstances, it disagreed with Kezhaya’s contention about the righteousness of a second lawsuit. For the claims dismissed “without prejudice” in the first lawsuit, Kezhaya and the Temple made a strategic choice to seek leave to amend the complaint to correct the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order. Further, the court found that even if the City’s insurance carrier ultimately paid the fees, the fees were “incurred” for the motion and could be awarded under Rule 11(c)(2). View "Matthew Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a corrections officer, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights while Plaintiff was a detainee at a jail in Minnesota. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that qualified immunity protects governmental officials from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 unless a plaintiff shows that the official’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established right of the plaintiff. The court wrote that because Plaintiff was a detainee at the time of the incident, his relevant constitutional rights arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant argued that he did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that no constitutional violation occurred because “manual contact with a detainee’s genitals may be necessary as part of a search.” The court explained that as a general proposition, it is clearly established that “the sexual assault of an inmate by a guard violates the inmate’s constitutional rights.” The court explained that right is violated when a government official’s conduct is so egregious “that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant subjected him to a strip search and, without legitimate penological justification, grasped his naked penis, squeezed it hard, and gestured. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find that the alleged conduct constituted sexual abuse or assault. View "Wilbert Glover v. R. Paul" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and three firearm charges, including possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence to support his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction and that his Section 924(c) conviction should be vacated in light of United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022). He also challenged his sentence’s substantive reasonableness.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed his attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction but vacated his Section 924(c) conviction under Taylor. The court also vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that here Defendant repeatedly surveilled L.B.’s home. He donned a disguise and scripted his false entry. He had a rifle and planned to neutralize, if necessary, those he found inside. But he preferred to wield a handgun and told his fake accomplice he wouldn’t rob the house without one. Just before the trade, he was arrested. All told, the district court did not clearly err by finding the circumstances showed Defendant was about to complete all the acts he believed necessary to complete the Hobbs Act robbery but for the police’s intervention. The court explained that after Defendant’s trial, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Taylor and held that “attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause” of Section 924(c). This means that Defendant’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction no longer qualifies as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction. Thus the court vacated his Section 924(c) conviction in accordance with Taylor. View "United States v. Rufus Dennis" on Justia Law