Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted by a jury of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity. The charge arose from Defendant’s response to an online advertisement and his dialogue with an undercover detective who posed as a fourteen-year-old girl. At trial, the district court declined Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment, and Defendant appealed that decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the requested instruction. The court explained that the evidence here shows that the government presented Defendant with an opportunity to entice an arguably sexually precocious minor whose appearance was arguably more mature than average. Defendant responded to an advertisement, and broached the topic of unlawful sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old girl. The detective posing as a minor carried on a lengthy dialogue with Defendant, but did not employ the tactics most likely to warrant an entrapment instruction: pressure, assurances that a person is not doing anything wrong, persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy, or friendship. Without more, there was not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the government impermissibly induced Defendant to commit the offense. View "United States v. Darren Lasley" on Justia Law

The Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections relied on staff to investigate and address sexual assault allegations against a prison guard. At summary judgment, Appellant requested qualified immunity. The district court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that she knew prisoners faced “a substantial risk of sexual assault.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the entry of judgment in Appellant’s favor and denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The court wrote that even if it assumes that Appellant should have done more, neither “controlling authority” nor “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” required it. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “broad right” to protection from sexual assault, in other words, “does not answer” the “specific and particularized” question of whether Appellant violated the Eighth Amendment by waiting for her staff to complete their investigation. View "Teri Dean v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

Two organizations, one individual, one business (collectively “Private Plaintiffs”) and seventeen states (“the States”) sued the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) for overstepping its statutory authority and for violating federal law in promulgating the “Definition of ‘Frame or Receiver’ and Identification of Firearms” (“Final Rule”). Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not clearly shown how the Final Rule will prevent them from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. Regarding the business plaintiff in this case, we are left unsure what behavior it wishes to engage in, as an LLC, that is protected by the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs also argued they will suffer economic harm without a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs asserted generally that compliance costs and uncertainty surrounding the validity and scope of the Final Rule will be costly to businesses and lead to fewer sales of firearms. However, Plaintiffs do not explain the economic harm in definite enough terms to show the extent of any harm is “actual and not theoretical.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Plaintiffs have not met their burden. View "Morehouse Enterprises, LLC v. Bureau of ATF" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence that caused death. The district court sentenced Defendant to serve two concurrent life terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asserting the district court committed four errors during trial: (1) when it allowed the government to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) of Defendant’s jealous behavior toward two other men; (2) when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the government had presented sufficient evidence of premeditation; (3) when it sua sponte failed to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense; and (4) when it denied Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence of the manner of killing also gives rise to a reasonable inference of premeditation. Although Defendant provided three different versions of what happened, in one accounting before the jury, Defendant told law enforcement that he aimed and fired at the victim, who was indisputably shot in the back of the head at a distance of at least three feet away. Further, Defendant retrieved that gun from his bedroom closet and shot the victim in the head as she tried to escape. Defendant’s actions after the shooting also point towards premeditation. Because there is ample evidence that supports the jury’s finding that the killing was premeditated, Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. View "United States v. Casey Crow Ghost" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 30 months of imprisonment after McKenzie pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Defendant appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) by failing to account for the time he had served in Florida for a related state offense.Agreeing with Defendant, the Eighth Circuit reversed Defendant's sentence, finding that the district court did not reduce the sentence after finding the time served in Florida was for relevant conduct. Thus, the Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "United States v. Alfonso McKenzie" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He argued the district court should have suppressed the gun and shell casing found in his apartment. He challenged the steps the officers took from the moment they entered his apartment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a suspect who has just illegally used a gun is on a different Fourth Amendment footing than someone who merely possesses one. Moreover, the court wrote that first, when the officers asked Defendant whether they could “look” around “to make sure there’s nobody else in the apartment,” he replied, “[y]es ma’am. You can do whatever you want.” Based on that reply, he consented to at least a protective sweep of the apartment. Second, after Defendant blurted out that there had been suspicious activity outside, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that Defendant had provided consent to look there. Third, consent extended to the retrieval of the gun itself after Defendant confessed to “firing the shot” and admitted that the gun was in a kitchen cabinet. View "United States v. Cornell Williams" on Justia Law

Officers shot and killed Brian Quinones-Rosario as he approached officers with the knife drawn. His widow as trustee, sued the officers and their employing municipalities. She alleged an excessive use of force that resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court concluded that the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, and granted judgment for the officers and the municipalities. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”. Applying those principles, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Quinones, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. The court explained that Quinones-Rosario posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers. He aggressively wielded a knife that he refused to drop despite repeated commands to do so. He then charged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed a non-lethal taser against him, but it had no effect. The officers reasonably believed that Quinones-Rosario posed a serious threat to their safety. The officers fired more rounds when Quinones-Rosario survived the first round of shots and continued to approach the officers with the knife. The court concluded that their actions were a reasonable defensive response under the circumstances. View "Ashley Quinones v. City of Edina, MN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their child AMS at a private academy after the Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded Plaintiffs costs associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court affirmed.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Chamberlain argued that Plaintiffs weren’t eligible to remove the case from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). The court explained that while Plaintiffs initially sought to recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain became the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, because Plaintiffs were defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying remand. Further, the court explained that giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, it concludes that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. View "Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant and co-Defendant were convicted in district court on charges arising out of the kidnapping of Defendant’s minor grandchildren. Defendant appealed her conviction for aiding and abetting kidnapping, and co-Defendant appealed his conviction for being a prohibited person in possession of firearms. Defendant appealed, asserting (1) the district court erred in refusing to admit the full recording of her interview with law enforcement; (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury and preparing the jury verdict form; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Co-Defendant appealed, asserting the district court erred when it (1) declined to grant his motion to withdraw his plea; and (2) committed procedural error.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that co-Defendant has not offered a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Moreover, the court wrote that the children’s mother testified that she did not give consent to co-Defendant to take the children and that Defendant told her that co-Defendant was going to take the children because the mother did not love them, did not deserve to be their mother, and was not going to be able to see them ever again. The court found that the record contains more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Defendant guilty of aiding and abetting kidnapping. View "United States v. Nora Guevara Triana" on Justia Law