Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants pleaded guilty to federal controlled substance offenses, and all three appealed their sentences.   The Fourth Circuit vacated each defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Texas case law indicates that a defendant can be convicted of “offering to sell a controlled substance” under Section 481.112(a) without having the intent to distribute or dispense drugs. An offer-to-sell conviction is thus categorically broader than an attempt to commit a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. The court explained that the government bears the burden of proving “the facts necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement” by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, the court concluded that, once Defendant objected to the factual recitation in the PSR, the government failed to meet its burden as to both the obstruction-of-justice and the violent-threat enhancements. View "United States v. Jaime Campos" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced Smith to 180 months imprisonment as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e). Defendant appealed an order denying his motion to suppress evidence and challenges his sentence. At issue on appeal is whether the seizure was nonetheless reasonable, and whether evidence discovered in the course of the seizure was admissible in Defendant’s prosecution.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances provided the officers with a reasonable, articulable basis to believe that the suspect they were looking for was in the car that they stopped. Here, the Officers had reasonable suspicion that the suspect used a particular cellular telephone. One of the officers received the telephone number from a known informant. The informant had proved reliable by providing accurate information about the suspect’s possession of guns and drugs in the past. The informant reported recently speaking with the suspect at the specified phone number. Officers were armed with a judicial warrant based on a finding of probable cause that the suspect used the target phone number. When officers then determined that the man traveled the same route as the telephone associated with the suspect a reasonable officer could have believed, mistakenly, that the man under surveillance was the suspect. Accordingly, the stop did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Romelle Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for having knowingly procured her naturalization contrary to law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1425(a). Defendant made several false statements in procuring her naturalization. The issues on appeal are whether the government met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements were material, as that element of the Section 1425(a) offense was defined in Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017), and whether they were made “under oath.”
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that the false statements were immaterial because they did not necessarily establish she lacked good moral character. The court disagreed, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(f) provides that “no person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who” gives false testimony to obtain an immigration benefit in violation of Section 1101(f)(6). Moreover, Defendant argued that “false testimony” is limited to false statements given verbally under oath. As the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements in her N-400 Application for Naturalization were given orally and under oath, the government failed to present sufficient evidence, and we “need not even address materiality.” The court explained that the district court t was free to find the testimony of a USCIS supervisory officer more credible than the contrary opinion of Defendant’s expert, who admitted she had never attended a naturalization interview in Des Moines. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find she acted to obtain immigration benefits for her spouse. View "United States v. Deanah Cheboss" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. One special condition of supervised release required him to participate in a sex offender treatment program. At sentencing, the district court1 overruled Defendant’s objection to this special condition because the government advised that he “had just been released from prison in 2014 for violating the terms of his Sex Offender Registry.” Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court explained that the issue in the first revocation proceeding – Defendant’s refusal to attend sex offender treatment -- is behavior “capable of repetition” while “evading review.” Therefore, when the appeal in No. 23-1245 was filed, the court delayed ruling on the mootness issue, anticipating Defendant might challenge reimposition of this special condition in the second revocation sentence. But, the court wrote, he failed to do so. Additionally, neither brief in No. 23-1245 challenges the special conditions of supervised release reimposed in the second revocation sentence, including the sex offender treatment condition. The condition challenged in No. 22- 2610 was reimposed in the second revocation sentence and not challenged in the appeal of that sentence. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal in No. 22-2610 as moot. View "United States v. Adrian Weems" on Justia Law

Two dog owners sued a police officer and the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners after the officer shot a dog during an encounter at a residence. The dog owners alleged that the officer violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by unreasonably “seizing” the dog. They also asserted that the Board’s policies and customs caused the officer to commit the alleged violation. The district court granted summary judgment for the officer and the Board.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the behavior of the dog, and the failure of the owner to control the animal at the doorway, a reasonable officer could have perceived the dog as an imminent threat. Thus, the officer’s s firing of a first shot was reasonable. The court further wrote that the circumstances in LeMay are readily distinguishable from the officer’s doorway encounter with a growling dog who suddenly rushed at him and then turned in the direction of his fellow officer. View "Brandee Buschmann v. Kansas City Police Department" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed the court’s evidentiary rulings at trial and the determination of his sentence. The parties dispute whether Defendant’s term of imprisonment for the state assault offense was “anticipated.” Defendant says the state sentence was anticipated because the state assault charge was pending in state court. The government counters that any state sentence was speculative and not “anticipated” because Defendant had not been convicted of any state offense.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment. The court concluded that there is no plain error warranting relief because it is not obvious under current law that Defendant’s state term of imprisonment was “anticipated.” Section 5G1.3(c) does not define “anticipated,” and Defendant cites no authority from the Eighth Circuit. The court explained that given the absence of a definition in the guidelines, and the limited authority on the issue, the court wrote, it is at least subject to reasonable dispute whether the filing of a state charge, by itself, makes a future state sentence “anticipated” within the meaning of Section 5G1.3(c). Further, the court concluded that the district court made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented and acted within the wide latitude available to a sentencing judge who weighs the relevant factors. View "United States v. Montgomery Lebeau" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of assaulting a federal officer and one count of using a firearm to further a crime of violence. The first assault count was based on Defendant’s altercation with Officer Johnson, the second on Defendant’s pointing his rifle at Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley. The third count, using a firearm to further a crime of violence, was based on the second assault count. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for all counts. The district court denied both motions. Defendant was convicted of all three counts, and the district court denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of his judgment of acquittal. He appealed his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Officer Johnson testified that when he went to the house the first time, it was in the back of his mind to look for possible firearms violations. His concern about the possible access to weapons is the reason he did not let Defendant go back inside the house. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Officer Johnson was fulfilling the mission of the ATF to enforce federal firearms statutes when he went to the home. To be sure, he was also conducting a state investigation, but an officer can be “engaged in the performance of official [federal] duties” while simultaneously fulfilling state duties. Further, the court wrote that there is sufficient evidence that Troopers Shipley and Wakefield and Sheriff Medley were assisting Officer Johnson “in the performance of official duties” when they were assaulted. View "United States v. Zerak Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that led West Memphis Police Department (WMPD) officers on a dangerous chase. He was shot and killed when officers tried to stop the car, and his estate sued them under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force and state-created danger. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that Plaintiff had his hands up. And the court has no doubt that shooting into the car posed a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to him. But the driver had just led police on a reckless, high-speed chase, which involved swerving into oncoming traffic, hitting a police car, and resisting efforts to stop the car by other means. By the time officers started shooting, the car had run over one officer’s legs and was headed toward others. Here, the court wrote that all things considered, officers acted reasonably in using deadly force, and the district court didn’t err in granting summary judgment. View "Estate of De'Angelo Brown v. E.C. West" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him as a career offender to 168 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, claiming the district court committed three reversible errors: (1) designating him as a career offender; (2) applying a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon; and (3) applying a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment in the course of fleeing from law enforcement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the dangerous weapon enhancement is applicable if the firearm is found during “relevant conduct,” as defined in U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.3(a)(2) and is not limited to the offense of conviction. both instances involved drug trafficking-related conduct, with the only difference being the seizure of a distributable quantity of methamphetamine in March, while there was no seizure of drugs but evidence of drug trafficking at the time of Defendant’s arrest in May. Specifically, the district court noted the discovery of two scales, one with methamphetamine residue, a pipe with residue, baggies, and two firearms. Notably, Defendant was out on bond for the March possession offense when he was observed at a known drug house, and his companion acknowledged that she and Defendant had met with a known drug trafficker. On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding the events surrounding the May arrest and seizure of evidence were relevant conduct under the Guidelines because they were part of Defendant’s course of conduct—his ongoing drug trafficking activities—during these three months. View "United States v. Remberto Rivera" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of four charges related to sex trafficking. Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions. Defendant first argues that the government violated his due process right to the disclosure of exculpatory or impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by failing to disclose one of the victim’s (J.R.) juvenile court records.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a violation of the Brady/Giglio rule, Defendant must demonstrate that the government suppressed evidence that was favorable to him and material to the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Garrett, 898 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2018). There was no violation here because Defendant learned of the records during the trial and had an opportunity to use them in cross-examining the witness. United States v. Almendares, 397 F.3d 653, 664 (8th Cir. 2005). The court explained that  If Defendant needed more time to make use of the information, then he could have moved to continue the trial or sought other relief, but he did not do so. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new trial. The allegation that the federal agent communicated with J.R. about impeachment material was speculative and controverted by the agent. In any event, whether J.R. lived with her foster parents for one week or two months was immaterial to the charged offenses. View "United States v. Jesse Cody" on Justia Law