Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced Defendant to 87 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Specifically, Defendant argued the district court erroneously decided Defendant’s past conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes Section 5/18-4(a)(3) was a crime of violence. Thus it should not enhance his offense level under Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue is whether, under the pre-2012 version of the Illinois statute, Defendant could have been convicted for reckless vehicular hijacking. The court concluded that the answer was no. The court wrote that there is neither a precedential case nor a realistic situation in which vehicular hijacking would not be considered a crime of violence as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Therefore, the court held Defendant’s vehicular hijacking conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause. View "United States v. Ricky Pulley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was no error in admitting the evidence. The court explained that officers may seize an effect without a warrant under the “plain view doctrine” if they are lawfully present in a place to view the object, the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. Here, once the officers were lawfully present in Defendant’s house based on his stepfather’s apparent authority to consent, the officers permissibly seized the Molotov cocktails as objects in plain view in the bathroom and kitchen.   Defendant suggests that even if the police officers were lawfully present in his home and the incriminating character of the explosive devices was immediately apparent, the officers were required to obtain a warrant before making a seizure. But “where the elements of the plain view doctrine are met, the fact that the officers could have left and obtained a warrant does not invalidate the justification for seizing the property.” Accordingly, the district court did not err when it concluded that the officers lawfully seized the items from Defendant’s bathroom and kitchen. View "United States v. Melchizedek Hayes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1), after law enforcement found more than 1,500 grams of methamphetamine concealed in a vest on his person. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his detention and frisk were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, Defendant conceded that his first two encounters with the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Officer (TFO) were consensual and that his third encounter involving both TFOs began consensually. He argued only that his detention and subsequent frisk during this third encounter were neither consensual nor supported by reasonable suspicion, and, thus, the evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that initially, it is questionable whether the TFOs would have even been justified in conducting a pat down, as the facts do not lend much credence to the claim that Jimenez may have been “armed and presently dangerous.” The court explained that even if it were to assume that the TFOs would have been justified in conducting a pat down of Defendant based on his efforts to keep his blanket on his person and his potential involvement in drug trafficking, the TFOs far exceeded the scope of these permissible bounds when they immediately leaped to the substantially more intrusive action of forcibly removing his blanket. View "United States v. Sergio Jimenez" on Justia Law

An officer deployed pepper spray on Plaintiff and others during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Plaintiff sued various parties (collectively, “City Officials”), alleging various federal and Missouri law claims, including First Amendment retaliation. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the City Officials on some of the claims. As relevant to this interlocutory appeal, however, the district court concluded that neither the City nor one officer was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim and therefore denied the motion in part. The district court also reserved a ruling on the City Officials’ motion for summary judgment on two state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded for the district court to resolve the motion on the state law claims. The court explained that based on Plaintiff’s interaction with the officer and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, “a jury could find that the officer acted with the prohibited . . . malice” if he deployed the pepper spray with the ulterior motive of retaliation. Or a jury may determine that the officer’s actions upheld his duty, but the court explained that it has no basis to decide that factual question on an interlocutory appeal. However, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue as to the state law claims. View "Amir Brandy v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed rom the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of TrialCard, Inc. (“TrialCard”) on employment claims she brought under Mo. Stat. Section 213.055.1 (“MHRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence is likewise insufficient to establish TrialCard’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. This Court has noted that “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims can be relevant because “an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may well illustrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence, however, is insufficient because she has not shown that these individuals received the same discipline under the same circumstances from the same person. Further, the court explained that Cigna repeatedly reached out to Plaintiff and her therapist about obtaining medical certification. Because Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her FMLA claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of TrialCard. View "Lakeitha Boston v. TrialCard, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud and money laundering; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering.  On appeal, Defendants claimed the district court erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement that Ridings signed but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms of the plea agreement, one Defendant waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That Defendant also appealed his sentence, asserting that the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was an overwhelming quantum of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Defendant’s statement, rendering admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the court explained that here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on Defendant’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Defendant used faith to manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a false sense of security. The court explained that it has upheld sentences where the district court took into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendant’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Phillip Ridings" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs individually and as next friends of their minor daughter, I.B., appealed the district court’s dismissal of disability discrimination and civil rights deprivation claims, and denial of their motion to reconsider dismissing with prejudice a state law negligence claim against the Bentonville, Arkansas School District (“the District”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Arkansas law provides a direct cause of action against the liability insurer of a school district that is “not subject to suit for tort.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint named “John Doe” as an additional defendant, alleged on information and belief that the District maintained liability insurance, identified the insurer as John Doe, and stated that “the joinder of [John Doe] will be made upon verification of its identity.” Eleven months later, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for an extension of the deadline to add parties, if they opposed dismissal of the John Doe defendant without prejudice. When Plaintiffs did not respond, the district court dismissed John Doe without prejudice, leaving the District, with its statutory immunity, the only negligence defendant. Plaintiffs were not deprived of a remedy for the alleged negligence of District employees and agents. View "Rodney Baker v. Bentonville School District" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant argued judgment of acquittal or a new trial and in calculating the drug quantity for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from the officer, concluded that his conduct in drafting the affidavit amounted to negligence. But to prevail here, Defendant “must show more than negligence or an innocent mistake.” And the court agreed with the district court that the officer did not act recklessly in his efforts to obtain a search warrant, despite the time pressure. The record does not indicate that the officer entertained serious doubts about or had obvious reasons to question the accuracy of his statements. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to suppression under Franks. Further, the court held that the information included in the warrant affidavit, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the search warrant for Defendant’s home, was objectively reasonable. Moreover, the court wrote that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the Gentry evidence been produced. Finally, the court saw no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation. View "United States v. Melroy Johnson, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for committing mail and wire fraud against his spouse and National Life Insurance. He moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, which the district court1 denied. Welker appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment included allegations about Defendant’s intentional concealment of material information from and misrepresentations to R.W., supporting that he had the “intent to defraud” her. And it alleged that he used the mail and wire in furtherance of his scheme. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Defendant of the nature of the accusations against him and to enable the district court to determine that the facts stated were adequate in law to support a conviction. Further, the court wrote that Defendant provided no support for the proposition that an indictment must sufficiently allege a violation of state law to sufficiently state a federal mail or wire fraud offense. Ultimately, the court held that the indictment charging Defendant is not “so defective” that it fails to charge him for mail and wire fraud under federal law. View "United States v. Michael Welker" on Justia Law