Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged was assaulted by his daughter’s ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend’s cousin outside his house in Camden County, Missouri, in December 2011. He reported the assault to the Camden County Sheriff’s Department the following May. After no charges were brought, Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the alleged assailants. While pursuing his civil suit, Plaintiff claimed he discovered that the sheriff’s department refused to investigate the assault because the assailants were related to the county’s clerk of court. This refusal meant that Plaintiff could obtain very little evidence of the assault. Plaintiff then filed an action against officials in the sheriff’s department for claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Missouri Constitution. He claimed that Defendants’ inadequate investigation deprived him of his equal protection and due process rights. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing. They also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants and denied their motion to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss these claims for lack of standing. The court affirmed to Plaintiff’s state law claims.  The court explained that it has not yet addressed whether a crime victim has standing to sue a government official for an inadequate investigation. However, the court has held that a crime victim cannot sue a government official for failing to prosecute his assailant. View "Jeffery Pratt v. Tony Helms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative of her brother, who was in pretrial custody at Phelps County Jail for about six months, filed a lawsuit for damages from inadequate medical care during her brother’s pretrial detention. The district court awarded the individual defendants and Phelps County summary judgment. Plaintiff argued the district court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on her claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. “   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent. A correctional officer’s deference to a medical professional regarding a pretrial detainee’s medical care, standing alone, does not create a genuine issue of material fact on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff, however, points to nothing in the record showing Defendants deliberately disregarded her brother’s condition while he was in the holdover cell during the final weeks of his pretrial detention. Instead, Plaintiff points to evidence that Phelps County employees were generally aware that her brother was suffering. This evidence, however, does nothing to address the focus of the court’s inquiry: whether Defendants deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s brother’s serious medical need. Ultimately, the court concluded there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Lady Maakia Charlene Smith v. Richard Lisenbe" on Justia Law

The United States indicted Defendant for illegal exportation of firearm parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Defendant while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Defendant to the United States border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States, where he was arrested by United States authorities. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities. The district court denied both motions. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression and dismissal motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the record reflects Defendant made his Miranda waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Further, Defendant’s that the district court clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to show a joint venture. In this case, the district court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months and based on applicable Section 3553(a) factors. Defendant has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Andrew Pierson" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 63-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. The question for us is whether a prior conviction for “intentionally” causing “bodily injury,” Iowa Code Section 708.4(2), qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that committing willful injury in Iowa requires an unjustified “act” that is “intended to cause serious injury.” The fact that the statute requires an intent to cause harm to another person necessarily means that anyone who violates it has used “physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. Christopher Cungtion, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant faced 13 federal charges. Included among them are three counts of arson: “maliciously damaging or destroying]” by “fire or an explosive,” a “vehicle . . . owned or possessed by . . . an institution or organization receiving” federal funding. The arson charges are also the driving force behind three counts of possessing a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” Under the government’s theory, the Molotov cocktails were destructive devices, and the three counts of arson were crimes of violence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing three destructive device counts against Defendant. The court held that arson is not a “crime of violence.” The court explained that the differences between recklessness, malice, and knowledge come down to a sliding scale of probabilities. From “substantial and unjustified” (recklessness), to a “likelihood” (malice), to “practical certainty” (knowledge), each requires more risk and culpability than the last. In many cases, there may be “little difference” between these mental states. But little does not mean none. The court explained that consciously creating a “likelihood” of harm to property does not satisfy the force clause, despite the high risk involved. In short, the arson counts cannot support the charges for using a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Mujera Lung'aho" on Justia Law

Petitioner shot and killed her husband when she found him cheating. She pled guilty to second-degree murder in Indian country. She also pled guilty to discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. A year later, Petitioner moved to vacate her Section 924(c) conviction, believing that intervening Supreme Court cases rendered it unlawful. Specifically, she argued that federal second-degree murder could not be considered a “crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The district court dismissed her motion. She appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that federal l murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an “unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.” The statute lists the killings that qualify as first-degree murder.3 “Any other murder is murder in the second degree.” Second-degree murder thus has two elements: (1) unlawful killing of a human being; with (2) malice aforethought. Petitioner argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “using force against the person or property of another.” The court reasoned that the history and definition of “malice aforethought” demonstrate that federal second-degree murder satisfies Section 924(c)’s force clause. The phrase “malice aforethought” necessarily denotes the oppositional conduct that the force clause requires. Second-degree murder is thus a crime of violence. View "Tiffany Janis v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 142 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. As two of the conditions of supervised release, the district court prohibited Defendant from possessing or using a “computer,” as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(e)(1), and from possessing or viewing visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct. On appeal, Defendant challenged both special conditions.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the special condition on computers and affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that the district court discussed how, in its experience, people who have Defendant’s addiction initially search for adult pornography, which eventually “leads back to” searching for child pornography. Defendant’s internet search history; and the connection between using the Internet and accessing pornography. In addition, the presentence report detailed how some videos tied to Defendant depicted adult pornography. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not plainly err. However, the court concluded that the district court’s findings do not adequately tie the special condition on computers to statutory purposes. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion, and therefore the court vacated the special condition discussing computers. View "United States v. Joshua Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of ammunition as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 296 months and one day of imprisonment.  Defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury forbids the district court to determine whether he committed three prior felonies on different occasion   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory factors and made an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. In varying upward, the district court considered Defendant’s extensive criminal history and concluded that his criminal history category understated the likelihood of recidivism and the seriousness of his criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history scored 24 points under the guidelines, well above the 13 points required for placement in the highest criminal history category. Giving deference to the district court as required by Gall, the court concluded that the one-level variance and the overall sentence is not unreasonable in light of Section 3553(a). View "United States v. Deonte Ellison" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance, resulting in the death of R.L. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, (2) the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence of Defendant’s prior drug arrests and convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (3) the district court’s use of Defendant’s prior drug possession conviction to enhance his sentence is unconstitutional because it punishes Defendant more harshly than a drug distributor.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and drawing all reasonable inference in its favor, it held that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Defendant distributed the drugs to R.L. Further, the court concluded that the record includes sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that fentanyl was the but-for cause of R.L.’s death. Finally, the court held that the First Step Act did modify Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). But it did not alter the language of Section 841(b)(1)(C), the crime under which Defendant was convicted. View "United States v. Gerald Cardwell, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Isanti County, Minnesota (the “County”) violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it unlawfully prosecuted him under the County’s solid waste ordinance (the “Solid Waste Ordinance”). Plaintiff also asserted Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to the federal claims in favor of the County and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state law claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s opening brief lists 21 cases, which Plaintiff contends constitute proof the County used the Solid Waste Ordinance to wrongly prosecute property owners, none of these cases are properly before the court as they were not included in the complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to sustain a municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the court held that without a constitutional violation, there can be no Section 1983 liability. View "Keith Kiefer v. Isanti County" on Justia Law