Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While in prison for dealing drugs, Defendant continued to run his operation from behind bars. At one point, he arranged for a shipment of marijuana to a relative. But when black-tar heroin arrived instead, a co-conspirator, C.H. sold it on his behalf. To protect his family, Defendant pointed the finger at C.H. and passed along his address to their suppliers. C.H. continued to sell drugs, including what he received through Defendant. He eventually sold those drugs in controlled buys, which led to federal drug charges. Defendant, for his part, pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court gave him a two-level enhancement for “making a credible threat to use violence or directing the use of violence.” Defendant challenged the enhancement on appeal. At issue on appeal is whether providing a co-conspirator’s address to dangerous people “directs the use of violence” or itself conveys “a credible threat to use violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that once danger came knocking on his family’s door, Defendant redirected the suppliers’ anger toward the person who refused to pay. It was “reasonably foreseeable” that this simple act, given how dangerous they were, could have led to the use of violence against C.H. Accordingly, the court held that the record supports a two-level enhancement for “directing the use of violence.” View "United States v. Luis Hernandez-Barajas" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on four drug-related charges stemming from his involvement in a narcotics-distribution ring in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which culminated in the overdose deaths of two individuals. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and two counts of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute heroin and 420 months imprisonment on each count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, with all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) that the district court erroneously admitted text messages between one of the victims and himself and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any of the three counts of conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the night before her overdose, the victim texted Defendant—her primary if not only supplier of narcotics—at 6:58 p.m. “presumably to make arrangements to purchase heroin.” Per their typical arrangement, the victim then withdrew the necessary funds from an ATM and drove to Defendant’s house, texting him at 7:48 p.m. that she was in his backyard. Her subsequent text messages to family members reveal that she then went home. The victim’s body was found the next day. Under these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant distributed the fentanyl that resulted in the victim’s death. View "United States v. Jeffery Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children, natives and citizens of Honduras, petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering them removed and denying their claims for relief. In her petition for review, Petitioner claimed that the BIA erred (1) by finding that her due process rights were not violated when the IJ continued her case instead of terminating it and (2) by denying her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.   The Eighth Circuit denied their petition. The court explained that while Petitioner contends that by continuing the proceedings, the IJ “was engineering a preferred outcome,” the record demonstrates that the IJ “had not researched the issue before” and simply wanted “to give [DHS] a chance to address the issue.” Second, the court agreed with the BIA that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. By continuing the removal proceedings, the IJ provided Petitioner with exactly what she was promised: presence in the United States until November 10, 2018.   Further, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the gangsters’ threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. Here, the threats were telephonic, sporadic, and over a period of four years. Given that the record does not indicate that the gangsters ever acted, or attempted to act, upon these threats during this long period, the threats lack immediacy and appear exaggerated. View "Rosaura Brizuela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a six-count federal indictment -- carjacking resulting in death (Count 1); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j) (Count 2); and two counts of witness tampering (Counts 5 and 6). The government agreed to drop Counts 3 and 4. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of 360 months imprisonment. Defendant timely objected to a statement in his presentence investigation report (PSR) that the sentence imposed for Count 2 must be consecutive to the other counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Defendant argued that violations of Section 924(c) and § 924(j) are separate offenses and that Section 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing. The district court overruled the objection, accepted the guilty plea but not the 360-month recommendation, and imposed a within-range sentence of 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court procedurally erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 2 and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Defendant’s disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal. Accordingly, the court held that, in light of the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes and lengthy criminal history, the district court was well within its substantial discretion in sentencing Defendant to a within-guidelines-range term of imprisonment. View "United States v. Anthony Jones, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of wire fraud, one count of theft of government money, and two counts of Social Security fraud. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offenses. He also appealed the district court’s order for restitution in the amount of $168,456.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion, vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that a jury could reasonably disregard Defendant’s asserted reason for these inconsistencies—that he did not believe that he had to report “work” below a certain income threshold—and find that he acted with the intent to defraud the SSA by receiving benefits for which he was not eligible. Further, the court reasoned that reliance on the SSA’s determination alone does not allow the court to meaningfully review the calculation of the amount of loss when, as here, that amount is challenged by the defendant. The government was thus required to present evidence to show that Defendant engaged in substantial gainful activity in November 2009. The court held that the district court erred in accepting the statement of loss in the absence of evidence establishing the date that Defendant became ineligible for benefits. View "United States v. James Workman" on Justia Law

After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Prior to trial, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress twelve ounces of cocaine that investigators found in a warrantless search of the rental car Johnson was driving as he arrived at the Omaha home of local distributor A.M. Prior to sentencing, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 851 seeking a statutory enhancement based on Defendant’s prior Texas state court conviction for a “serious drug felony.” Overruling Defendant’s written objection, the district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum 120 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court erred by denying his motion to suppress and by applying the sentencing enhancement and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he conspired to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant was a key part of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and that it was reasonably foreseeable to Johnson the conspiracy distributed 500 grams or more of cocaine. Moreover, the court held that Defendant makes no attempt on appeal to show good cause for his failure to raise an Oliver objection to the district court. View "United States v. Isaac Johnson" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Arrested on November 17, she was detained for 37 days before appearing before a magistrate judge on December 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress her statements from a post-arrest interview. The district court denied both motions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the 37-day delay between Jones’s arrest and her initial appearance before a magistrate judge violated Rule 5(a). However, to determine whether a delay in presentment violates substantive due process, this court determines whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government’s conduct “offends the standards of substantive due process” and “shocks the conscience.” Defendant asserted that law enforcement officers in South Dakota have a “pattern” of delaying defendants’ initial appearances, citing two cases where defendants moved to dismiss indictments based on delays in their initial appearance. However, the court held two mistakes do not establish a pattern of outrageousness sufficient to show deliberate indifference and support a due process violation.   Further, Defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was involuntary because the agent’s pre-warning statements were an unlawful two-step interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert and that her confession was involuntary under United States v. Aguilar. The court held the district court properly concluded that these brief, narrow-scope pre-warning statements were not a two-step interrogation in violation of Seibert and that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Tracy Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle that she was driving. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant reserved the right to appeal that ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that there was no error in denying the motion to suppress. The court explained that the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant as she drove away from the residence on August 24. Officers had abundant reason to believe, based on informant reports and surveillance, that the owners were distributing methamphetamine from their residence. Police seized drugs from four short-term visitors who were stopped shortly after leaving the residence in June. As of August 24, investigators had reliable information that the owners were distributing a shipment of methamphetamine that arrived two days earlier, including a quantity that was seized from a downstream customer that very morning. A detective saw Defendant enter the residence at 10:00 p.m. and depart six minutes later. Although Defendant was previously unknown to investigators, her short-term visit to the suspected drug house conformed to the pattern of the drug trade and gave police reasonable suspicion to believe that she was carrying drugs as she departed. Accordingly, the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity as she departed the residence, so the traffic stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Elizabeth Pounds" on Justia Law

At sentencing, the district court, varying upward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range, imposed a sentence of 120 months imprisonment plus four years of supervised release upon Defendant. Defendant appealed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court agreed with Defendant that the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and, without adequate notice varied upward for reasons that contradicted the PSR’s factual findings. However, the court found that the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, the court did not disturb the jury’s credibility findings on appeal. Similarly, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court wrote that it cannot conclude that the inconsistencies between the PSR findings and the findings on which the district court based its upward variance, combined with the lack of prior notice, resulted in procedural sentencing error that was harmless. View "United States v. Deshonte Dickson" on Justia Law