Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions, an evidentiary ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court first wrote that Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can show that the error affected his substantial rights. To meet that prong of the plain-error analysis, Defendant must show a reasonable probability that the erroneous instruction affected the verdict. The court saw no reasonable probability that the jury would have found Defendant not guilty of touching C.W.’s genitalia if the instruction had excluded the extraneous terms. Further, Defendant contended the jury could have mistaken C.W.’s sexualized behavior for his own. Here, the district court reasonably declined to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. C.W.’s testimony about age-inappropriate sexual behavior was not presented in the abstract; she connected it directly to Defendant by explaining that she learned the behavior from him. Viewed in that context, the testimony was prejudicial to Defendant but not unfairly so. C.W.’s testimony, if believed, gave the jury reason to conclude that Defendant had sexually abused her. Finally, the court wrote that no physical evidence was required: “A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” View "United States v. Garrett Waters" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant, a former sheriff’s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, enticement of a minor, and transferring and attempting to transfer obscenity to a person under the age of 16. Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging him with the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 under a single count. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the original indictment. The parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court sustained Defendant’s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Defendant challenged his sentence’s length.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court emphasized that the Guidelines did not adequately account for the seriousness of Defendant’s offense and the need to send an accurate message to the community. Given the clarity of the district court’s rationale for its variance, any procedural error in the upward departure was harmless. Accordingly, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court’s rationale for its alternative variance. The court wrote that Defendant has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error. View "United States v. Francis Kistler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. He argued that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of the offense and when it responded to two questions from the jury during deliberations. He also contended that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury on the first element of the offense. Further, the court held that the instructions provided that in making the determination about knowledge, the jury may consider whether Defendant reasonably believed that his right to possess a firearm had been restored. The instruction allowed Defendant to argue and a jury to find that he lacked the requisite knowledge due to a belief that his rights had been restored. Further, the court concluded that the district court was correct that Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant based on his particular felony convictions. The court explained that legislatures traditionally employed status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms. Whether those actions are best characterized as restrictions on persons who deviated from legal norms or persons who presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, Congress acted within the historical tradition when it enacted Section 922(g)(1) and the prohibition on possession of firearms by felons. View "United States v. Edell Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. While in jail, prior to pleading guilty, he sexually assaulted multiple corrections officers. Later, following his guilty plea, jail personnel discovered him with a six-inch metal shank. At sentencing, one of the assaulted corrections officers testified. She described how Defendant, without her consent, rubbed her thigh and buttocks with his hand while she was serving breakfast. Another jail employee testified about the shank. Based on these accounts, the district court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and in determining that the attempted aggravated-assault offense is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s deviant behavior while incarcerated—molesting corrections officers and carrying a shank—is hardly emblematic of a “sincerely remorseful defendant.” Further, the court wrote that Defendant does not dispute that if the assault offense is a crime of violence under the guidelines, an attempt to commit that offense qualifies as well. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault of a police officer with a deadly weapon was a conviction for a crime of violence that raised his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). View "United States v. Christopher Chappell" on Justia Law

A Missouri trial court declined to permit Petitioner to represent himself. After conviction at trial, an unsuccessful direct appeal, and an unsuccessful attempt to collaterally attack his convictions in state court, Petitioner filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 in federal court. The district court granted Petitioner’s petition, finding Petitioner had unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation, and the Missouri trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that given the state court’s factual findings, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court jurisprudence in finding Petitioner was not unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se. Petitioner conditioned his self-representation request on his speedy trial motions being denied and wanted counsel to depose witnesses even after being informed counsel could not do so if he was pro se. From these facts, a court could reasonably conclude Petitioner’s waiver of the right to counsel was not unequivocal. View "Darrell Bolden v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and he appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that he did not knowingly possess the meth because it was concealed in the rental car before he rented it. But the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, supports the conclusion that Young knowingly, and constructively possessed the meth. He was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Further, Defendant rented a car, traveled across the country, took $8,500 in cash advances, had two cell phones and text messages about buying and selling meth, and transported five bundles of meth—about five pounds—in concealed compartments in a rental car (with one bundle wrapped in a sack from WSS where Defendant had recently shopped). The evidence viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. Moreover, the court wrote that the government presented sufficient evidence linking Defendant to the concealed drugs. Thus, the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. View "United States v. Quennel Young" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences arising out of an attempted robbery that resulted in a woman’s death.   The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendants’ convictions and sentences on Count One and directed the district court to dismiss Count One. The court affirmed the remaining convictions, vacated Defendants’ remaining sentences under the sentencing package doctrine, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the record contains overwhelming evidence of both Defendants’ guilt. Considering the evidence and counsel’s (mostly) appropriate arguments, the court wrote that it cannot say the district court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte or abused its discretion in determining the prosecutor’s statement did not satisfy the requisite prejudice to warrant a new trial. Further, the court wrote that given the evidence in the record, the two alleged predicate offenses for the firearms conspiracy were so inextricably intertwined that no rational juror could have found Defendants possessed firearms in relation to one predicate but not the other. The court reasoned that while it would have been preferable for the jury to have been given special interrogatories or a special verdict form to facilitate effective appellate review, considering the nature of the jury instructions and the evidence submitted to the jury, the court found that Defendants’ substantial rights were not affected by the jury’s general verdict in this particular case. View "United States v. Tawhyne Patterson, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then a conductor and now an engineer for Union Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”), brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when Union Pacific refused Plaintiff’s requests that he be allowed to bring his Rottweiler service dog on board moving Union Pacific freight trains as a reasonable accommodation to ameliorate the effects of Plaintiff’s undisputed disabilities, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and migraine headaches resulting from his prior service in the military. At the end of a week-long trial, the district court denied Union Pacific’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury then returned a verdict for Plaintiff, awarding compensatory but not punitive damages. The district court granted Union Pacific’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that “benefits and privileges of employment” (1) refer only to employer-provided services; (2) must be offered to non-disabled individuals in addition to disabled ones; and (3) does not include freedom from mental or psychological pain. Further, the court noted that mitigating pain is not an employer-sponsored program or service. As such, providing a service dog at work so that an employee with a disability has the same assistance the service dog provides away from work is not a cognizable benefit or privilege of employment. View "Perry Hopman v. Union Pacific Railroad" on Justia Law