Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant guilty of sexual exploitation of a child and receiving images depicting the sexual exploitation of a child. The district court sentenced him to 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, asking that the Eighth Circuit vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial because the district court failed to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cellphone, excluded other evidence that he sought to admit at trial, and gave an incorrect jury instruction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s suppression motion nor abuse its discretion in rejecting his request for a Franks hearing. The court wrote that it agreed with the court that it had no more than a marginal relationship to the issue of Defendant’s guilt while presenting a considerable risk of unfair prejudice. Defendant claimed that the aiding-and-abetting instruction is erroneous because it omits an additional, fourth element included in the Eighth Circuit’s Model Jury Instructions: that the defendant “have [Intended] [known] (insert mental state required by principal offense).” The court concluded that the district court did not plainly err by omitting the fourth aiding-and-abetting element from the model jury instructions. The court explained that it is aware of no case in which the court specifically discussed this element, much less declared it mandatory. View "United States v. Derrick Walker" on Justia Law

Defendants injected their patients with Orthovisc, which was not approved by the Food and Drug Administration, while falsely representing it as FDA-approved. A jury convicted them of healthcare fraud and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States. Defendants appealed, alleging that the district court erred by denying motions for judgment of acquittal on both counts and committing several reversible errors that warrant a new trial. Moreover, Defendants believe a new trial is needed as a result of four other errors by the district court that denied: FDCA-device evidence; their theory-of-defense jury instruction; their FDCA-device argument; and their advice-of-counsel instruction   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendants failed to identify any probative value in communicating to the jury their misunderstanding of the Notice. Further, the court wrote that,  if, as the Defendants argued, the jury instructions and indictment required the government to prove that the non-approved Orthovisc is a device, then this sentence from the theory-of-defense instruction duplicates other instructions submitted to the jury. Defendants cannot identify any prejudice in excluding this misleading, duplicative sentence. Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting further argument that misrepresents the Notice. Finally, the court held that the district court properly denied the advice-of-counsel instruction. View "United States v. Abdul Naushad" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 262-month prison sentence after a jury found him guilty of selling methamphetamine. The Second Circuit appointed counsel, who has attempted to file an Anders brief and asked to withdraw.   The Second Circuit determined that it cannot decide the appeal until counsel files a brief that satisfies Anders’s requirements. The Supreme Court has been clear that an “attorney must be zealous and must resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of his or her client.” Here, the brief appears to make inferences against Defendant. For example, it argues that “he waived his right to make a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal” by failing to make a motion when prompted. It turns out, however, that trial counsel agreed that he did not “want to waive any appeal” when questioned by the district court. Accordingly, the court held that the motion to withdraw is held in abeyance pending the filing of a compliant brief. View "United States v. Ramien Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of abusive sexual contact. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the district court constructively amended his indictment in violation of his right to a grand jury. Defendant argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment by providing a definition of groin that included genitalia. According to Defendant, his Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury was violated because the jury could have convicted him of a different offense (touching the genitalia) than the one he was indicted for (touching the groin). The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s definition indicated that the groin “often” includes the genitalia, which is different than the groin always including the genitalia. These terms naturally overlap as a function of human anatomy.   Moreover, Defendant argued that the six locations outlined in Section 2246(3) are discrete, so referencing one location (genitalia) in the definition of another (groin) constructively amends the indictment. The court disagreed. If this were true, then a separate part of the court’s definition would have the same problem because it references the “inner thigh,” one of the six locations defined in Section 2246(3). Defendant points to United States v. Burch, where the court conformed the jury instructions to the indictment by limiting the definition of “sexual contact” to what was alleged in the indictment (“touching of the genitalia”). But Burch only supports that each Section 2246(3) location is narrower than “sexual contact,” not that each location is independent of each others. View "United States v. Neeraj Chopra" on Justia Law

The Swampbuster Act and United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulations work together to provide farmers with the right to request reviews of wetland certifications. The Swampbuster Act’s review provision (“Swampbuster Review Provision”) provides that a prior wetland certification “shall remain valid and in effect . . . until such time as the person affected by the certification requests review of the certification by the Secretary.” In turn, a regulation (“Review Regulation”) provides procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request.   Appellant filed an action alleging that: (1) the Review Regulation contravenes the Swampbuster Review Provision; (2) the Review Regulation was never submitted to Congress or the Comptroller General as required by the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”); and (3) the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellants 2017 and 2020 review requests violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Review Regulation imposes reasonable procedural requirements a farmer must follow to make an effective review request and thereby delimit a prior wetland certification. Because the Swampbuster Review Provision is silent as to the nature of an effective review request, the Review Regulation does not conflict with the Swampbuster Review Provision. Further, the court wrote that the CRA’s judicial review provision precludes review of Appellant’s CRA claim. Finally, the court held that the NRCS’s decisions to refuse to consider Appellant’s review requests were not arbitrary and capricious because Appellant failed to comply with the Review Regulation. View "Arlen Foster v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Defendant loaded a pickup truck with a 20-pound pipe bomb, two assault rifles, and a sledgehammer and drove with two confederates from Illinois to the Dar al-Farooq Islamic Center in Bloomington, Minnesota. The trio smashed a window of the Imam’s office before the parishioners’ dawn prayer and threw gasoline, diesel fuel, and the pipe bomb inside. The bomb detonated. The jury convicted Defendant of five federal offenses. Four are at issue on appeal: Count 1, intentionally damaging religious property because of its religious character; Count 2, obstructing by force the free exercise of religious beliefs; Count 3, conspiracy to commit Counts 1 & 2 by means of fire or explosive; and Count 4, carrying or using a destructive device during or in relation to a crime of violence. Defendant appealed, raising these same issues and arguing, with regard to the second, that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), overruled the district court’s analysis of why Sections 247(a)(1) and (a)(2) are not overbroad predicate felonies.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agrees with the government that Section 247(a) is a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power to punish offenders who “rely on the channels and instrumentalities of commerce in committing criminal acts.” Further, the court held that considering this offense under the modified categorical approach, the elements fall within the force clause as defined in Section 924(c)(3). Finally, the court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice of any kind, either transitory or permanent, to the ability of her counsel to provide adequate representation in the criminal proceedings. View "United States v. Emily Hari" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possessing firearms and ammunition as an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. He appealed his conviction. Defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the eyewitness identification because it was “based on the impermissibly suggestive photo array line-up and the likelihood of misidentification.”    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Even if the line-up were impermissibly suggestive, as Defendant contends, it was sufficiently reliable (i.e., there was not a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification). The court explained that by balancing these factors, there was “very little likelihood of misidentification.” As the district court found, the two eyewitnesses interacted with Defendant both at the shooting and at the bar before the shooting, giving them “ample opportunity” to see him. The eyewitnesses also consistently identified Defendant’s physical characteristics, including his lighter skin tone and the tattoo on his neck. Finally, the eyewitnesses expressed 100% certainty about their identifications. Thus, the court found that the district court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on the motion to suppress. Defendant claimed irreconcilable defenses: his defense relies on mistaken identity (he claims he was not at the apartment at the time of the shooting), while his brother claims both he and Defendant were at the shooting, but he did not possess a gun or shoot anyone. Therefore Defendant’s argument is flawed. View "United States v. Javaar Watkins" on Justia Law

Defendant z pled guilty to a drug offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level sentence enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), while declining safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2. The court sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant argued that the enhancement should not apply because the firearms in the garage were locked in the safe. But the weapons in the shed, where at least two of the four controlled purchases occurred, were not in a safe—which independently supports the enhancement. Even without independent evidence, the locked garage safe might support the enhancement. Further, Defendant stresses he had legitimate purposes for possessing the firearms. But this does not affect the analysis. Thus, the court held that it is not clearly improbable that the weapons were connected to Defendant’s drug offense. The district court properly applied the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1). Further, the court held that sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant possessed the weapons in connection with the offense. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding Defendant ineligible for safety-valve relief because enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) was proper. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not commit plain error by following Eighth Circuit precedent and properly assigning the burden of proof for safety-valve relief to Defendant. View "United States v. Michael Voelz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, over Defendant’s objection, the district court applied an increased base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2), finding Defendant’s two prior convictions for aggravated assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3) and his prior conviction for aggravated domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code Section 708.2A(2)(c) qualify as convictions for crimes of violence. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court erred in making these determinations.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Iowa Code Section 708.2(3), aggravated assault occurs when “[a] person . . . commits an assault, as defined in section 708.1, and uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault.” In United States v. McGee, the Eighth Circuit held Section 708.2(3) qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause because the “display” of a dangerous weapon requires at least the threatened use of physical force. In addition, the court wrote that it is unaware of any Iowa case in which a defendant was convicted under Section 708.2(3) without knowingly or intentionally displaying a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, there is no “realistic probability” the Iowa courts would apply Section 708.2(3) in a situation where the defendant did not knowingly or intentionally display a dangerous weapon. View "United States v. Kaleb Shannan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of robbing two branches of Regions Bank and brandishing a firearm during one of the robberies. Following trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial. He argued that (1) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as the bank robber; (2) the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status, and (3) the verdict was the product of jury coercion after the district court instructed the jury to continue deliberating once a jury poll revealed the initial verdict lacked unanimity. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court acknowledged that Defendant “offered numerous persuasive challenges to the credibility of this identification” but ultimately concluded “that the fingerprint evidence and other testimony, in this case, were sufficient to permit a conviction absent any eye-witness identification. The court explained that the evidence offered in the present case exceeds what was offered in Rusan and sufficiently proved the Regions Bank branches’ FDIC status. The government presented testimony and introduced exhibits proving that the deposits of Regions Bank were insured by the FDIC and that the policy was in effect at the time of the robberies. Specifically, the government admitted into evidence the certified and stamped copies of the FDIC certificates. Finally, the court found that the district court’s “inquiries were essentially neutral and not calculated to affect the juror’s judgment. Thus, the court found no error of law or fact in this determination. View "United States v. Briran Blake" on Justia Law