Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with two prior serious drug felonies. The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) testimony from a man who was not involved in the charged conspiracy but began selling meth with Defendant three months after the conspiracy ended.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government failed to give the notice required under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). But under a plain error standard of review, the error did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The evidence of his participation in the conspiracy was robust. And, as he concedes, many witnesses had already testified about his drug connections to California.   Further, Defendant argued the testimony, particularly about him exchanging guns for drugs, was unduly prejudicial because it “changed a non-violent, alleged conspiracy into a hyper-violent one.” However, the court held that the evidence, particularly with the court’s limiting instruction, was not unduly prejudicial. Moreover, four cooperating witnesses and co-conspirators testified that Defendant brought and shipped meth into Nebraska for redistribution. Their testimony was further corroborated by a package (intercepted by law enforcement) with about five pounds of meth; Postal Service records of packages sent; records of wire transfers sent to California; phone records; and records of drug sales kept by a cooperating witness. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. View "United States v. Enrique Abarca" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine or 5 grams or more of actual, pure methamphetamine, two counts of distribution of heroin, and one count of distribution of heroin and methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the introduction of a stipulation as to his codefendant’s prior conviction, its refusal to give his requested jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy count. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of his advisory sentencing guidelines range.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the stipulation to be introduced or in rejecting Defendant’s proposed jury instructions, and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to distribute. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity involved in Defendant’s offense. The district court’s quantity determination was largely based on a customer’s and a confidential informant’s testimony. The district court found these witnesses to be credible, and the court found no reason to overturn that finding. View "United States v. Charleton Maxwell" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for a firearm offense after he was pulled over and during the traffic stop, the officer conducted a pat down search, finding a firearm. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, subject to his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The court explained that the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop. Here, there was a color discrepancy between the vehicle's actual color and the color listed on the vehicle registration. The officer also testified that, in his recent experience, several vehicles with mismatched colors came back as stolen. Thus, this gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the vehicle View "United States v. Joshua Brown" on Justia Law

The City of Edina, Minnesota, passed an ordinance banning the sale of flavored tobacco products. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company sued the City, arguing that the Ordinance is preempted by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, and Reynolds appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the Ordinance is not preempted. The court reasoned that a plausible reading of the TCA allows state prohibitions, even “blanket” prohibitions, on the sale of flavored tobacco products. And because the TCA implicates state police powers, the court must accept the interpretation that disfavors preemption. If Congress wants to preempt these types of state rules, it should do so more clearly. The court concluded that the TCA does not expressly preempt the Ordinance.   Further, the Ordinance does not destroy Congress’s regulatory scheme. Although the TCA does grant the FDA exclusive authority to promulgate tobacco manufacturing standards, Section 387p can be plausibly interpreted as preserving state laws that relate to manufacturing, so long as they also relate to the sale of tobacco. Under that reading of the statute, the Ordinance does not “upend the TCA’s carefully calibrated regulatory scheme”—it operates within it. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. City of Edina" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendants guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. In a consolidated appeal, the three raise numerous challenges to the admission of wiretap evidence, the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and their sentences.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In regards to Defendant’s argument that the district court erred in admitting the wiretap evidence, the court found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the Government satisfied the necessity requirement. The court reasoned that the affidavits explained in great detail how these conventional methods had failed—and would have likely continued to fail—to reveal the full extent of the organization’s drug-trafficking activities and membership because, among other reasons, Defendant and his associates utilized various and frequently changing residences and vehicles. Further, the orders authorizing the wiretaps expressly required minimization, providing that interception “must immediately terminate when it is determined that the conversation is unrelated to communications subject to interception.”   Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the multiple-conspiracies jury instruction. Here, the Government’s evidence at trial overwhelmingly pointed to a single conspiracy with a singular purpose—selling methamphetamine and cocaine—a steady core membership—Defendants, and others—operating primarily in the same territory—Burlington—over several years. Witnesses consistently described a single organization in which Defendant would recruit and oversee multiple underlings. Although one of the defendants may have joined the conspiracy later than other members, and membership in the organization may have fluctuated somewhat over the years, this is not necessarily evidence of separate conspiracies. View "United States v. Breon Armstrong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fled when Defendant police officer stopped him based on an outstanding warrant for fifth-degree theft. At the nearby police station, Plaintiff briefly refused to obey Defendant’s command to exit the squad car and proceed to the station for booking. When the handcuffed Plaintiff finally exited the car and stood up, Defendant struck him with his fist on the back of the head and neck. Plaintiff brought this action for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and asserted pendent Iowa state law claims for tortious assault and battery. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing both claims on the ground that the force used was objectively reasonable. Alternatively, the court ruled that Church was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal Section 1983 claim because any constitutional violation was not clearly established. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that genuine issues of disputed facts preclude a determination, on this summary judgment record, of whether the alleged unlawful use of excessive force was objectively reasonable and, if not, whether the violation was clearly established at the time of the incident in question. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of all claims, including Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims. View "Derek Westwater v. Kevin Church" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse, and the district court sentenced him to 440 months in prison. Defendant appealed his conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant claims the district court erred “by failing to instruct the jury that it had to agree on the specific act of sexual abuse in order to convict.” However, Defendant cites no authority that failure to give a specific unanimity instruction. To the contrary, the Eighth Circuit has held that jurors need not agree on a specific sexual act to reach a unanimous verdict.   Further, Defendant contends the district court erred in admitting hearsay statements regarding the reports of abuse. The court wrote that the statement was limited in scope to the victim’s disclosure of the abuse, not the specifics of it. But even if the statements were inadmissible hearsay, their admission would be harmless given the other evidence against Defendant.   Moreover, Defendant maintains he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial because the government’s closing argument “distorted its burden of proof and unfairly mischaracterized Defendant’s theory of the case.” Even if the closing were improper, under plain error review, the Eighth Circuit wrote it will “reverse only under exceptional circumstances,” which requires that Defendant show “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the alleged error.” The evidence and the district court’s instructions show this is not an exceptional case where the conviction is overturned based solely on a prosecutor’s statements during closing argument. View "United States v. Adam Poitra" on Justia Law

Following a six-week trial in 1998, a federal jury convicted Defendant of twelve crimes he committed as part of the 6-0 Tres Crips, including the five murders (Counts 51-55) and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine (Count 2). Under the mandatory sentencing guidelines then in effect, the district court imposed statutory maximum life imprisonment sentences on those counts. Defendant sought Section 2255 relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, which made relief under Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 available to eligible defendants sentenced prior to 2010. Invoking the concurrent sentence doctrine, the district court denied First Step Act relief. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by employing the concurrent sentence doctrine to avoid resentencing Defendant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the district court’s use of the concurrent sentence doctrine for an abuse of discretion, the district court applied the doctrine consistent with controlling Eighth Circuit decisions. The court explained that when, as here, the district court ruling on a First Step Act motion initially sentenced the defendant and later granted a sentence reduction, the court’s “plain statement” that it declined to exercise its discretion to grant a further reduction “closes the matter.” The district court properly treated the concurrent sentence doctrine as “a species of harmless-error review.” As it applied the proper analysis in invoking the doctrine, and its analysis is consistent with our First Step Act precedents, there was no abuse of its broad First Step Act discretion. View "United States v. Robert Jefferson" on Justia Law

Appellees raised a First Amendment challenge to South Dakota’s statutory deadlines to submit petitions to initiate South Dakota statutes and to amend the South Dakota Constitution. After a bench trial, the district court agreed the filing deadline for petitions to initiate statutes violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the filing deadline for petitions to amend the state Constitution does not. The district court then permanently enjoined three South Dakota officials from enforcing the unconstitutional deadline and crafted a new filing deadline.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the filing deadline in South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.2 violates the First Amendment, reversed the holding that the filing deadline in South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.1 does not violate the First Amendment, and remanded with instructions to modify the permanent injunction. Further, the court denied the dueling motions to strike party submissions. The court explained that South Dakota’s filing deadline of one year before a general election “imposes a burden on political expression that the State has failed to justify.” In other words, South Dakota failed to provide evidence connecting the one-year deadline to its asserted interests. Further, in applying the same legal framework and record available for the filing deadline under South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1-1.2, the court concluded that the filing deadline under South Dakota Codified Laws Section 2-1- -15- 1.1 also violates the First Amendment. Finally, the court found that prescribing a new filing deadline is outside the scope of the district court’s authority. View "SD VOICE v. Kristi Noem" on Justia Law

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) permanently disqualified Euclid Market Inc. (“Euclid Market”) from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) after it determined Euclid Market had unlawfully trafficked SNAP benefits. After the USDA issued its final decision, Euclid Market filed an action in federal court under 7 U.S.C. Section 2023, requesting the district court set aside the USDA’s final decision. The district court found Euclid Market did not meet its burden to show the USDA’s action was invalid and entered judgment in favor of the government. Euclid Market appealed. Euclid Market argued that the district court erred by requiring it to produce transaction-specific evidence for every transaction raised by the USDA to meet its burden of proof.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded. The court agreed with Euclid Market that the transaction-specific standard is erroneous and that the district court applied such a standard in this case. A store’s failure to provide transaction-specific evidence for every transaction does not inherently doom its case. Concluding otherwise would create unnecessary tension with the fundamental principles of evidence. Further, a hardline rule that a store cannot prevail without transaction-specific evidence for each transaction raised by the USDA is inconsistent with the district court’s rightful discretion in weighing all of the relevant, admissible evidence to determine the validity of the disqualification by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Euclid Market Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law