Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Section 841. The district court imposed a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence of 87 months in prison. Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court explained that “procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009).   Where, as here, the defendant fails to object at sentencing, the court reviews for plain error. Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. The court wrote that contrary to Defendant’s argument, the court found that the safety valve applied. But safety valve eligibility does not guarantee Defendant a below-statutory minimum sentence; it just gives the court the opportunity to sentence below the minimum if it believes it is appropriate. Defendant argued that the court needed to specifically explain why it decided not to impose a below-minimum sentence— beyond the usual explanation for choosing a particular sentence. But he does not cite any cases from this circuit announcing such a rule, and the out-of-circuit cases he cites do not support his argument. Further, the court found that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and the court’s Section 3553(a) analysis was proper. View "United States v. Jaamil Owens" on Justia Law

Arkansas Act 710 prohibits state entities from contracting with private companies unless the contract includes a certification that the company “is not currently engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not to engage in, a boycott of Israel.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 25-1-503(a)(1).  Arkansas Times, a newspaper, contracts with University of Arkansas-Pulaski Technical College sued for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the certification violates the First Amendment in two ways.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections don’t just prevent outright prohibitions on speech; they also prohibit the government from imposing unconstitutional conditions that chill or deter speech. At issue, here, is whether “boycotting Israel” only covers unexpressive commercial conduct, or whether it also prohibits protected expressive conduct. Arkansas Times points to N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which held that expressive conduct accompanying a boycott is protected by the First Amendment.  The State argues that Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) controls. There, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection does not extend to non-expressive conduct intended to convey a political message.   The court wrote that it believes the Arkansas Supreme Court would read Act 710 as prohibiting purely commercial, non-expressive conduct. It does not ban Arkansas Times from publicly criticizing Israel, or even protesting the statute itself. It only prohibits economic decisions that discriminate against Israel. Because those commercial decisions are invisible to observers unless explained, they are not inherently expressive and do not implicate the First Amendment. View "Arkansas Times LP v. Mark Waldrip" on Justia Law

Following a series of trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Defendant of two counts of interstate communication of a threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months in prison.   Defendant appealed arguing that the government did not have sufficient evidence to prove he made “true threats” because his statements were ambiguous and/or political hyperbole. Further, he argued that; the jury instructions were erroneous; the indictment failed to state an essential element of his offense; and he was denied a right to a speedy trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first held that a jury could have reasonably concluded that his messages constituted a true threat of present or future violence and that he intended to communicate a threat. Thus, because the statements were objectively threatening, and neither ambiguous nor political hyperbole. The evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements required for convictions under Section 875(c).  Further, there was no reversible error, because when taken as a whole, the instructions sufficiently articulated the elements for the charges and the matters were fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.   Next, Defendant has not shown prejudice caused by the delay. While he points to a longer period of detention, repossession of his vehicle, increased pretrial anxiety, and an in-custody assault, none of these circumstances demonstrate he was deprived of an opportunity to properly defend himself at trial. Finally, Defendant’s constitutional claim fails because he has not shown that a nine-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. View "United States v. Cody Leveke" on Justia Law

The government alleges that Medicare overpaid Plaintiff and his medical practice approximately $5.31 million. While the third level of administrative review, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), was pending, Medicare began to recover the overpaid funds by withholding new reimbursements. Plaintiff argued that recovery prior to an ALJ hearing and decision violates procedural due process. He moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Medicare from recovering payments prior to the ALJ decision. The district court denied the preliminary injunction and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction finding that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Further, he has not shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his procedural due process claim nor that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. The court explained that if an audit shows that a provider has been overpaid, Medicare may seek to recover the overpaid funds. Moreover, if a Medicare contractor determines a provider has been overpaid, the provider may challenge that decision through administrative and judicial review.   Here, Plaintiff’s interest in avoiding erroneous recoupment outweighs the government’s interest in prompt repayment. However, there is no evidence in the record that any delay in recovery against Plaintiff will cause long-term harm to Medicare or prevent Medicare from providing services to other beneficiaries. Further, Plaintiff’s claims of irreparable harm are undercut by his apparent failure to try to ease the burdens of recoupment. View "Gurpreet Padda v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz declared a state of “peacetime emergency” and began issuing executive orders (EOs) intended to combat the spread of the virus. The EOs limited which types of businesses could continue operations and, later, specified the capacities at which those businesses could operate. Plaintiffs, three Minnesota businesses and their respective owners, suffered financial losses during the COVID-19 pandemic while these EOs were in effect. Plaintiffs brought an Equal Protection Clause claim against Governor Walz and Minnesota’s Attorney General, in their official capacities and a Takings Clause claim against Governor Walz in his individual capacity, which the district court dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court found that in 2020, the law was not clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his issuance of the challenged EOs violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to just compensation for a government taking. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not offered anything that supports their hypothesis that Governor Walz will, first, declare a second peacetime emergency and, then, will issue additional EOs—specifically, EOs like 20-74 that, in their view, treat them differently than other, similarly situated businesses and impede them from conducting their businesses as they wish. The court further wrote that it need not parse through whether or not a taking occurred, however, because even assuming that a taking did occur, whatever its type, Plaintiffs have offered nothing to support their contention that, in 2020, the law was clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his EOs constituted a taking. View "Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a law enforcement officer employed by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). Martinez claims that Sasse violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by effecting a seizure through the use of excessive force. Sasse moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity. denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez’s allegations stated a claim for the violation of a clearly established right.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that Defendant violated a clearly established right, because it was not clearly established as of June 2018 that Defendant’s alleged push was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that although the claim here alleges the use of excessive force, the parties dispute the threshold question of whether Defendant seized Plaintiff at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant effected a seizure when she pushed Plaintiff to the ground before locking the doors to the ICE facility. Defendant maintains, however, that when an officer’s use of force is designed only to repel a person from entering a facility, there is no seizure. On that view, Plaintiff may have a tort claim against Defendant for assault or battery if the officer used unjustified force, but Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Andrea Martinez v. Ronnet Sasse" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, filed suit against Arkansas, patrolman in his individual capacity.  Plaintiffs pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the patrolman had violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also sued the Wynne police chief, and the mayor, in their individual capacities, for failing to supervise the patrolman.   Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not set forth evidence showing that the patrolman is responsible for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations.   Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Police Chief and Mayor are liable for the patrolman’s alleged unconstitutional acts because they had received notice of his behavior and failed to stop it. A supervising officer may be liable for the actions of his subordinates when “he (1) had ‘notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates’; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take ‘sufficient remedial action’; (4) proximately causing injury to” the plaintiffs. Here, no evidence in the record supports a finding that either the Chief or Mayor subjectively knew of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of unconstitutional harms posed by the patrolman. View "Dana Harrison v. Brodie Faughn" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress items found during a warrantless search of the apartment he shared with his girlfriend. The district court granted the motion as to the narcotics found in a black bag, concluding the search that led to the discovery of the narcotics exceeded the scope of his girlfriend’s consent to search the apartment. As to the other evidence, the court denied the motion.   The government filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting the district court erred when it focused on ownership of the bag rather than his girlfriend’s authority to give consent for the search and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The question before the court was whether Defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. The court held that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, which may be given by a third party with common authority or apparent authority over the premises or effects. Here, at the time of consent, law enforcement officers knew: (1) Defendant had directed his girlfriend to move the gun owned by and registered to her to a specific place within the apartment; (2) she voluntarily led the officers to the location of the gun; and (3) she had access to the bag and never indicated it was Defendant’s bag or that her ability to use or access the bag was limited. As the sole lessee, Defendant had actual and common authority over the apartment and consented to the search of the entire apartment for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "United States v. Mosley Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child sex trafficking, firearms, and drug charges. Forty-eight hours before trial, the government disclosed certain benefits it had provided to several minor victims. Defendant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the indictment or, in the alternative, exclusion of the victim's testimony. Instead, the district court offered Defendant a continuance, instructed the jury accordingly and allowed broad cross-examination of the witnesses. Defendant was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 268 months in prison.Defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions and sentence. The court explained that even if the government's late disclosure of benefits it had provided to the victims of Defendant's offenses was a discovery violation, the district court's chosen remedy was not an abuse of discretion. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that all three sentencing enhancements used to determine Defendant's sentence were properly applied and his 268-month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kendall Streb" on Justia Law

Defendant was pulled over after an officer observed excessive braking. During the stop, the officer observed both driver and passenger appeared to be nervous. Upon a subsequent pat-down, the officer observed a clear glass smoking device with burnt residue inside Defendant's open pocket. After another search, an additional 20 grams of methamphetamine were recovered from Defendant.The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. He ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 216 months in prison.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding the officers did not unconstitutionally extend the traffic stop. The court also held that the officer was permitted to ask Defendant out of the car and that Defendant consented to the pat-down by raising his arms.The court also found that the district court did not commit any error in the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). View "United States v. William Kennedy" on Justia Law