Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to 270 months of incarceration followed by five years of supervisor release following a conviction for various drug and gun crimes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on all charges, rejecting each of his appellate issues.The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The tint on Defendant's window was dark enough to give the officer reasonable suspicion that Defendant's vehicle was in violation. The second traffic stop of Defendant was also supported by probable cause because Defendant's vehicle was missing license plates and he was speeding.The court also found that the evidence against Defendant was sufficient to support his convictions and that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Tevin Maurstad" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement for possessing any firearm in connection with another felony offense, and its decision to depart upward under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 based on conduct for which Defendant was acquitted.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Defendant argued that the district court clearly erred in finding that the gun facilitated the marijuana possession. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant’s gun facilitated his drug possession. Defendant possessed the gun in public, on a public road in his car, and both the gun and at least some of the drugs were easily accessible; the gun was on the passenger-side floorboard and a baggie of marijuana was found in the center console.   Next, Defendant argued that the district court erred in departing upward under Section 4A1.3 based on the conduct of which he was acquitted. The court held that the district court’s reliance on acquitted conduct to depart upward did not violate Defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Second, the Government established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant recklessly used a firearm, resulting in serious injury. Third, the district court adequately explained why the applicable criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of Defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that he will commit other crimes. Finally, though Defendant disagreed with the district court’s weighing of the factors, that does not make his sentence substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. DeShaun Bullock, Jr." on Justia Law

Kansas City Officer (“Officer”) shot and killed the victim during a foot chase. Family members of the victim filed suit and the district court concluded that the Officer was entitled to both qualified and official immunity. In addition to contesting the grant of summary judgment on appeal, Plaintiffs argued they should receive a trial on their claims against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and the other municipal officials named in their complaint.   In evaluating the family’s excessive-force claim against the Officer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the key issue requires answering whether the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and then whether the right was clearly established. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has explained that “the focus” of the clearly-established-right inquiry “is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). Here, “judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct,” a reasonable officer would not have had “fair notice” that shooting the victim under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.     Additionally, to prevail in this case under Kisela, the family would need to establish “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Here, the family failed to show that the Officer acted in bad faith or with malice. Finally, there is not enough evidence to find that the municipal defendants liable under a deliberate indifference theory. View "N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police" on Justia Law

A police officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle after the officer observed it traveling 20 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. The driver did not stop and led the officer on a high-speed chase before crashing. Two people exited the vehicle and fled. The officer pursued Defendant, who was the passenger. The officer used his taser on Defendant, who then grabbed a nearby firearm and pointed it at the officer. The officer shot Defendant, who was later indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon.The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress any evidence recovered after he was tased, and a jury ultimately convicted Defendant. Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, affirming the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. By tasing Defendant, the officer executed a warrantless arrest. However, this arrest was supported by probable cause based on the traffic stop and Defendant's subsequent flight despite the officer's demands to stop. The court determined that the officer reasonably thought that Defendant was the driver of the vehicle.The Eighth Circuit rejected Defendant's remaining challenges to his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Meamen Nyah" on Justia Law

Defendant was pulled over for speeding. Defendant and her passenger consented to a vehicle search, which revealed 28.4 pounds of heroin. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied, at which point Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute. Seeking safety valve relief, Defendant gave a proffer interview to law enforcement, explaining how she became involved in drug trafficking, including who recruited her and the methods used to transport the drugs, as well as how she supported herself since coming to the United States. However, at sentencing, the district court determined Defendant was not entirely truthful about the source of funds in her bank account and denied relief. The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. The district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The district court was entitled to make a credibility determination regarding whether Defendant was speeding. Additionally, the officer did not exceed his authority when asking Defendant out of the car and did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop. Finally, the officer's testimony that Defendant verbally consented was sufficient to establish consent, even without a signed consent form.The Eighth Circuit also held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant safety valve relief or calculating her sentencing guidelines. View "United States v. Veronica Gonzalez-Carmona" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted commercial sex trafficking of a minor, 18 U.S.C. Sections 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and 1594(a), and attempted enticement of a minor for sexual activity using a facility of interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress and his conviction on numerous grounds.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied Defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed his conviction.  Defendant argued that law enforcement’s warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.  The court held that a reasonable person could believe Defendant committed or was committing a crime and the facts sufficiently establish probable cause to believe that Defendant was attempting to commit sex trafficking crimes. Defendant further argued that his indictment was insufficient because he contends his crimes cannot be based on a non-existent victim. The court held that caselaw states a defendant may commit both attempted commercial sex trafficking of a minor and attempted enticement of a minor for sexual activity using a facility of interstate commerce.  Next, Defendant argued insufficient evidence supported either conviction. Here, the evidence sufficiently showed Defendant’s subjective intent to engage in a commercial sex act with someone he believed to be a minor. Moreover, the evidence showed Defendant knowingly used two facilities of interstate commerce, to try to entice a fictitious minor female to engage in illegal sexual activity and then took a substantial step toward committing the offense by driving to the meeting spot. View "United States v. Carlocito Slim" on Justia Law

After being pulled over, Defendant and his vehicle were searched, revealing a pistol and cocaine contained in various packaging materials. Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug transaction, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, an expert testified for the government that the narcotics in question were "possessed with the intent to distribute." Defendant did not object at the time.Reviewing for plain error, the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court erred in admitting the expert's testimony, but affirmed Defendant's conviction. While the expert's testimony was prohibited opinion evidence, given the other evidence supporting the jury's verdict, the error did not affect Defendant's substantial rights. The court also held the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, rejecting Defendant's sufficiency challenge. View "United States v. Emanuel Cowley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants, Des Moines Police Department officers, lacking probable cause, took relatives of a stabbing victim to the station and held them for over three hours during which time the victim died. The district court denied qualified immunity, ruling for the family on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held both the duration and the nature of the seizure at issue exceeded the bounds of the Constitution.   The court reasoned that officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful.  Here, the officers seized the family against their will and without probable cause. There was no “reasonable ground” for the officers’ action.   The court concluded that there was no minimally-intrusive Terry stop and the detention was the most intrusive means of questioning survivors after a violent crime. Further, officers of the Des Moines Police Department were on notice that they could not detain someone for questioning against their will, even in a homicide investigation, absent probable cause.  The same evidence establishes the officers’ violation of sec. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment establishes a violation of the Iowa Constitution. View "Crysteal Davis v. Trevor Spear" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, described as “political candidates, political associations, and individuals who engage in political activities relating to political elections and campaigns in Minnesota”, brought a case under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to assert a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to Minn. Stat. Section 211B.02. Plaintiffs sued four Minnesota county attorneys with the authority to criminally prosecute violations of 211B.02. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the county attorneys from enforcing 211B.02 pending the district court’s entry of final judgment. The district court denied the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction holding that Defendants had not enforced the statute and had not threatened to do so and were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court reasoned that the record showed that after the motion-to-dismiss stage and in response to Plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, the four county attorneys filed substantially similar affidavits providing that they had “no present intention” to prosecute anyone for violating 211B.02. Further, because county officials’ affidavits all show that they have not enforced or threatened to enforce 211B.02 the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Immunity is inapplicable. View "Minnesota RFL Caucus v. Mike Freeman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, Defendant consented to a video sentencing hearing. After reviewing the pre-sentence report, Defendant's evidence of mitigation and the relevant sentencing factors, the court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum term of incarceration.On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court violated his right to counsel and his right to meaningful allocation by muting the audio portion of the recording two times during the sentencing hearing. The Eighth Circuit rejected Defendant's argument, finding that the muting did not implicate Due Process concerns. Defendant's attorney was able to argue on his behalf while the audio was muted and Defendant had subsequent opportunity to allocate.The court also determined that Defendant's sentence was not procedurally flawed or substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Joshua Braman" on Justia Law