Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of U.S. Bank's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the Bank fired her because of her age and in retaliation for reporting discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.The court held that the Bank articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate plaintiff with adequate support in the record: performance issues. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show that the Bank's explanation for her firing is mere pretext for intentional discrimination. In this case, none of the employees that she compares herself to are similarly situated in all relevant respects, and the evidence does not present a change in basis for firing her. Furthermore, plaintiff offered no evidence to support causation for her retaliation claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Finally, the Bank's decision not to hire plaintiff in another position was not based on a discriminatory and retaliatory motive, and plaintiff failed to establish pretext. View "McKey v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was convicted for two counts of first degree murder among other things and was sentenced to death. Petitioner claims that counsel at his third penalty-phase trial was ineffective for failing to argue that the passage of time had undermined his mitigation case.The court held that petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not "substantial enough" to excuse his procedural default. The court explained that when postconviction counsel filed petitioner's petition in 2010, the law was far from settled that a 10-year delay between conviction and sentencing would give rise to a constitutional claim, much less that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the argument two years earlier. The court stated that failing to make an argument that would require the resolution of unsettled legal questions is generally not outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In this case, postconviction counsel's performance was reasonable and the Martinez exception—the only conceivable basis for excusing petitioner's procedural default—is unavailable to him. Finally, the court held that petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "Deck v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Avitso, a citizen of Togo, entered the U.S. as a student in 2004 and married a U.S. citizen. In 2011, USCIS denied a Petition for Alien Relative filed by Avitso’s wife and an application for adjustment of status filed by Avitso, concluding they had entered into a fraudulent marriage to procure immigration benefits, which made Avitso removable, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A). Notice of removal proceedings was mailed to Avitso at the address where USCIS investigators had been told he resided. In 2012, DHS mailed notice to a different address. The immigration court also mailed notice; it was returned, marked “moved left no address.” Avitso failed to appear. The IJ entered a removal order.In 2019, remarried and represented by new counsel, Avitso moved to reopen, alleging that he “did not personally receive" notice but a copy was forwarded to him by his then-attorney. The motion cited ineffective assistance of counsel. The IJ denied the motion, concluding Avitso failed to meet case law requirements to establish ineffective assistance and even if those requirements were satisfied, the outcome would not have been different. The BIA dismissed Avitso’s appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. Avitso’s motion to reopen included no evidence that he notified former counsel of his ineffective assistance claims, provided her an opportunity to respond, or filed a complaint with disciplinary authorities. The BIA enforces those requirements to discourage baseless allegations and deter meritless claims. View "Avitso v. Barr" on Justia Law

Following a shooting, police went to Roberts’s apartment to execute a search warrant on the residence and a Durango vehicle. Officers found firearms. An officer stated Roberts was not under arrest. Roberts admitted he brought the guns into the residence from the Durango, where “Mike” had left them. The officers noted possible federal firearm charges because they knew Roberts was a felon. The officers did not arrest Roberts, but read his Miranda rights, despite Roberts saying “you don’t have to.” Officers asked if Roberts wanted to continue to talk. Roberts replied, “Not really,” but continued the interview. He admitted driving a man to the crime scene on the night of the shooting in the Durango. Roberts was arrested hours later. Roberts entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit supplied with the search warrant application gave the judge probable cause to believe that Roberts drove the vehicle associated with a shooting on the night of the shooting and that evidence of the crime would be found in the truck or his residence. Roberts’s incriminating statements before receiving Miranda warnings were admissible; he was not in custody and the statements were voluntary. Roberts's prior Illinois and Iowa convictions were controlled substance offenses for purposes of sentencing under Guidelines 4B1.1(a). View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former student at the University, filed suit against the Board of Trustees and several university officials, claiming that they violated his rights in a disciplinary action against him. This case stemmed from another University student's accusation against plaintiff for sexual assault. After the initial decision by the Title IX coordinator finding no misconduct, the other student herself publicly criticized the University's decision. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the University was under pressure and fearful of sanctions from the Office for Civil Rights, so it took steps harmful to him to alleviate and lessen the scrutiny that it was attracting from the other student's media blitz and protests. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.The Eighth Circuit held that the complaint stated a claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 that is plausible on its face. First, the allegations in the complaint support an inference that the hearing panel reached an outcome that was against the substantial weight of the evidence. Second, the panel's chosen sanctions are allegedly contrary to the ordinary disposition in cases of sexual assault by force. Third, plaintiff alleged that the University was under pressure on multiple fronts to find males responsible for sexual assault. The court held that these circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to support a plausible claim that the University discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex. However, the court held that plaintiff's due process claims against the University officials in their official and individual capacities were properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. University of Arkansas - Fayetteville" on Justia Law

A.C.'s Westside eighth-grade class watched a video about athletes kneeling during the national anthem. During a “critical thinking” discussion, the teacher insisted that A.C. share her ideas. A.C. stated that “kneeling was disrespectful to law enforcement and military," and questioned that violence could have stemmed from music lyrics including "F-the Police, and the use of the N-word.’” A.C. stayed home the next day due to illness. The teacher allegedly told students that A.C. was a racist and was on suspension. A.C. was subjected to bullying. After meeting with school officials, her parents removed A.C. from school. A.C. attempted suicide. Her parents contacted eight lawyers. but were unable to retain one.On behalf of A.C., they filed the pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The court ruled that they could not serve pro se as A.C.’s representatives and lacked standing to bring individual claims that only derive from alleged violations of their child’s constitutional rights. They contacted 27 more lawyers and organizations. They refiled, requesting court-appointed counsel. The district court refused, reasoning that the claims were “not likely to be of substance,” and that A.C. lacked standing for declaratory and injunctive relief, as she was no longer a student at Westside. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the parents may not represent A.C. pro se but remanded with directions to appoint counsel. The court did not err in considering the potential merit of the claims and other relevant factors in deciding whether to request counsel but the allegation of First Amendment retaliation is a serious claim on which the plaintiffs and the court would benefit from the assistance of counsel. View "Crozier v. Westside Community School District" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by a student and Turning Point USA, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs aimed to recruit students for a local Turning Point chapter by setting up a table at the Union Patio. University administrators then asked that the student take down her table.The court held that the patio is a limited designated public forum in which speech restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Furthermore, the Tabling Policy was not viewpoint-discriminatory. The court held that the Tabling Policy, as applied to the student, is unconstitutional because the distinction between registered student organizations and individual students is not reasonable, when the sole justification offered for the distinction provides no meaningful reason for differentiating the two. Therefore, plaintiffs have put forward sufficient facts to show a constitutional violation. However, the court held that defendants were properly granted qualified immunity because the student's First Amendment right to access a limited public forum, which she was unjustifiably denied, was not clearly established at the time. View "Turning Point USA at Arkansas State University v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting Title IX violations and various state law claims against the University after it began disciplinary proceedings that resulted in plaintiff's suspension. The disciplinary proceedings arose from a fellow student's accusation against plaintiff of sexual misconduct.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University. The court held that, while the district court erred by rejecting Rollins v. Cardinal Stritch Univ., 626 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), and formulating a reasonable care standard that no Minnesota court has adopted, even applying the more permissive reasonable care standard, no reasonable jury would find the investigators' actions showed bias against plaintiff. In this case, no reasonable jury would find bias because the investigators did question the accuser about inconsistencies in her story and found her to be credible. Furthermore, no implication of bias arises by asking the accuser to preserve evidence or by offering her mental health services. View "Doe v. University of St. Thomas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Allied Pilots in state court for conversion and unjust enrichment, arguing that he was entitled to keep his whole profit sharing payment rather than give some of it to the union for "dues." The union removed to federal court, contending that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The district court held that state law claims fell away due to preemption and the federal claims did not survive summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred by relying on the complete-preemption doctrine, finding that the RLA wholly displaced plaintiff's state law claims. In this case, the RLA does not require disputes between an employee and a union to be heard by an adjustment board, so there is no federal cause of action at all, much less an exclusive one. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and instructed the district court, on remand, to return this case to state court. View "Krakowski v. Allied Pilots Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, six former inmates of the Faulkner County Detention Center, filed suit against the County and two jail employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that their conditions of confinement were unconstitutional because of mold in and around the jail's shower.The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and held that the district court erred in denying the individual jail employees summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court held that the only thing clearly established in this case is that the definition of the asserted constitutional right embraced by the district court — a right to sanitary prison conditions — was impermissibly broad. The court also held that a finding that such a right was clearly established based on this general definition was therefore in error. Because the right at issue has not been properly defined and there are genuine disputes of material fact at play, it is not possible for the court to determine whether the individual officers committed a constitutional violation in the detention center due to the presence of Cladosporium. Finally, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the County's appeal where the question of whether the County was liable for failing to train its officers is not inextricably intertwined with the matter of qualified immunity. View "Thurmond v. Andrews" on Justia Law