Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after he was pepper-sprayed and tackled by a Des Moines Police Officer while photographing a protest. Plaintiff, who was covering the protest as a journalist, claimed that the officer and other city officials violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the city officials’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the unlawful seizure and excessive force claims but affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment dismissing the retaliation claim. The court explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact on whether there was an excessive use of force. To begin, they arrested Plaintiff for failure to disperse—a misdemeanor. Second, while the officer focuses on the fact there had been “hours of criminal activity occurring” and that he was “under constant threat of harm from active rioters,” he cannot point to any facts suggesting an immediate threat to his safety or the safety of others. Further, the court wrote that numerous cases show that the identified general constitutional rule applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question. View "Mark Nieters v. Brandon Holtan" on Justia Law

Defendant used fake deeds to gain possession of three houses. On appeal, Defendant challenged the loss calculation but began by disputing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his identity theft convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Defendant argued that the government said too much in the closing argument. According to Defendant, two of the prosecutor’s statements qualify. The court explained that the prosecutor’s comment was a fleeting reference that immediately followed an accurate statement of the government’s burden—proof beyond a reasonable doubt— and the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that the burden was on the government.   However, the court explained that while Defendant’s convictions stand, his 41-month sentence cannot. For identity theft and other property crimes, the recommended sentencing range depends in part on the amount of the “actual” or “intended” losses from the crime. Defendant ended up with a total offense level of 22 and a range of 41 to 51 months in prison. The court explained that on remand, the district court must adopt “a reasonable estimate of the” fair market value at the time of the transfer, either by using a measure that reflects the value at that point or by accounting for Defendant’s post-fraud improvements and market changes during the intervening period. View "United States v. Arondo Harris" on Justia Law

After Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced him to 24 months in prison even though the Sentencing Guidelines recommended 5–11 months. He maintains that the district court failed to explain the sentence adequately and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when explaining a sentence, a court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decision-making authority. The district court provided ample reason for imposing an upward variance, including the fact that Defendant stayed at the sober-living house only briefly, previously received leniency, frequently violated court orders, and absconded for months on end. The court explained that the court isn't required to discuss or recite each statutory sentencing consideration before imposing a sentence; when, as here, the court mentions some of them, we presume it is aware of them all. View "United States v. Lamar Bertucci" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant and co-Defendant of conspiracy to distribute 400 grams or more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, as well as individual counts of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl. Co-Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying their request for a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies. Co-defendant contends that the district court erred by ordering him to be handcuffed and shackled throughout the trial and by admitting into evidence portions of a post-arrest interview. Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his possession with intent to distribute conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the lack of any substantial prejudice stemming from the absence of a multiple-conspiracies instruction and the presence of sufficient single-conspiracy supporting evidence leads the court to conclude that no reversible error occurred with respect to the drug quantity finding. Further, the court wrote that given co-Defendant’s noncompliant behavior in jail and during transport, the district court acted well within its discretion by ordering that co-Defendant be shackled and handcuffed during trial and by taking appropriate precautions to minimize any prejudice to co-Defendant. View "United States v. Kevin Green" on Justia Law

Parolees sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), claiming that its parole revocation system violated the Due Process Clause. Recognizing the system’s flaws, MDOC rewrote its policies and consented to summary judgment. Later, MDOC moved to dismiss for failure to join a required party—the Missouri Public Defender Commission (Commission). The district court denied MDOC’s motion and held a hearing to determine whether MDOC’s revised policies satisfied due process. Finding additional problems, the district court issued a remedy order instructing MDOC to make changes.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that the state must hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” The court wrote that MDOC has a policy requiring a revocation hearing within 30 days, but it does not always follow that policy. The district court ordered MDOC to follow its 30-day policy. The court wrote that because it has held that longer delays may be reasonable in some cases, the remedy is not tailored to the violation and was an abuse of discretion. View "Stephanie Gasca v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

Defendant’s mother called local dispatch and said an officer needed to come by because her son was “acting up.” A Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer was dispatched to the home, learning on the way that Defendant had an active tribal arrest warrant. Defendant’s mother invited Defendant into the living room and told Defendant to join them. The officer told Defendant he was “going to have to take you because you got that warrant.” Defendant fled to the garage, pursued by the officer, where Defendant knocked the officer down and escaped. Defendant was charged with forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer and inflicting bodily injury. The jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of forcible assault of a federal officer involving physical contact. The district court sentenced Defendant to 44 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, raising numerous evidentiary issues and challenging the assessment of a two-level sentencing increase.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the amicable conversation -- dominated by Defendant-- occurred in his mother’s home, a non-custodial atmosphere. The officer testified he did not know what the warrant was based on. Defendant fled only after the officer later told him he would be arrested, confirming that Defendant initially believed or at least hoped that he could avoid immediate arrest. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant was in custody, follow-up questions to clarify ambiguity do not amount to “interrogation” unless “their point is to enhance the defendant’s guilt.” The court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Jade LaRoche" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing morphine within 1,000 feet of a school. He was sentenced to 262 months imprisonment followed by 6 years of supervised release. Defendant began supervised release in September 2021. He was arrested and charged in Iowa state court with Domestic Abuse Assault for pushing his fiancée into a wall while inebriated. His fiancee requested a no-contact order, The United States Probation Office filed a petition to revoke supervised release that day. Probation filed an amended petition to revoke supervised release. He now appealed the revocation sentence, arguing the district court erred in imposing an overly broad no-contact order restricting communication between Defendant and his fiancée. At the end of the hearing, the court stated it would modify Special Condition 8. The court directed Probation to prepare and circulate revised language to counsel for both parties and stated, “If the parties object when it’s finally written out, please let me know, and we’ll try to arrive at appropriate wording.” Defendant made no objection to the final wording of Special Condition 8, either before or after Judgment was entered.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant, with a long history of alcohol abuse, admitted he assaulted his fiancee while he was literally falling down drunk. By limiting contact, Special Condition 8 seeks to protect the victim from further harm. Fiancee had requested a no-contact order from the state court, subject to a specific exception the district court incorporated in Special Condition 8. View "United States v. Paul Swehla" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12 and one count of abusive sexual contact. He appeals, challenging two evidentiary rulings at trial and the restitution order.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions but remanded to the district court for further proceedings to resolve the parties’ disputes about the amount, if any, of restitution owing. The court wrote that the government argued that restitution for lost wages was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Section 2248 and that the amount was supported by documentation submitted in advance of sentencing. The district court did not hold a hearing. Instead, it entered an order that stated that it had “reviewed the presentence report concerning restitution” and the parties’ briefs and found that “the government’s requested restitution is authorized by law and is unrebutted by any evidence.” The court explained that the burden lies with the government to “demonstrate[e] the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense.” Without any findings from the district court to resolve Defendant’s objections, the court wrote that it was unable to review whether the government met its burden of establishing restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Warren Mackey" on Justia Law

Parents Defending Education, an association of parents, brought this action to challenge a policy adopted by the Linn Mar Community School District in Iowa. The disputed policy is entitled “Administrative Regulations Regarding Transgender and Students Nonconforming to Gender Role Stereotypes.” The policy sets forth regulations for the District that “address the needs of transgender students, gender-expansive students, nonbinary, gender nonconforming students, and students questioning their gender to ensure a safe, affirming, and healthy school environment where every student can learn effectively.” The parents who seek to participate in this case are anonymous; the pleadings identify them by a letter of the alphabet. The district court determined that Parents Defending failed to establish Article III standing because the organization did not show injury, causation, or redressability on its claims.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part as moot and reversed on one claim. The court concluded that at least Parent G has alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. Parent G asserts that her son wants to “state his belief that biological sex is immutable.” Because of the policy, however, Parent G states that her son remains silent in school “when gender identity topics arise” to avoid violating the policy. This student’s proposed activity “concerns political speech” and is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.” Thus, Parent G has standing to bring a claim challenging the policy based on the First Amendment. Therefore, Parents Defending has standing as an association to pursue the claim on behalf of a member. View "Parents Defending Education v. LinnMar Community School Dist., et al" on Justia Law

MyPillow, Inc. and Chief Executive Officer Michael Lindell (collectively, “Lindell”) appealed the district court’s denial of their motions for a preliminary injunction and for the return of property—Lindell’s cell phone that was seized by federal agents on September 13, 2022. The basis of Lindell’s action arises from an ongoing federal investigation into the individuals responsible for publishing forensic images of election software used in the 2020 election in Mesa County, Colorado. He argued on appeal that the federal investigation violates his First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and the right to petition for the redress of grievances. He also contended the search warrant for his phone violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against general warrants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Lindell’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed the district court’s decision not to exercise equitable jurisdiction over Lindell’s motion for the return of property as it relates to the continued retention of the cell phone itself and all its data. The court explained that it is unable to determine from the record whether the government can reasonably justify its continued refusal to return Lindell’s cell phone, which at this point was seized nearly a year ago, or the data on it, which is entirely unrelated to the offenses the government is investigating. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to hold a prompt hearing and balance the government’s interest in retaining Lindell’s cell phone and all its data against Lindell’s right to get the property back. View "Michael Lindell v. United States" on Justia Law