Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Officers Richter and Sullivan, patrolling a high crime neighborhood, observed McLemore standing by a BMW parked at a residence frequented by gang members. Days earlier, investigating reports of a nearby shooting, Richter and Officer Del Valle had seen Rode exit the BMW. They learned that Rode was affiliated with the gang and may have been the victim of an unreported shooting. Richter radioed Del Valle, patrolling in a different car, and told her to follow the BMW. Del Valle saw that it had a dealer advertising plate instead of a rear license plate and a temporary paper card taped inside of the rear window. Del Valle radioed that she had “no violations yet” but “you can see a plate, but you can’t read what’s on it.” Sullivan replied, “there you go.” Del Valle made an “equipment stop.” She did not examine whether the temporary card was valid (it was) because “I already had the probable cause.” During the stop, Del Valle smelled marijuana, and Richter discovered a firearm during his pat-down search of McLemore. The district court ruled that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The government failed to identify what violation of state law the BMW operator was suspected of committing and did not introduce into evidence either the BMW’s temporary registration card or a copy of the standard-form card; neither officer testified that they can usually read temporary cards at night or that they had previous problems with fraudulent or invalid cards. View "United States v. McLemore" on Justia Law

After being arrested, Whitney was taken to the St. Louis University Hospital for treatment of an irregular heartbeat. He attempted to escape and said that he wanted the police to take his life so that he would not be sent back to prison. He was determined to be suicidal. After being treated by psychiatry and showing improvement, he was released and transported to the St. Louis City Justice Center. Two days later, Whitney was moved to a medical unit, suffering from detoxification from heroin use, congestive heart failure, hypertension, and diabetes. Sharp was assigned to monitor Whitney in his cell via closed-circuit television. Sharp last saw Whitney pacing by the shower area at 9:05 a.m. Within the next 14 minutes, she discovered that he had hanged himself, using his ripped hospital gown. The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims by Whitney’s estate. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The complaint failed to allege that Sharp knew that Whitney presented a suicide risk. There was no claim that any identifiable jail official had knowledge or suspected that Whitney was suicidal or was harming himself; the complaint fails to allege any constitutional violation arising out of a municipal policy that would expose the city to Monell liability. View "Whitney v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was paralyzed from the waist down and used a wheelchair, filed suit against RL Liquor for violating Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), after he encountered barriers at the store. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action as moot, holding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden to prove a readily achievable barrier removal method. Following the Tenth, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, the court held that the district court properly required plaintiff to initially present evidence tending to show that the suggested method of barrier removal was readily achievable under the circumstances. In this case, plaintiff failed to offer a plausible proposal for barrier removal. View "Wright v. RL Liquor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer for hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Plaintiff was terminated after she burned a customer with her cigarette when he was sexually harassing her. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the ICRA claim as time-barred and held that the pendency of an EEOC review did not toll a state civil rights claim. The court rejected the Title VII claims on summary judgment where the customer's action did not constitute conduct so severe or pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of plaintiff's employment. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show that the employer new of the customer's harassing conduct but failed to take remedial action. The court also held that the retaliatory discrimination claim was time-barred. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's exclusion of evidence regarding previous sexual assaults and expert testimony. View "Hales v. Casey's Marketing Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of excessive force and municipal liability, as well as state tort claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff established that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In this case, the officers delivered repeated strikes, punches, and blows to plaintiff while plaintiff pleaded with them to stop hitting him because he was not resisting arrest or doing anything wrong. Therefore, a reasonable officer standing in defendants' shoes would have understood that the amount of force used to subdue plaintiff was excessive, as was their action in purposefully dropping plaintiff face-first onto the sidewalk after he had been subdued and handcuffed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the officers' appeal of the denial of summary judgment on the state law claims because the court's resolution of the qualified immunity appeal did not necessarily resolve plaintiff's state law claims against the officers. View "Burnikel v. Fong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of excessive force and municipal liability, as well as state tort claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff established that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In this case, the officers delivered repeated strikes, punches, and blows to plaintiff while plaintiff pleaded with them to stop hitting him because he was not resisting arrest or doing anything wrong. Therefore, a reasonable officer standing in defendants' shoes would have understood that the amount of force used to subdue plaintiff was excessive, as was their action in purposefully dropping plaintiff face-first onto the sidewalk after he had been subdued and handcuffed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the officers' appeal of the denial of summary judgment on the state law claims because the court's resolution of the qualified immunity appeal did not necessarily resolve plaintiff's state law claims against the officers. View "Burnikel v. Fong" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights action against four South Dakota corrections officials, asserting both facial and as-applied challenges to the State's prison-pornography policy. The Eighth Circuit found it prudent to decide whether the policy was constitutional as applied to plaintiff before reaching his facial challenges. However, the court could not adopt the district court's as-applied analysis because it was error to resurrect and apply the 2000 Policy. The court explained that this was not the policy that plaintiff actually challenged, nor was it the authority under which SDSP staff withheld the rejected materials. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded for it to reevaluate defendant's as-applied claims based on the 2014 Policy. View "Sisney v. Kaemingk" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. Plaintiff has cerebral palsy and uses a wheelchair for mobility. In this case, she tried to eat at an Omaha steakhouse owned and operated by defendant and alleged that she could not access the steakhouse due to certain physical barriers. The court held that the action became moot after defendant's mediation; plaintiff could not use the violation encountered in the parking space to expand her standing to sue for unencountered violations inside the steakhouse that never injured her; the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in allowing evidence on jurisdictional issues; plaintiff's request for discovery was futile because she did not have standing to sue in this action; and the district court did not err in deciding the Rule 12(b)(1) motion and denying discovery under Rule 56. View "Davis v. Anthony, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to deputies in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. In this case, each of the deputies knew that plaintiff was a paranoid schizophrenic who had not taken his antipsychotic medication, could potentially be dangerous, refused repeated requests to go to the hospital or lie on his stomach, pretended to shoot himself in the head, took a defensive position lying on the ground with his hands and feet up, and yelled "just shoot me." Therefore, the deputies knew there was a reasonable expectation of aggression and a resistant subject. The court held that Deputy Maggard acted reasonably in cuffing and shackling plaintiff; Deputy Shuster acted reasonably in applying an arm lock that broke plaintiff's arm and by using nunchucks to obtain plaintiff's compliance; Deputy Calvin acted reasonably by tasing plaintiff five times after giving warnings to plaintiff and attempting less intrusive methods; and, even if Deputy Calvin did not act reasonably, he was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff could not show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. View "Cravener v. Shuster" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to deputies in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. In this case, each of the deputies knew that plaintiff was a paranoid schizophrenic who had not taken his antipsychotic medication, could potentially be dangerous, refused repeated requests to go to the hospital or lie on his stomach, pretended to shoot himself in the head, took a defensive position lying on the ground with his hands and feet up, and yelled "just shoot me." Therefore, the deputies knew there was a reasonable expectation of aggression and a resistant subject. The court held that Deputy Maggard acted reasonably in cuffing and shackling plaintiff; Deputy Shuster acted reasonably in applying an arm lock that broke plaintiff's arm and by using nunchucks to obtain plaintiff's compliance; Deputy Calvin acted reasonably by tasing plaintiff five times after giving warnings to plaintiff and attempting less intrusive methods; and, even if Deputy Calvin did not act reasonably, he was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff could not show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. View "Cravener v. Shuster" on Justia Law