Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in violation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Plaintiff after she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkelstein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work, did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organizations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated Plaintiff's employment after the primary election, which Plaintiff had lost to another employee of the office. The district court granted summary judgment to Finkelstein. It concluded that many of Plaintiff’s statements about Finkelstein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Plaintiff’s interests against her employer’s interests, the district court concluded that her interest in making these statements did not outweigh the government’s interest in the effective management of the public defender’s office.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s termination cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court wrote that it is yet to consider whether and how a public employee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although the court recognized that an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing the elected official currently holding that position, the court believes the employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the employee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frustrate the employer’s mission. View "Ruby Green v. Howard Finkelstein, et al" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison. Defendant claimed that the jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an explanation of “excusable homicide.” At issue is whether Defendant was prejudiced when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument. The district court recognized the change in the law and rejected Defendant’s Lucas-based arguments. When Defendant appealed, the Eleventh Circuit granted him a certificate of appealability on this issue. As stated by Defendant, “the determinative fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v. Fretwell” to his claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court explained that Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Further, both the Supreme Court and the court have reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or modification. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied Fretwell to this case. View "Pablo Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, together with three others, conspired to rob a cocaine stash house. They did not know that the conspiracy was part of a reverse sting operation administrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Before Defendant and his co-conspirators could carry out the robbery, ATF apprehended them, confiscating a firearm from Garrison in the process. A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to use and use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), among other crimes. At issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction had three possible predicate offenses—one of which is now invalid in light of Davis— he is not entitled to relief. The predicate offenses are so inextricably intertwined that the jury could not have based the Section 924(c) conviction on the invalid predicate without having also based it on the valid drug trafficking predicate offenses. In other words, the Stromberg error that occurred below was harmless, and thus Defendant is not entitled to relief. View "Sean Garrison v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in a trial that took place during the initial days of the coronavirus pandemic. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising a number of constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural challenges. Defendant argued that he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because, among other things, his lawyer, fearing coronavirus exposure, refused to visit him in jail throughout the trial. He also posits that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly questioning one of his witnesses. On top of all that, Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by making erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant believes the district court’s cumulative errors denied him a fundamentally fair trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence on this record that Defendant’s lawyer “actually intended to confer” with his client during the overnight recess, irrespective of the pandemic concerns. For instance, Defendant’s lawyer also told the district court that he did not have time to visit the jail. The court noted that the district court went to great lengths to facilitate communication between Defendant and his lawyer. It allowed them to communicate in writing during the trial and while Defendant was incarcerated at the county jail. And nothing precluded Defendant’s lawyer from attempting to communicate electronically or via telephone with his client. Finally, the court noted that Defendant has not established a single error, let alone the aggregation of many errors. Thus, his cumulative error claim lacks merit. View "USA v. Sebastian Ahmed" on Justia Law

Defendant, a pimp, transported three young women from Connecticut to Miami, Florida, for his prostitution business shortly before Super Bowl LIV. Following a jury trial, Walker was convicted of three sex-trafficking-related crimes: (1) sex trafficking of an adult by coercion (Count 1); (2) sex trafficking of a person (A.H.) who is a minor and alternatively of a person (A.H.) by coercion (Count 2); and (3) transporting a person to engage in sexual activity (Count 3). In a special verdict form as to A.H., the jury found Defendant guilty on Count 2 on both of the alternative liability theories: minor status and coercion. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 but not on Count 3.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded (1) there was ample evidence to support Defendant’s coercion conviction in Count 1, and (2) as to Count 2, Defendant did not challenge the government’s amended notice of its expert testimony in the district court, plain error review thus applies, and Defendant has not shown any alleged error in the notice prejudiced him on the coercion conviction. The court explained that a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that (1) A.H.’s young, runaway background and dependent circumstances made her particularly susceptible to sex trafficking and (2) A.H. feared that stopping the prostitution would result in serious harm in the form of losing Walker’s emotional, psychological, and financial support. View "USA v. Edward Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by an Alabama jury. The jury recommended death by execution, and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Northern District of Alabama, alleging—as relevant to this appeal—that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The district court initially denied habeas relief on all claims, and Petitioner appealed. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded to the district court to determine whether Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to reconsider his failure-to-investigate claims de novo. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted habeas relief. The State of Alabama (State) appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the failure-to-investigate claims, made extensive factual findings based on evidence that had not been presented during Petitioner’s penalty phase, and concluded that Petitioner was entitled to habeas relief. The court concluded that Petitioner has established Strickland prejudice. Thus, Petitioner “has met the burden of showing that the decision reached [at the penalty phase] would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” View "Marcus Bernard Williams v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

After perpetrating elaborate bank and credit card fraud, Petitioner “embarked upon a new scheme . . . to ensnarl the proceedings against him” through obstructionist and disruptive behaviors “so that he might avoid trial altogether.” His scheme, however, did not end at trial or even when the jury issued its guilty verdict. Rather, it continued through sentencing. Now, on a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, Petitioner advances two claims: a substantive competency due process claim, contending that he was not competent at the time of sentencing, and an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The district court denied his Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Petitioner’s substantive due process rights were not violated when the district court denied his motion for a competency hearing. Nor did Petitioner receive constitutionally deficient performance from court-appointed counsel when they failed to request his medical records or request a mental health evaluation. Even if such failures constituted deficient performance, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced as a result. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Perkins’s Section 2255 motion. View "Jean-Daniel Perkins v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wanted to enjoy that terrific feeling of carefreely careening down a waterslide with his son to celebrate his son’s seventh birthday. So he took his son to Universal’s Volcano Bay waterpark and got in line to ride its Krakatau Aqua Coaster— a waterslide version of a roller coaster. But as Plaintiff approached the front of the line, Universal pulled him aside and told him he was “unfit” to ride the Aqua Coaster. Plaintiff was born with only one hand. And Universal doesn’t allow people without two natural hands to ride. So Plaintiff sued Universal for imposing an allegedly discriminatory eligibility criterion in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). During the litigation, Universal stipulated that the Aqua Coaster’s manufacturer had identified “no specific risks” of riding to anyone like Plaintiff. Universal argued that complying with this morass of mandates was “necessary.” The district court agreed and also concluded that the ADA did not preempt Florida law. It therefore entered summary judgment for Universal.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that the ADA prohibits imposing a discriminatory eligibility criterion unless the criterion is “necessary.” Universal argues that “compliance with state law” necessitates Universal’s discriminatory eligibility requirement. But to the extent that state law conflicts with the ADA and requires disability discrimination, the court held that “compliance with state law,” in and of itself, cannot qualify as “necessary” under the ADA, or it would impermissibly preempt and effectively eviscerate the ADA. So “compliance with state law” does not relieve Universal of its obligation to follow the ADA View "Dylan Campbell v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm in violation of federal law, was sentenced to 60 months in prison based on a Guidelines range of 70–87 months. In calculating Defendant’s range, though, the district court concluded that an earlier Alabama youthful-offender adjudication constituted an “adult” conviction within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines provisions. Defendant contends that the court erred in doing so.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s Alabama YO adjudication wasn’t “adult” under either U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1 or Section 4A1.2. His Guidelines range of 70–87 months was thus wrong in two respects. The court explained that the Pinion factors favor Defendant, indicating that his YO adjudication wasn’t “adult.” The sentence-length and time-served factors, the court held, yield to the stronger indications of the classification and nature factors: Because of the defendant’s age, Alabama law doesn’t even treat YO adjudications as convictions, let alone adult convictions. And the law further shields YOs “from the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime.” Alabama’s YO system differs from the adult system from stem to stern, in both substance and procedure. View "USA v. Deunate Tarez Jews" on Justia Law

In 2008, Debtors Mosaic Management Group, Inc., Mosaic Alternative Assets, Ltd., and Paladin Settlements, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of Florida, a “UST district” in which the U.S. Trustee program operates. In June 2017, the bankruptcy court confirmed a joint Chapter 11 plan, under which most of the Debtors’ assets were transferred to an Investment Trust managed by an Investment Trustee. The issue before the court is the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation the Supreme Court found in Siegel. The Debtors in this case—being debtors in a U.S. Trustee district—have been required to pay higher fees than a comparable debtor in one of the six BA districts in Alabama or North Carolina.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court concluded that Reich, Newsweek, Bennett, McKesson, and the long line of similar state tax cases are closely analogous to the instant case and provide strong precedent supporting the refund remedy urged upon us by the Debtors. Accordingly, the court held that the appropriate remedy in this case for the constitutional violation identified in Siegel is the refunds that the Debtors in this case seek. View "United States Trustee Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP" on Justia Law