Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a Florida death-row prisoner who is scheduled to be executed on May 3, 2023, at 6:00 p.m. Barwick brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that the Governor of Florida and several other state officials violated his constitutional right to due process because they did not adequately consider his candidacy for executive clemency. He also moved for an emergency stay of execution. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. Plaintiff then moved in this Court for a stay of execution pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. The court explained that here Plaintiff argued that the State violated his due-process rights because it did not provide any standards that would govern the clemency decision. But under the Eleventh Circuit’s binding precedent, the court wrote it cannot agree that the Due Process Clause requires the State to provide any such standards. An initial problem with Plaintiff’s argument about the State’s lack of standards is that it runs counter to Supreme Court authority. Further, the court held that it cannot agree with Plaintiff’s argument that his clemency proceeding was arbitrary because the Commission allegedly “provided false guidance” when it said it was not concerned with his guilt but then “myopically focused on [his] crime.” Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s due-process claim does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. View "Darryl Barwick v. Governor of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), an Alabamian non-profit organization dedicated to aiding low-income individuals, and several Alabamian felons (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s summary judgment denying their Equal Protection Clause challenge to Amendment 579 of the Alabama state constitution, their Ex Post Facto Clause, challenge to Amendment 579’s disenfranchisement provisions, and their National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), challenge to the format of Alabama’s mail voting registration form.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) Amendment 579 successfully dissipated any taint from the racially discriminatory motives behind the 1901 Alabama constitution; (2) Amendment 579 does not impose punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (3) Alabama’s mail voting registration form complies with the NVRA. The court wrote that it rejects Appellants’ invitation to review the extent the Alabama legislature debated the “moral turpitude” language of Amendment 579. Further, the court explained that Section 20508(b)(2)(A) is a notice statute enacted for the convenience of voting registrants. Alabama’s mail-in voting form has provided sufficient notice by informing registrants that persons convicted of disqualifying felonies are not eligible to vote and providing an easily accessible link whereby voters convicted of felonies can determine their voter eligibility. Accordingly, Alabama has complied with the requirements of Section 20508(b)(2)(A). View "Treva Thompson, et al. v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his Section 2255 habeas petition to vacate his sentence of 211 months imprisonment on the ground that he was sentenced as an armed career criminal but does not qualify as one. He argued that his prior conviction in Florida for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon cannot serve as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because it can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness and that, without this predicate offense, he does not have three qualifying convictions, and he must be resentenced.   The Eleventh Circuit, after receiving Florida Supreme Court’s answer to the court’s certified questions, affirmed. The court wrote that it is persuaded that aggravated assault under Florida law requires a mens rea of at least knowing conduct and, accordingly, that it qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). Defendant, therefore, has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and he was properly sentenced by the district court as an armed career criminal. View "Fred Somers v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, one day before the expiration of the statutory limitations period, initiated suit pro se against federal prison officials on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Plaintiff, who had unsuccessfully attempted to retain counsel before filing suit, did not know that he could not represent his mother’s estate pro se and needed, instead, to secure legal representation. Several months later, but before responsive pleadings were filed by Defendants, he retained counsel who entered an appearance and filed an amended complaint on behalf of the estate reasserting the original cause of action, asserting additional causes of action, and adding the United States as a defendant. Plaintiff assumed that retaining counsel and filing an amended complaint corrected his original mistake. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that while Plaintiff was not legally authorized under 28 U.S.C. Section 1654 to represent the Estate pro se, the district court erred in dismissing the case without first providing Plaintiff an opportunity to rectify his mistake by obtaining counsel. Once properly represented, the Estate was entitled to file the amended complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1). Further, the FTCA claims asserted therein were timely, and the Bivens claims relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. Therefore, the Estate’s claims can proceed. View "Grant Sunny Iriele v. Richard Carroll Griffin, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime. In his motion, Defendant argued that 8 U.S.C. Section 1324(a) does not apply extraterritorially.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and held that Sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and (a)(2)(B)(ii) apply to his extraterritorial conduct. The court concluded that it may infer the extraterritorial application of the Section 1324(a)subsections under which Defendant was charged. First, the subsections—which prohibit encouraging, inducing, or bringing aliens into the United States—target conduct that can take place outside the United States. Second, the nature of the offenses is such that limiting them to the United States would greatly “curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.” The court explained that Bowman’s principles and the weight of authority from other sister circuits overwhelmingly support the court’s conclusion that extraterritoriality may be inferred from Congress’ intent to prevent illegal immigration and from the nature of the offenses—each of which contemplates conduct at, near, and beyond our borders. View "USA v. Stanley Wintfield Rolle" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns whether several organizations may sue the governor and attorney general of Florida in federal court to challenge a state law that requires local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials. The state law provides that local officials shall support the enforcement of federal immigration law and cooperate with federal immigration initiatives and officials and that local officials may transport aliens subject to an immigration detainer to federal custody. Several plaintiff organizations sued the Florida governor and the Florida attorney general to enjoin enforcement of the law. The organizations alleged that the provisions about support and cooperation were adopted with the intent to discriminate based on race and national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. And they maintained that the transport provision is preempted by federal law. After a bench trial, the district court permanently enjoined the governor and attorney general from enforcing compliance with these provisions.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that this controversy is not justiciable because the organizations lack standing. The organizations have not established a cognizable injury and cannot spend their way into standing without an impending threat that the provisions will cause actual harm. Moreover, the organizations’ alleged injury is neither traceable to the governor or attorney general nor redressable by a judgment against them because they do not enforce the challenged provisions. Instead, local officials, based on state law, must comply with federal immigration law. View "City of South Miami, et al v. Governor of the State of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

A Florida jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and sexual battery. He was sentenced to death for the murder, 15 years imprisonment for the burglary, and 27 years for the sexual battery. After exhausting state remedies, Defendant sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, alleging (as relevant here) various evidentiary errors at his trial. The district court denied Defendant’s habeas petition, and he appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly held that the state didn’t violate Brady, that Defendant’s trial counsel didn’t provide ineffective assistance at trial—for failing to move for hearings under either Frye or Richardson—and that Miranda doesn’t require suppressing Defendant’s statement to the officer. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim predicated on his trial counsel’s failure to move for a Frye hearing on the ground that any deficiency wasn’t prejudicial.   Further, the court reasoned that Defendant likely wouldn’t have won a Richardson motion because, as a matter of state law, the state’s discovery violation—if there was one—didn’t harm or prejudice him. As an initial matter, the alleged violation likely wasn’t willful. Moreover, the alleged violation wasn’t “substantial,” nor did it affect Defendant’s ability to prepare for trial. View "Steven Richard Taylor v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, a real-estate developer, was convicted on multiple counts arising out of his alleged complicity in the bribery of Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Maddox. On appeal, Defendant challenged his bribery-based convictions on several grounds, two of which required the Eleventh Circuit to carefully examine the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), which explained—and by all accounts narrowed to some degree—the category of “official acts” that can support a federal bribery charge. Defendant separately contests his conviction for making false statements to federal agents during the course of their investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held it needn’t decide whether the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the meaning and application of the term “official act,” as used in 18 U.S.C. Section 201(a)(3) and interpreted in McDonnell, because (1) Defendant invited one of the errors that he now alleges and (2) he failed to object to the other and hasn’t shown that it affected his substantial rights. Further, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant assisted in bribing Maddox in connection with a Section 201(a)(3)-qualifying “official act”. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence pertaining to an FBI agent’s conduct during the undercover investigation. And any error that the court might have committed in admitting the agent’s testimony that Defendant had made “false exculpatory statements” was harmless. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant made actionable false statements to FBI agents. View "USA v. John Thomas Burnette" on Justia Law

This case arises out of a sober home’s battle to rezone its property. When its efforts came up short, the sober home sued the county in federal court, alleging disability discrimination. As discovery got underway, the sober home served a notice of deposition in which it sought to depose one of the county commissioners who voted down its rezoning request. The county opposed the deposition, arguing that the commissioner was shielded from discovery by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. But the commissioner never objected to the deposition request or otherwise appeared before the district court. The district court found that the immunity didn’t apply. At that point, the county and the commissioner appealed. Their sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court first held that the county may not appeal because it lacks appellate standing under Article III. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the district court’s order. But it’s the commissioner—not the county—who has the (alleged) immunity. So the county has suffered no injury and cannot challenge the district court’s denial of the immunity on appeal. Second, the commissioner may not appeal because he was not a named party to this case and did not become a party through intervention, substitution, or third-party practice. While a nonparty may sometimes appeal when he has participated before the district court, the commissioner didn’t participate at all. View "Kimberly Regenesis, LLC, et al v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in his individual capacity and official capacity as sheriff, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and falsely arrested him. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, finding the Complaint still fails to state a claim under the Twobly and Iqbal standard and does not cure the deficiencies that made the first amended complaint a shotgun pleading. Plaintiff appealed this order.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff carries the burden of pointing to what intentionally or recklessly false information went into the warrant affidavit. Otherwise, the presumption that the warrant was validly issued, and thus that probable cause existed, must stand. Here, the court explained that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest, and Plaintiff failed to satisfy either of the two exceptions to carry that burden or a plausible connection between his election announcement and teleserve reassignment. View "Bryan Turner v. Mike Williams, et al." on Justia Law