Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Acting as the decedent’s estate’s administrator and on behalf of his two sons, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant-Officer. Plaintiff principally sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant had used constitutionally excessive force—and had thereby “unreasonably . . . seized” Plaintiff’s son in violation of the Fourth Amendment—when she fired the 58th and fatal bullet. She also appended two Georgia law claims: one for assault and battery and another for wrongful death. Defendant moved for summary judgment. She argued that qualified immunity shielded her from suit on the Section 1983 claim and that official immunity protected her from the state-law claims. The district court granted Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that in firing the shot that tragically killed Plaintiff’s son, Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The court reasoned that Defendant was facing down a man who had been threatening to kill her for several minutes straight. He had held a gun to her head, separately pointed his gun at her and her partners, spurned repeated orders to drop his weapons and surrender, barricaded himself in his car, and, finally, opened fire. This man knew how to conceal guns; he was suicidal, dogged, and erratic, and he had shown no signs of backing down. The court wrote it has little trouble concluding that, in those circumstances, Defendant could reasonably have believed that he posed a lethal threat. Her decision to neutralize that threat was “reasonable” and therefore constitutional. View "Iwoinakee Gebray Harris-Billups v. Milele Anderson" on Justia Law

After a 19-year-old shot and killed seventeen people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which bans the sale of firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds. In doing so, the Legislature sought “to comprehensively address the crisis of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” Shortly after the law passed, the NRA challenged it, alleging that the law violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in Florida’s favor. The NRA then filed an appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in Florida’s favor. The court explained that Florida enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act—as its name indicates—for precisely the same reason as states in the Reconstruction Era adopted their firearm restrictions for 18-to-20-year-olds—to address the public-safety crisis some 18-to-20-year-olds with firearms represent. Because Florida’s Act is at least as modest as the firearm prohibitions on 18- to-20-year-olds in the Reconstruction Era and enacted for the same reason as those laws, it is “relevantly similar” to those Reconstruction Era laws. And as a result, it does not violate the Second Amendment. View "National Rifle Association, et al. v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement" on Justia Law

Defendant found in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating Section 922(g)(9) based on a previous misdemeanor conviction for battery under the Georgia Family Violence Act. The district court granted his pretrial motion to exclude evidence of that previous conviction after determining that his waiver of a jury trial in the earlier state proceeding resulting in the conviction had not been knowing and intelligent. Because that pretrial ruling left the government without any evidence to prove the prior qualifying conviction element of the charged Section 922(g)(9) offense, the government filed this appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s statement that there was “no evidence” that Defendant understood he had the right to a jury trial or that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. There is at least some evidence going both ways, and, if anything, the evidence showing a knowing and intelligent wavier is stronger than that indicating the absence of one. When the evidence is unclear or evenly balanced, or the inferences that can be drawn from it are ambiguous, the party with the burden of persuasion loses. View "USA v. Idris Shamsid-Deen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the Chief of Police for the Sneads Police Department from March 2006 until October 2018. On October 9, 2018, the five-member Town Council terminated Plaintiff’s employment by a 4-to-1 vote. The Town Council did so under the charge that Plaintiff was disrespectful at best and insubordinate at worst. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims his firing was in retaliation for things he said, disclosed, and reported, all regarding various matters related to the newer Councilmembers with whom he had a contentious relationship.   Plaintiff filed an eight-count action against the Town of Sneads, the Town Manager, Town Councilmembers, Town Council President, and Town Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). He brought unlawful-retaliation claims against the Town of Sneads under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (“FWA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the First Amendment. And he brought identical retaliation claims under the First Amendment against each of the five individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not established that he satisfied all three of these requirements for each instance of his speech that he claims were protected under the FWA. Further, the court wrote that because the record evidence shows that the Town of Sneads terminated Plaintiff for insubordination, not his invocation of the FMLA, the court concluded that the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was also proper. View "John "Burt" McAlpin v. Town of Sneads Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Based in Auburn, Alabama, Plaintiff and her pharmacy were one of the thousands of businesses that answered the call to provide Covid-19 tests to the public. However, the Alabama Board of Pharmacy (the Board) concluded that Plaintiff’s administration of these tests fell short of the medical safety standards required under Alabama law. When the Board instituted an administrative enforcement proceeding against Plaintiff, she sought to avail herself of the legal immunity provided by the Secretary’s PREP Act Declaration. Plaintiff filed a federal suit, seeking to enjoin the Board from even considering the charges against her. The district court exercised its discretion to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and declined to intervene in the Board’s proceedings.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to abstain under Younger. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not established that she lacks an adequate opportunity to present her federal claims to the Alabama Board of Pharmacy or an adequate opportunity to obtain judicial review of her claims in Alabama’s courts, and so Younger abstention is warranted. The court wrote that it did not decide today whether Plaintiff is immune from the Board’s charges or if they are, in fact, preempted by the PREP Act. All the court concluded is that this is not one of the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify federal intervention in a state proceeding that is adequate to hear Plaintiff’s claims. View "Lisa Hill Leonard, et al. v. The Alabama State Board of Pharmacy, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing three firearms. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Defendant appealed his conviction. He raised one issue. It involves the expert opinion testimony the Government presented in its case in chief over his objection to disprove his allegation that he was insane when he committed the Section 922(g)(1) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection and admitting the testimony. However, the court determined that under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the error is harmless because it did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The court explained that to establish a legally sufficient Section 17 insanity defense, Defendant had to prove that on November 8, 2018, he had a severe mental disease or defect capable of causing him to possess the firearms even though he knew that he could not do so. His right to present the defense constituted his “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). He introduced nothing to prove his defense other than his girlfriend’s testimony and his behavior. And the treating psychologist did not diagnose him with a qualifying “severe mental disease or defect” under Section 17(a). So, the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s opinions about his mental state did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Jessie James Turner, Jr." on Justia Law

The assignees of two Medicare Advantage Organizations seek reimbursements from insurance companies that they allege qualify as primary payers of beneficiaries’ medical expenses. The insurance companies argued, and the district courts agreed, that the assignees’ claims are barred because both assignees failed to satisfy a procedural requirement: a contractual claims-filing deadline in one case and a statutory requirement of a pre-suit demand in the other. The assignees contend that the procedural requirements are preempted by the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Florida’s pre-suit demand requirement does not meet this relatively high bar. The statutory notice requirement and corresponding 30-day cure period are procedural requirements that may result in a brief delay. But the Florida law does not prevent or meaningfully impede the reimbursement of Medicare Advantage Organizations that Congress sought to facilitate. So, the provision does not create an unconstitutional obstacle to the purposes or operation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. United Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for 27 counts of aiding and abetting the acquisition of controlled substances by deception and 102 counts of unlawfully dispensing controlled substances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions were improper and his statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argued that the district court erred because its jury instruction used “or,” instead of “and,” in setting forth the elements of Section 841(a) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found that Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians. The court reasoned that in Ruan, the defendant physicians were convicted of violating Section 841(a)(1) by “dispensing controlled substances not ‘as authorized.’” Here similarly, the jury was instructed that “whether Defendant dispensed the controlled substances ‘outside the usual course of professional practice’ is to be judged objectively.” Because this instruction allowed the jury to convict Defendant without considering whether he knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice, it was erroneous under Ruan. However, the court concluded that it is satisfied that (1) this evidence extensively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew his prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice, and (2) a jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that Section 841 is unconstitutionally vague because the CSA does not define the phrases “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” These phrases do not require statutory or regulatory definitions. View "USA v. Dr. James Heaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), claiming that Defendant violated TILA because it did not provide him those disclosures. The question in this case was whether Plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue his claim, which turns on whether Plaintiff's injuries are traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose.The Eleventh Circuit found that Plaintiff's injuries were traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose and thus reversed the district court's finding to the contrary. The court, however, expressed no opinion about the merits of Plaitniff's claim. View "Gary Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, et al" on Justia Law