Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following proceedings in district court, the trial court t entered a final judgment, finding Defendant liable, ordering him to disgorge over $4,000,000 in funds, and placing two of his entities under receivership in order to sell and reorganize assets to repay investors. Later, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami returned a superseding indictment that described consistent with the district court’s findings of fact.   After an extradition request was filed by the United States, the Supreme Court of Brazil allowed him to be extradited. He returned to the United States, and on the eve of trial, following over a year of pretrial proceedings, Defendant entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of mail fraud. The district court later sentenced Defendant to 220 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $169,177,338 in restitution.   On appeal, Defendant broadly argues: (1) that the custodial sentence imposed and the order of restitution violate the extradition treaty; and (2) that his guilty plea was not made freely and voluntarily. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court fully satisfied the core concerns of Rule 11, and the court could discern no reason to conclude that the district court plainly erred in finding that Defendant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court explained that in this case, the record fully reflects that Defendant agreed to be sentenced subject to a 20-year maximum term, and his 220-month sentence is near the low end of his agreed-upon 210-to-240-month range. View "USA v. John J. Utsick" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian native, was arrested in Colombia on drug trafficking charges and ultimately convicted in federal court. Petitioner now appeals the denial of both his amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his convictions and sentence and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. He claims that one of his pre-extradition attorneys was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. According to Petitioner, his attorney tried to convince him to pay a thirty-million-dollar bribe or kickback as part of a plea agreement, which would redound to the benefit of one of Petitioner’s other clients. But Petitioner was represented by other attorneys, and he does not allege that they were conflicted or otherwise deficient in pursuing legitimate plea agreements on Petitioner’s behalf. The district court held that the allegations in Petitioner’s motion would not establish a Sixth Amendment violation even if true.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming a conflict of interest existed, Petitioner’s claim ultimately fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the “conflict adversely affected his representation.” Although Petitioner criticizes his attorney, he does not allege that his other attorneys suffered under a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of “an attorney.” The Sixth Amendment does not include the right to receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant consults about his case. Further, the court wrote, that because it concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, it cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Fabio Ochoa v. USA" on Justia Law

The former Speaker of the House of the Alabama Legislature was the target of a grand jury investigation in Lee County, Alabama. He was accused of misusing his office for personal gain, including by funneling money into his printing business. Plaintiff was a state representative at the time of the investigation into Speaker Hubbard. Plaintiff believed that he had evidence undermining the accusations against the speaker and contacted the defense team to help them.   Plaintiff sued the Attorney General of Alabama in federal court. His complaint brought First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The relevant issues on appeal are: Does Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury, and if so, does the secrecy law violate the First Amendment? And does the Alabama grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness disclosing grand jury information he learned “only by virtue of being made a witness” violate his First Amendment free speech rights?   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed, in part, and remanded. The court concluded that Alabama’s grand jury secrecy law, unlike the Florida law in Butterworth, cannot reasonably be read to prohibit a grand jury witness from divulging information he learned before he testified to the grand jury. The court also concluded that the grand jury secrecy law’s prohibition on a witness’s disclosure of grand jury information that he learned only by virtue of being made a witness does not violate the Free Speech Clause. View "William E. Henry v. Attorney General, State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Petitioner participated in several shootings as a member of MS-13, a violent gang. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He was also convicted of four counts under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a). Because he used a gun in committing those offenses, he was also convicted of four corresponding counts of using a firearm in relation to each “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). For these nine convictions, he is serving three concurrent life sentences plus eighty-five years. His eighty-five-year sentence is based exclusively on the four firearms convictions.   Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his firearms convictions and his eighty-five-year sentence. The district court denied the motion. At issue on appeal is whether his four firearms convictions are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Petitioner’s VICAR convictions (Counts Two, Four, Eight, and Ten), predicated on his commission of murder and attempted murder, qualify as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. That means that his corresponding firearms convictions (Counts Three, Five, Nine, and Eleven) are still valid after Davis’s holding that the residual clause is unconstitutional. And that means that, after Petitioner completes his three concurrent life sentences, he will still have a consecutive eighty-five-year sentence left to serve. View "Miguel Alvarado-Linares v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was taken hostage by a fleeing felon in rural Georgia. At the felon’s behest Plaintiff drove the truck toward seven officers gathered at the scene and showed no signs of stopping. As the logging truck struck the police vehicles lining the dirt road, several of the officers opened fire on the cab of the truck, even though they allegedly knew Plaintiff -- an innocent hostage -- was being forced to drive.   Plaintiff survived but was shot in his hand, his fingers, his hip, and his shoulder. He sued both Georgia State Patrol Lieutenants in their individual capacities (collectively, “Defendants”) for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment because their actions were reasonable and, even if they were not, they did not violate any clearly established law.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the fleeing felon put Plaintiff, Defendants, and the public in grave and imminent danger. Police officers like Defendants may use deadly force to dispel a threat (and, here, an imminent one) of serious physical harm or death or to prevent the escape of a very dangerous suspect who threatens that harm. Defendants made the difficult, but altogether reasonable, a decision that the fleeing felon and the logging truck had to be stopped -- and, tragically, that meant stopping Plaintiff, too. View "Paul Donald Davis, et al. v. Paul Waller, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida LLC, sued a Canadian company, Teck Resources Limited, alleging that it had illegally trafficked in property to which Plaintiff says it has a claim. The district court granted Teck’s motion, holding that Florida’s long-arm statute didn’t provide jurisdiction over Teck and, additionally, that Teck lacked the necessary connection to the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed holding that courts should analyze personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment using the same basic standards and tests that apply under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court wrote that applying the minimum-contacts test here is relatively straightforward. The court held that Teck doesn’t have contacts with the United States sufficient to establish either specific or general personal jurisdiction over it. Plaintiff’s suit doesn’t arise out of or relate to any of Teck’s ties with the United States. And because a relationship between the defendant’s conduct within the forum and the cause of action is necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction, the lack of any such relationship here dooms Plaintiff’s effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Teck. View "Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC v. Teck Resources Limited" on Justia Law

S.S. was a student in the Cobb County School District. S.S.’s parents challenged the adequacy of the individualized educational plans. S.S.’s parents fought the school district for two years and eventually filed an administrative complaint requesting a due process hearing under the Act with the Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings. In the administrative complaint, S.S. alleged that the school district failed to provide her with a free and appropriate public education under the Act. The school district moved for summary determination of the administrative complaint. S.S. challenged the administrative law judge’s decision in the Northern District of Georgia.The district court denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment and remanded to the administrative law judge for a due process hearing. The school district appealed the district court’s remand order.   The DC Circuit concluded that remand orders from district courts to administrative agencies for further proceedings under the Act are not final and appealable under section 1291. And because the district court’s remand order was not final and appealable, the court wrote it lacks appellate jurisdiction to review it. Accordingly, the court dismissed the school district’s appeal. View "S.S. v. Cobb County School District" on Justia Law

After a thirteen-year-old victim of human trafficking performed at a City of Miami Beach (“the City”) fully nude strip club, Club Madonna, Inc. (“the Club”), the City came down hard on the Club. It enacted two closely intertwined ordinances (collectively, “the Ordinance”) that required all nude strip clubs to follow a record-keeping and identification-checking regime in order to ensure that each individual performer is at least eighteen years old.   The district court ruled for the City at summary judgment on the Club’s first two claims, ruled for the Club on its federal preemption claim at summary judgment, and ruled for the City on the Club’s state law preemption claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage for failure to state a claim. The Club then appealed the court’s rulings and the City cross-appealed the district court’s ruling on the Club’s federal preemption claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all counts. First, although the Ordinance implicates the First Amendment because it singles out an industry that engages in expressive activity for special regulation, it satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Second, the Ordinance’s warrantless-search provision does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the adult entertainment industry is a closely regulated industry for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the warrantless-search provision satisfies the administrative-search exception because it can be narrowly read to avoid Fourth Amendment concerns. Third, the Ordinance’s employment-verification requirement is preempted by federal immigration law. And finally, the Club’s state law conflict preemption claim fails because there is no Florida law that cabins the City’s ability to levy fines against the Club for violating the Ordinance’s requirements. View "Club Madonna Inc. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

In this action brought by a group of pre-trial detainees challenging the constitutionality of the Cullman County bail system, the court reversed the district court's finding that the system discriminated against indigent defendants and deprived pretrial detainees of procedural due process. View "Bradley Hester v. Matthew Gentry, et al." on Justia Law

While Plaintiff was intoxicated and handcuffed, former deputy sheriff (“Deputy”) pushed Plaintiff onto a concrete floor, breaking Plaintiff’s left arm. In response to a complaint from Plaintiff’s husband, the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”) investigated the incident and terminated the Deputy’s employment. A few months later, Plaintiff sued PCSO Sheriff (“Sheriff”), among others, in the Middle District of Florida, alleging several state and federal constitutional claims.  The district court denied the Sheriff summary judgment on this claim.   The parties now agree that the Deputy behaved inappropriately, but disagree over whether the Deputy’s behavior was so egregious that the Sheriff could not be held liable for it. Put differently, this interlocutory appeal centers entirely on whether the Sheriff is, as a matter of law, entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s state law battery claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Florida’s sovereign immunity statute protects the Sheriff. The court explained that serious factual disputes have often prevented Florida’s courts from applying sovereign immunity at the summary judgment stage.  Measuring the facts as they have been adduced in this case against Florida’s legal standards, the court agreed there are material factual disputes about the precise actions Plaintiff and the Deputy took, the Deputy’s state of mind, and the inferences that might reasonably be drawn from them. Moreover, reasonable factfinders could disagree over whether the Deputy’s conduct was wanton and willful, malicious, or exhibitive of bad faith. View "Marie Butler v. Bob Gualtieri" on Justia Law