Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit held that sexual harassment—both hostile housing environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment—is actionable under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, provided the plaintiff demonstrates that she would not have been harassed but for her sex.In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the property manager and the property's owner, alleging sexual harassment claims under the Act and state law. The district court found no guidance from the court on this question and therefore dismissed the complaint based on the ground that plaintiff's claims were not actionable under the Act. The court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint and remanded for reconsideration. View "Fox v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Spencer sued Sheriff Benison under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Benison violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by ordering him to remove cones and vehicles that were preventing Spencer’s neighbor from completing construction that Spencer claimed encroached on his property. The district court found that Benison acted outside the scope of his discretionary authority and was not entitled to qualified immunity on Spencer’s individual capacity claims and that Spencer had presented adequate evidence of a constitutional violation to sustain his section 1983 claims against Benison in both his individual and official capacities.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. Benison was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he ordered Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles. It was a legitimate job-related function for Benison, an Alabama sheriff, to seek the removal of cones and vehicles for the purposes of achieving public safety, given that traffic was backing up and customers were unable to access a business. Benison properly carried out his duties by verbally commanding Spencer to remove the cones and vehicles and by threatening arrest should he fail to comply. Spencer failed to present adequate evidence of a constitutional violation; he did not demonstrate that Benison’s actions caused him to be deprived of a constitutionally-protected property interest. View "Spencer v. Benison" on Justia Law

The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (CARES Act), among other things, imposed a 120-day moratorium on evictions for rental properties receiving federal assistance. The CDC then issued a temporary eviction moratorium on September 4, 2020, that suspended the execution of eviction orders for nonpayment of rent. Before the CDC's order was originally set to expire on December 31, 2020, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which extended the CDC's order through January 31, 2021. The CDC's order was then extended again through March 31, 2021, and again through June 30, 2021, and again through July 31, 2021.Plaintiffs, several landlords seeking to evict their tenants for nonpayment of rent and a trade association for owners and managers of rental housing, filed suit alleging that the CDC's orders exceeds its statutory and regulatory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates their constitutional right to access the courts.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to show an irreparable injury. The court declined to find that the CDC's order is unconstitutional, and failed to see how the temporary inability to reclaim rental properties constitutes an irreparable harm. Furthermore, the court explained that, without any information about a tenant’s financial or employment picture, the court has no way to evaluate whether she will ever be able to repay her landlord; to decide otherwise based solely on the CDC declaration would be to conclude that no one who signed the declaration is likely to repay their debts after the moratorium expires. Given the lack of evidence and the availability of substantial collection tools, the court could not conclude that the landlords have met their burden of showing that an irreparable injury is likely. View "Brown v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

After the district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring Fulton County Jail officials to provide regular out-of-cell time to female inmates with psychiatric disabilities and to improve the sanitary conditions in their cells, the officials appealed. The officials argue that the district court abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction because neither the traditional requirements for a preliminary injunction nor the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) additional need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements were satisfied. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law under the terms of the PLRA and thus dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the preliminary injunction order. View "Georgia Advocacy Office v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its previous opinion and substituted it with this opinion. This revised opinion does not reach the Title IX question and reaches only one ground under the Equal Protection Clause instead of the three Equal Protection rulings the court made in the August 7 opinion.Plaintiff, a recent high school graduate and a transgender young man, filed suit against the school board through his next friend and mother, alleging violations of his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.The court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff on the equal protection claim under the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard, concluding that the school district's policy barring plaintiff from the boys' restroom violates the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection, because the school district assigns students to sex-specific bathrooms in an arbitrary manner. In this case, the school board has not met its "demanding" constitutional burden by showing a substantial relationship between its policy for excluding transgender students from certain restrooms and student privacy. The court affirmed the district court's award of damages because plaintiff undoubtedly suffered harm as a result of this violation. Because plaintiff prevails on his equal protection claim, which fully entitles him to the relief granted by the district court, the court declined to reach his Title IX claim. View "Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the hotel alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting. Plaintiff claimed that one of the hotel's employees falsely accused him of engaging in inappropriate behavior at the pool, that the employee did so because she harbored animus against Arabs, and that employee's accusation led to his eviction.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that, at this preliminary stage, plaintiff's allegations plausibly allege a circumstantial case of racial discrimination. The court explained that plaintiff adequately alleged that he was treated differently from comparators who were similarly situated to him in all material respects. In this case, he and his fiancée were hotel guests, sat by the pool, and behaved entirely appropriately; other, non-Arab hotel guests sat by the pool and acted similarly; and the towel attendant singled out him and his fiancée, fabricated a story about them, and caused them to be evicted. Furthermore, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the towel attendant intended to cause him a contractual injury based on the attendant's racial animus. The court noted that a cat's-paw theory of liability under section 1981 is not inconsistent with the stricter causal standard. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hospitality Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a yacht club member, filed suit against the club for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Florida Civil Rights Act after the club refused plaintiff's request to bring her service dog into the clubhouse and expelled her from its membership.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the club on plaintiff's ADA claims because the record does not establish that the club is a "private club" exempt from the ADA or the Florida Civil Rights Act. The court explained that the record contains substantial evidence that the club fails to ensure the seclusion of its members on much of its property and often fails to do so even in its clubhouse. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim because plaintiff failed to rebut the club's nondiscriminatory justifications for expelling her. In this case, plaintiff failed to rebut the club's liveaboard justification for her suspension and expulsion. View "Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc." on Justia Law

Khoury lives near the school’s baseball field and complained about parking, noise, lights, and the influx of people. Khoury took photos of cars that she believed were illegally parked. Khoury and a parent had a verbal confrontation. Williams, a Miami-Dade Public School police officer, told Khoury the cars were not illegally parked and told the parents there was nothing he could do about Khoury filming. Other residents told Williams that Khoury took photos of their children and that they were “afraid of her.” Khoury claims Williams “charged” her because she was recording him and twisted her arm behind her back. Williams and the parent claim that Khoury “pushed” Williams, then threw herself on the ground,” yelling “false arrest.” After handcuffing Khoury, Williams detained her under the Baker Act for mental health observation and took her to a hospital for treatment of her dislocated elbow. She was transferred to Miami Behavioral Health Center, which found no evidence of "psychosis.” Khoury was released two days later and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the School Board had an unwritten policy of improperly detaining people under the Baker Act to reduce crime statistics.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, noting the lack of evidence establishing a pervasive practice. The court reversed as to Williams, noting the many disputed facts. Williams concluded Khoury was “not mentally well” simply because she didn’t believe that the cars were parked legally; Khoury was not violating the law or harming anyone by filming, and other eyewitnesses testified that Khoury was not a threat—her response was simply irrational. That alone does not form a basis under which a reasonable officer would conclude that Khoury was a danger to herself or others View "Khoury v. Miami-Dade County School Board" on Justia Law

An abortion facility (RHS) and its owner filed suit against the Attorney General of Alabama and the District Attorney of Montgomery County, challenging some of the amendments to Alabama's Parental Consent Act, Ala. Code 26-21-4, which regulates an unemancipated minor's ability to obtain an abortion. Ruling on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the district court held that some of the challenged provisions were unconstitutional, severed those provisions from the rest of the Act, and entered a declaratory judgment that rendered the severed provisions unenforceable.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly held that RHS had Article III standing to challenge Alabama's Parental Consent Act. In this case, plaintiffs have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement and they have demonstrated causation and redressability. The court also concluded that the district court correctly held that the Attorney General and the District Attorney are proper defendants under Ex parte Young. The court explained that the criminal-enforcement link here establishes the necessary connection between defendants and the challenged provisions. The court stated that Ex parte Young provides an avenue for a civil lawsuit so plaintiffs do not need to subject themselves to criminal prosecution to challenge unconstitutional laws. That civil avenue is particularly important here, where the law involves the inherently serious time-sensitive issue of minors' access to abortion and violating the law could cause medical professionals to lose their licenses.On the merits, the court agreed with the district court that several provisions of the Act create an undue burden under Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016), and Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). The court agreed with the district court that the Act constitutes an undue burden because it places a substantial obstacle on a "large fraction" of unemancipated minors who seek to obtain a court order authorizing an abortion without the consent of their parent or guardian. The court considered the benefits and burdens of the challenged regulation, concluding that although the state has an interest in providing guidance and assistance to minors who seek an abortion without parental consent, the challenged provisions provide, if anything, marginal benefit. Instead, the provisions created substantial obstacles and were therefore impermissible means of serving legitimate ends. The court was confident that the Act as amended creates an undue burden under Whole Woman's Health by placing a substantial obstacle each year for a handful of unemancipated minors who would seek to obtain a judicial bypass from the parental/guardian consent requirements of the Act. For these minors, the Act would either (a) unduly interfere with the minors' ability to demonstrate maturity or best interest by adding additional (and possibly adversarial parties) in the bypass proceeding, or (b) deter them from trying to obtain a court order through a judicial bypass proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reproductive Health Services v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her former employer violated the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) by discriminating against her because of her association with her son, who suffers from severe asthma. The district court dismissed plaintiff's associational discrimination claim and granted summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff's remaining claims under the FCRA and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eleventh Circuit held, in light of the statute's plain language, that the FCRA does not support an associational-discrimination claim and no Florida court has concluded otherwise. The court also held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on plaintiff's claim for FCRA retaliation where she failed to show that any of the relevant decisionmakers knew of her protected activity or that other employees engineered her termination by manipulating the relevant decisionmakers; FMLA retaliation where plaintiff failed to show that the employer's reasons for taking adverse action were pretextual; and FMLA interference where she did not establish that she was entitled to FMLA leave. View "Matamoros v. Broward Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law