Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus based on lack of jurisdiction as an unauthorized second or successive petition. In this case, the state trial court granted in part petitioner's motion to correct sentence, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a), and issued an amended sentence nunc pro tunc, which removed a 10-year mandatory minimum term on one of his counts of conviction.The court held that the district court properly determined that petitioner's latest section 2254 petition was an unauthorized second or successive petition over which it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that, because the amended sentence was entered nunc pro tunc under Florida law, it related back to the date of the original judgment and it was not a "new judgment" for purposes of section 2244(b). View "Osbourne v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner, who pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual battery on a child between the ages of 12 and 18 years old by someone in familial or custodial authority, one count of possession of child pornography with intent to promote, four counts of possession of child pornography, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The court held that the district court did not violate Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address all claims fully, and petitioner never presented an independent coercion claim; the district court did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of a prosecutorial vindictiveness defense; and the district court did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of a double jeopardy defense to the charges of possession of child pornography and possession of child pornography with intent to promote. The court explained that the vindictive prosecution claim and double jeopardy defense would not have succeeded and petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the claims. View "Barritt v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 652–53 (11th Cir. 2020), is not controlling in this case and vacated the district court's dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. In Paez, the court held that the district court acted within its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed a habeas petition as untimely.In this case, the district court, unlike in Paez, dismissed the petition based on a date that was neither in the record, nor provided by petitioner, nor expressly judicially noticed—a date that, even if properly judicially noticed, was the wrong one for purposes of calculating the timeliness of the petition. Therefore, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing the habeas petition as untimely. The court remanded for the district court to determine the correct remittitur date and proceed accordingly. View "Bryant v. Ford" on Justia Law

The Independent Party of Florida and the Party for Socialism and Liberation seek to place their presidential candidates on the ballot in Florida without satisfying the requirements of Fla. Stat. 103.021(4)(a)–(b). Under the law, minor parties may access the presidential ballot either by satisfying a one-percent signature requirement or by affiliating with a qualified national party.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the minor parties' motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of these requirements. The court first held that the Party for Socialism and Liberation has Article III standing. In this case, the party will be injured if its candidate is denied access to the ballot; the future injury is impending; the injury is fairly traceable; and the injury could be redressed by an injunction forbidding the Secretary to deny the party access to the ballot based on the challenged provisions.The court applied the Anderson-Burdick test to resolve equal-protection challenges to a ballot-access requirement and held that Florida's goal of accounting for the national interest in presidential elections justifies its decision to provide different paths to the ballot for minor parties that affiliate with a qualified national party and those that do not. Therefore, the minor parties are unlikely to succeed on their claims that the ballot-access requirements unconstitutionally burden their First Amendment rights and deny them equal protection of the laws. View "Independent Party of Florida v. Secretary, State of Florida" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of capital murder for killing a DEA special agent. The court agreed with the district court that the 31 claims in the petition are time-barred and that the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling cannot excuse the simple negligence of an attorney. In this case, petitioner alleged that his state petition was not properly filed because his attorneys neither paid the filing fee nor filed a motion to proceed without paying the fee until more than one year after his conviction had become final. Petitioner further alleged that counsel received misinformation from the state court clerk's office and thus the federal limitations period should be equitably tolled.The court also held that, although petitioner's Atkins claim was timely, it failed on the merits because the state court's determination that petitioner failed to demonstrate either significant subaverage intellectual functioning or significant deficits in adaptive functioning was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. View "Clemons v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The court first held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Kia's stated reason for firing her -- solicitation of another employee to sue the company -- was a pretext to mask a retaliatory motive, and thus she has necessarily failed to show that a reasonable jury could find that but for the filing of her EEOC charge she would not have been fired.The court also held that an employee's oppositional conduct under Title VII is not protected if the means by which the employee has chosen to express her opposition so interferes with the performance of her job that it renders her ineffective in the position for which she is employed. In this case, Kia held a good faith belief that plaintiff had abandoned her responsibility to try to resolve an employee's dispute without litigation when she instead actively solicited a complaining employee to sue the company and provided the employee with the name of an attorney to use; Kia determined it could no longer keep her as its Manager of Team Relations, the department to which unhappy employees were sent to air their complaints; and Kia fired plaintiff because she chose to act in a way that conflicted with the core objectives of her sensitive and highly important position. View "Gogel v. KIA Motors Manufacturing of Georgia, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim. In this case, plaintiff, a prisoner, told defendant, a prison official, that another prisoner threatened to kill him.The court held that the reasonableness of a prison official's response to a substantial risk of serious harm depends on the facts the official knew when she learned about the threat. The court explained that sometimes, the facts are so serious and clear that anything less than immediate protective custody for the threatened prisoner would be unreasonable. More often, as here, the court explained that the prison official responds reasonably by taking the time to investigate the threat and look into different options all while making sure the prisoners are being supervised.The court agreed with the district court that, viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant reasonably responded to the other prisoner's threat (even if the harm was ultimately not averted). In this case, defendant was available to talk to plaintiff about the threat and told him she had his back, would investigate the threat, and look into moving the other prisoner. Furthermore, her response was reasonable in light of what she knew about plaintiff and the other inmate, the history of their dispute, and the fact that both plaintiff and the other prisoner were in the "good behavior dorm." View "Mosley v. Zachery" on Justia Law

In 2015, plaintiffs filed suit challenging Alabama's 2011 Photo Voter Identification Law passed by the Alabama legislature as House Bill 19 and codified at Ala. Code 17-9-30. The voter ID law took effect in June 2014 and requires all Alabama voters to present a photo ID when casting in-person or absentee votes. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the law has a racially discriminatory purpose and effect that violates the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act (VRA).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, holding that plaintiffs failed to identify any genuine disputes of material facts and no reasonable factfinder could find, based on the evidence presented, that Alabama's voter ID law is discriminatory. The court held that the burden of providing a photo ID pursuant to Ala. Code 17-9-30 in order to vote is a minimal burden on Alabama's voters—especially when Alabama accepts so many different forms of photo ID and makes acquiring one simple and free for voters who lack a valid ID but wish to obtain one. Therefore, the Alabama voter ID law does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution, nor does it violate the Voting Rights Act. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a city ordinance and resolution subjecting alarm companies to a series of fines when a false alarm is sounded at one of the properties which they service. The district court dismissed the substantive and procedural due process claims.The court held that the ordinance and resolution at issue easily survive rational basis scrutiny where imposing a fine on the alarm companies is rationally related to the City's strong interests in reducing the number of false alarms that heavily burden its police and fire departments and waste public resources. The court also held that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their procedural due process claim as nonjusticiable where there is no cognizable injury for standing purposes when a party fails to attempt an appeal and instead merely points to some procedural elements within a regulation, without alleging how those features injured them or even might potentially cause them some concrete harm. View "The Georgia Electronic Life Safety & System Assoc. v. The City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 as untimely. The court held that its decisions in Hall v. Secy, Dep't of Corr., 921 F.3d 983, 988–90 (11th Cir. 2019); Green v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 877 F.3d 1244, 1247–49 (11th Cir. 2017), issued after the district court dismissed the petition, foreclosed the government's arguments.Hall and Green held that the one-year limitations period tolled the day a petitioner filed a procedurally noncompliant Rule 3.850 motion if he was permitted to and did later file a compliant motion. Therefore, a compliant Rule 3.850 motion relates back to the date of filing of a noncompliant motion, such that the compliant motion was "properly filed" and "pending" as of that date for purposes of tolling the limitations period in section 2244 of Title 28. In this case, because the limitations period tolled on the date of petitioner's initial motion, the court held that he timely filed his petition in federal court. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bates v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law